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This thesis examines the development of RAF high command of the 
Metropolitan Air Force (MAF) during the Second World War. It sheds new light on 
the re-organisations of the Air Ministry in 1934, the RAF Command structure in 
1936, and the tri-service debate in 1937 concerning the RAF proposal to establish a 
Supreme Air Commander (SAC). It reveals that while frontline expansion created an 
impetus for re-organisation, it was operational readiness that was the dominant factor 
in the re-structuring of the RAF. It examines the transition in RAF frontline 
organization from the mono-functional command system of 1936 to the multi-
functional organisation that emerged after 1943 by looking at command structure and 
practice, personalities, and operational thinking. This study builds on the established 
historiography but challenges the accepted explanation of RAF reforms in the 1930s. 
It addresses a significant gap in the literature concerning the way the frontline was 
directed by the War Cabinet and the Air Ministry. In doing so it seeks to establish a 
new starting point for the analysis of RAF high command by providing an assessment 
of the effectiveness of the reforms of the 1930s to the higher command of MAF 
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Just over 100 years ago, on 1 July 1916, the British launched their offensive 
on the Somme in part to assist their French Allies who were under great pressure at 
Verdun. The British Army of 1916 consisted of many recently raised battalions who 
were extremely enthusiastic to play their part but limited in their tactical ability. 
Sheffield has stated that one ‘factor thus united Haig and his Army commanders: that 
they had no previous experience of command at the level that they were called upon 
to perform on the Somme’.
1
 Similarly, in 1943 the Western allies committed to a 
strategic bombing offensive, in part, to assist the Soviet Union by opening a second 
‘aerial front’ to relieve pressure in the east. In a further parallel the forces tasked with 
the offensive, RAF Bomber Command and the USAAF Eighth Air Force were 
extremely enthusiastic to play their part but again limited in their tactical capability 
and experience. The result in both cases was an extended and gruelling battle of 
attrition and a lengthy historical debate concerning the utility and merit of the 
undertaking, along with a most critical analysis of the respective commanders all of 
whom had limited experience of command at that level.
2
 
The popular history of the RAF in the Second World War is dominated by the 
Battle of Britain, the bombing campaign against Germany, tactical operations in 
                                                          
1 G Sheffield, The Somme (London: Cassell, 2003), p. 25. 
2 R Neillands, The Bomber War – Arthur Harris and the Allied Bomber Offensive 1939-1945 
(London: John Murray, 2001); A Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (London: Batsford, 1968); and see 
R J Overy, The Bombing War – Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013) for three differing 
perspectives on the campaign. 
2 
 
North Africa and Normandy, and spectacular events such as the Dambuster Raid 
against the Ruhr Dams in 1943. Personalities, such as Harris, Dowding, Bader and 
Gibson are central to this popular narrative. To the reader RAF operations are a 
catalogue of loosely connected heroic acts that contributed, in a way not usually 
explained, to the wider war aims of the nation. Whilst this literature fills the shelves in 
even the best bookshops, it is, at best, a partial picture of the RAF’s contribution to 
the Allied victory. 
Contrary to the popular view, RAF operations were very much coordinated by 
a central authority, the Air Staff, acting on behalf of the individual constitutionally 
charged with ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the Service, the Chief of the 
Air Staff (CAS). From the War Cabinet came the policy decisions that provided the 
legal basis for the RAF’s operations and which formed the rationale for the directives 
issued by the CAS to the commanders of the frontline commands. In this way the 
aircrew, when they manned their aircraft, were undertaking legal missions that were 
intended to contribute to the democratically derived war aims of the government.
3
 
Black highlighted the tendency for military history to over focus on frontline 
operations at the expense of the higher war direction.
4
 This is particularly true in 
studies of Second World War air campaigns. The efforts of Bomber Command 
against Germany are regularly portrayed as an exclusive alternative to the use of 
Bomber Command in support of Coastal Command in the Battle of the Atlantic.
5
 
Many histories do not address the higher co-ordination of the air war or its integration 
                                                          
3 Lord Hankey, Government in War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), pp. 60-65. 
4 J Black, Rethinking Military History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. Xi. 
5 M Hastings, Bomber Command (New York: Touchstone, 1989), pp. 178-180 and A Verrier, The 
Bomber Offensive, pp. 116-120. 
3 
 
into allied strategy. Often the focus of attention is placed on the field commander who 
is portrayed as the main actor in the drama, for good or ill. His interaction with 
subordinate formations and personnel is often seen as paternal, particularly in the case 
of Dowding and Harris, and in contrast with the inevitable ‘staff battles’ that were 
fought with over demanding and misunderstanding faceless individuals in higher 
authority.
6
 But this is the analysis of the crew room not the boardroom. 
In any complex organisation teamwork and aligned co-ordinated action are the 
keys to success. In the case of the RAF the organ for higher direction and co-
ordination was the CAS and the Air Staff at the Air Ministry.
7
 The reasons for this 
were two-fold. First, the UK based MAF had re-organised itself into a mono-
functional frontline structure rather than the multi-functional organisation adopted by 
the Luftwaffe, the USAAF, and the RAF in its overseas commands. This mono-
functional approach required central co-ordination between the commands to create 
co-ordinated multi-functional output. Second, the British way of control in war 
depended on a wartime extension of the peacetime committee structure that 
underpinned the Government of not just the country but of the empire. This demanded 
an efficient and effective flow of operational direction from the political level through 
the high command to the frontline.
8
 
This committee structure centred on the War Cabinet and the policy direction 
it gave to the armed services and their respective chiefs whose task it was to ensure 
                                                          
6 See V Orange, Dowding of Fighter Command – Victor of the Battle of Britain (London: Grub Street, 
2008) and R Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain (London: Corgi, 1970); both these books 
describe the view from the commander as being paternal towards their subordinates and critical 
towards their superiors be they higher headquarters or higher commanders. This singular perspective 
can be found in many popular histories and understandably in almost all memoirs. 
7
 Hankey, Government in War, p. 62. 
8
 Ibid., p. 64. 
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their Service produced the outcomes desired.
9
 Such a structure placed the First Sea 
Lord (1SL), the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) and the CAS in a critical 
position for they held the highest responsibility for their Services’ operational 
effectiveness. Thus literature that focuses on subordinate commanders only tells part 
of the story for in the case of the RAF with its functional structure; it underplays or 
ignores the vital role of higher direction, integration and co-ordination. 
In 1937 the RAF proposed to the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) the 
establishment of a senior air command position to co-ordinate the actions of the 
Metropolitan Air Force (MAF) mono-functional commands. The proposal was 
rejected by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) who decided to put in place a Central 
War Room to be supported by War Rooms in the three Service Ministries and an 
enhanced process of co-ordination between the DCOS to achieve the aim the RAF 
had proposed.
10
 As a consequence, the CID sub-committee retained its central 
authority, enhanced inter-service co-ordination and avoided the unwelcome prospect 
of empowering a single individual with overwhelming authority for the tool of war, 
air power, that many considered might become critical in the expected struggle with 
Germany. 
The stimulus for this research study was an insignificant footnote in The 
Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940 by T C G James.
11
 It recorded that in 1936 it 
was envisaged that a Supreme C-in-C would to be established between the CAS and 
the command Cs-in-C. However, James stated that the Cs-in-C of Bomber Command 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
10
 TNA CAB 53/38/3 CID, Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, CID 1425-B, The Co-
Ordination and Control of Defence Operations, dated 29 April 1938. 
11
 T C G James, The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940 (London: Cass, 2001), p.23, footnote 8. 
5 
 
and Fighter Command, Steel and Dowding, opposed the idea suggesting that it would 
detract from the authority of the CAS. He also alluded to the implications for the other 
Services and summarised by stating that the idea was dropped in 1937.
 12
 
This footnote raised a number of questions, especially given the criticism in 
the historiography of the effectiveness of higher RAF command, the much vaunted 
success of the unified air command that developed in the Middle East in 1942-43, as 
well as the disruptive debates that ensued in the MAF over operational direction and 
force development.
 13
 The debate within Fighter Command over night air defence and 
in Bomber Command over targeting priorities and Pathfinder development supported 
the view that RAF high command lacked grip with consequential operational 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency.
14
 Could the decision not to appoint a Supreme Air 
Commander (SAC) have contributed to these debates and the perceived inefficiency 
that followed? This study explores this question by re-examining the RAF reforms of 
the 1930s and assessing their effectiveness in preparing the RAF for high command in 
the Second World War.  
The Literature 
This study is deliberately broken into two parts. Part I takes a fresh look at the 
development of the RAF’s high command from the unreported 1934 reform of the Air 
Ministry to the start of the Second World War. It focuses on the actions of the CAS 
and the Air Staff in their direction and co-ordination of the MAF. Part II analyses the 
development of RAF high command practices in the European air war of the Second 




 J Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European in the European War 1939-
1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), p. 343-347. 
14
 Hastings, Bomber Command, pp. 334-336. 
6 
 
World War. Much of the later discussion focuses on the way in which the RAF 
addressed the outcome of the SAC debate and the practices it put in place to create the 
system of command that oversaw the final and critical years of the war. In key areas 
this study sets out the source material for the first time and casts a new light on the 
structure of the RAF and the conduct of the air war. Because of this, this study 
assesses the performance of the MAF in the Second World War from a new start 
point, namely that the CAS and his Air Staff were a key element in the higher 
command of the MAF in a way that has not previously been explored or recognised. 
This study aims to correct that deficiency. 
RAF Organisational Reforms in the 1930s.  No studies have been published 
concerning the Air Ministry Review of 1934 or the debate concerning the creation of 
a SAC appointment in 1937. Moreover, the secondary sources relating to the 
Command Re-organisation of 1936 focus almost exclusively on the impact the new 
command structure had in relation to RAF expansion management.
15
 The reforms of 
the Air Ministry in 1934, the frontline in 1936 and the SAC debate of 1937 are 
covered in TNA AIR 2/673 S32201 – War Organization of the Air Ministry, TNA 
AIR 2/8875, S35818 and TNA AIR 2/1950, S39818 respectively. These sources form 
the key documents in the chapters 2, 3, and 4 respectively which deal with each 
reform in detail and all cast new light on the generally available literature. This is 
mysterious because the primary sources are quite clear as to the driving purpose of 
                                                          
15
 H Montgomery-Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars 1918-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976), 
and M Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
7 
 
each reform, but the literature conforms almost entirely to the perspective given in 
two key secondary sources.
16
 
These publications make no reference to the 1934 Air Ministry review which 
is an important gap in the understanding of the RAF’s command structure in the 
Second World War as this re-organisation set the tone for the Air Staff’s development 
and importantly established the Director of Training (DofT) appointment that would 
be responsible for all post ab-initio training, ie, the training of all of the RAF’s 
frontline forces. This was a critical role, for in combination with the Air Staff’s plans 
and doctrine staff, it was central to establishing the capability of the frontline through 
advanced and combined training. This all came about as a result of the 1934 Air 
Ministry reform, yet it is covered nowhere other than in the primary material. 
Fortunately, the 1936 frontline review benefits from better coverage in the 
literature. The key source is Montgomery-Hyde whose excellent review of British air 
policy addresses the topic superbly but adds authority to the concept of a management 
induced re-organisation.
 17
 Others follow this line. Biddle, Terraine, Richards, James 
et al all reinforced the explanation of an expansion-led command re-organisation.
 18
 
Helpfully, Smith expands on the subject by observing that the re-organization of the 
command structure raised the important question of how it would be directed in co-
ordinated action in war.
19
 Although he does not explore the issue further, he does 
observe, in terms of the relationship between the armed services, that in the absence 
                                                          
16
 Montgomery-Hyde, British Air Policy, and Smith, British Air Strategy. 
17
 Montgomery-Hyde, British Air Policy. 
18
 T Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, The Evolution of British and American Ideas 
about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Terraine, The 
Right of the Line; D Richards, ‘Royal Air Force 1939-45, Vol 1, The Fight at Odds’ (London: HMSO, 
1974); and James, The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940. 
19
 Smith, British Air Strategy, pp. 41-43.  
8 
 
of a central co-ordinating authority with sufficient power to compel, it was unrealistic 
to expect institutions with differing aims and perspectives to do little more than that 
which suited their narrow individual goals. Smith was discussing this in relation to the 
calls for the establishment of a Ministry of Defence and the ultimate decision to 
introduce a Minster for Defence Co-Ordination, but it was equally relevant to the 
higher command of the functionally independent RAF commands, and is one of the 
few works that offer more on this important subject.
20
 
The Air Historical Branch (AHB) Narrative of the development of the 
bombing offensive against Germany offers better coverage of this important period 
but omits critical aspects.
21
 In summarising the creation of BC the authors stated that 
the: 
Separation of the branches into independent commands, co-ordinated 
by the Air Staff itself and organised upon a ‘functional’ basis, was therefore 
the natural and logical outcome of expansion.
22
 
They concluded by stating that the ‘establishment of a separate Bomber Command 




These words seem to have set the scene for many subsequent authors but the 
AHB conclusion does not wholly reflect its narrative. Under the side title ‘Its 
Functional Character’ the Narrative highlights the fact that operational analysis into 
the possible course of a future war with Germany was at the heart of the re-
organisation, pointing out that it was considered likely that the roles of RN/Army 
                                                          
20
 Ibid., pp. 76-83. 
21
 TNA AIR 41/39, AHB Air Ministry Narrative, The RAF in the Bomber Offensive against Germany – 




 Ibid., p. 110E. 
9 
 
support, fighter defence, coastal and trade defence, and offensive operations would 
emerge as generally separate functions for the MAF.
24
  This disparity between the 
narrative and the firm statements in the conclusion might lie at the heart of why the 
historiography is consistently biased in favour of one opinion while the primary 
sources are clear that the 1936 command reform was initiated to better prepare for the 
operational demands of the anticipated war with Germany, and as a logical 
development following the 1934 Air Ministry re-organisation.  
The 1937 debate concerning the SAC proposal is, like the 1934 Air Ministry 
reform, another area where there is little subsequent acknowledgement that it ever 
took place or had any impact on the development of the RAF. James mentions it 
briefly in a footnote, and Webster and Frankland refer to it in passing, but it receives 
scant attention elsewhere.
25
 In this case the reasons are more obvious. In contrast to 
the command re-structuring the proposed SAC appointment was not accepted so it is 
understandable that it would be edited from many studies. This, however, misses the 
essential point that the SAC proposal shows that the CAS and his staff had a more 
comprehensive and sophisticated perspective on the requirements of high command 
than has been portrayed, and that the proposal also demonstrates that they were aware 
of the operational limitations of the command structure, and the demands that might 
arise for multi-functional responses to the reality of war. This subtlety of thought and 
preparation is not something attributed to the RAF by many authors, who more 
usually criticise the high command for their lack of imagination and operational 
flexibility. 
                                                          
24
 Ibid., p. 110D. 
25
 James, The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940, p. 23, footnote 8 and Sir C Webster and N 
Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany Vol 1 Preparation (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 
83. (Hereafter this title will be referred to as SAOG) 
10 
 
This perspective and new research is central to this study. However, the thesis 
put forward, that the reforms were driven by the needs for operational efficiency and 
effectiveness, is at odds with the accepted and well respected work of significant 
authors. This seeming contradiction deserves early consideration and reconciliation 
for Montgomery-Hyde’s important work established in the historiography the image 
of a strong causal link between RAF expansion and re-organization.
26
 He noted that 
the Command re-organisation came about as the ‘natural and logical outcome of the 
expansion and the advances in technology which the German menace evoked.
27
 
Expansion did create a demand for efficient management and advances in technology 
required operational development and effective frontline procedures to be developed. 
However, the primary sources clearly show that the motivation behind the various re-
organisations was not management or technological development but operational 
preparedness.
28
 This clearly begs the question of why should Montgomery-Hyde and 
others have attributed this explanation when the primary sources so clearly point 
elsewhere. 
The answer may lie in the span of the study he undertook and his professional 
background. The book summary contained on the dustcover highlights the fact that 
‘No definitive history of British air policy between 1918 and 1939 has hitherto been 
possible’.
29
 It goes on to outline the impressive scope of the work which 
encompassed: the development of Government air policy; the bitter inter-service 
rivalry of the 1920s and 1930s; the personalities and relationships of Government 
ministers, senior officials, high ranking officers and the staffs of government 
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departments; foreign policy and overseas operations; the demands of rearmament; the 
rise of Hitler; the creation of the shadow aircraft factories; the question of offensive 
and defensive posture in terms of defence policy; and various key developments and 
setbacks in the progress of British civil aviation. Added to this, Montgomery-Hyde 
explains his approach in his preface commenting: 
If I have dwelt more on personalities than another writer in the same 
subject might have done, that is because as a biographer I tend to regard 
personalities as the stuff of history.
30
 
Reading his book it is remarkable that he covered so much but it is also clear that 
much, of necessity, had to be omitted. His experience as a Member of Parliament and 
previous private secretary to an Air Minister not unreasonably seems to have 
predisposed him to view matters predominantly from the political and ministerial 
level. This coupled with his biographer’s preference for examining events through the 




The RAF reforms covered in Part I were responses to changes in Government 
defence policy. So it could be argued that the reforms were a direct response to the 
needs of expansion. But that would also be to over simplify a complex matter. 
Military expansion could only follow Government policy decisions but it was not the 
role of government to make decisions concerning the way in which the RAF was 
organised or how it intended to command in time of war. Thus, the subject of this 
study is a consequence of the decisions that form the core of Montgomery-Hyde’s 
work, but which lay outside his particular frame of reference.
32
 The argument that the 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., p. xiv. 
31





Command restructuring was the simple response to the needs of expansion and 
technological development has become so central to the historiography that no work 
begins from an alternative perspective. This coupled with the complete absence of any 
reference to the Air Ministry Review of 1934 and the almost total sidelining of the 
SAC debate of 1937, creates a false starting point for any assessment of RAF high 
command in the Second World War. 
Montgomery-Hyde’s work addressed the development of British air policy at 
the highest level between the wars. It was concerned with the essential building 
blocks upon which the Second World War would be fought in the air. Without the 
expansion programmes the RAF would have been without the adequate means to fight 
the war and would have been doomed to defeat. If expansion had not taken place it 
would have mattered little whether or not the RAF had reformed its command 
structures because it would have been without the required equipment and 
overwhelmingly defeated. Thus it was entirely reasonable that Montgomery-Hyde 
paid no attention to the RAF reforms save for how the Command restructuring 
interplayed with the expansion programmes.
33
 
However, there may be an even simpler explanation. The title of the Air 
Ministry file containing much of the primary source material is ‘Organisation of the 
Home Commands – Consequent on Expansion Scheme ‘C’.
34
 This would clearly 
suggest that the MAF command structure was reorganised to cope with the demands 
of expansion. Therefore, it would be entirely reasonable for Montgomery-Hyde and 
many others to conclude that expansion management was the driving and critical 
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factor. However, for this study it is the motivation behind the decision making that is 
important. In the case of Montgomery-Hyde and Smith, their focus was on the 
creation and development of British air policy. In assessing the performance of the 
RAF in the Second World War, air policy was clearly important but the thinking and 
mindset of the CAS and Air Staff in their consequent decision making was of greater 
importance. 
The difficulty with works that adopt the expansion management theory is that 
while this explanation is perfectly sound for studies concerning air policy 
development, it creates an incorrect starting point for studies of high command in the 
Second World War, because it down plays the focus, attention and awareness of 
operational priorities that motivated the CAS and Air Staff, many of whom would 
reach high rank in the Second World War, in their deliberations on frontline re-
structuring. On 4 May 1936 the Air Council promulgated a letter to establish the new 
Command structure.
35
 It stated in paragraph 1 that the Air Council wished to state 
that: 
In consequence of the Expansion scheme it has become necessary to 
review the system of command and administration.
36
 
However, in paragraph 2 it stated unequivocally that: 
The first principle which has guided the Council in their examination 
of the problem has been the desire to frame a peace organisation which 
conforms as closely as possible with the organisation visualised for war.
37
 
On balance, the seeming confliction between this study and the conclusions in 
such fine works as Montgomery-Hyde’s is due to approaching a common event from 
a different perspective. In terms of air policy the expansion management explanation 
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is entirely reasonable. But from the perspective of understanding the dynamics of air 
command in the Second World War it is inadequate and at odds with the primary 
material. 
RAF High Command in the Second World War.  Part II will explore the command 
adaptations that were required to meet the unfolding operational demands of the 
Second World War. Here a mixture of primary and secondary sources, many of which 
relied on the earlier officially edited narratives, will form the basis of the assessments. 
The excellent work by Terraine leant heavily on the AHB series of monographs which 
were equally at the heart of the Official History of the RAF in the Second World 
War.
38
 Neither of these works suffers as a result of this, but the reader must bear in 
mind, as Cox expertly advises, that both originate from the same official assessment 
and this is particularly relevant when looking at subsequent studies that use these 
earlier works foundation documents.
39
 
In the case of the air offensive against Germany this pattern is repeated with 
Verrier making great use of the official histories.
 40
 Indeed, in his section entitled 
References, Verrier states the ‘three authorities...most frequently cited are:’ and goes 
on to list Webster and Frankland, Craven and Cate, and the AHB analysis of ‘The 
Rise and fall of the German Air Force’.
41
 All these official documents are based on 
primary sources, but each is also the product of edited narratives. The process of 
reprising earlier work can then continue. Hastings thanked Verrier for his ‘good study 
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of the strategy of the campaign’ to which ‘I am indebted for many lines of thought’ as 
well as Webster and Frankland for their Official History.
42
 This re-working of facts 
and ideas from the AHB narrative to the Official Histories on to the initial secondary 
sources and eventually into the subsequent analysis created the distinct possibility of 
generating a singular perspective is clear. 
In analysing the RAF’s response a sound methodology is to follow the 
decision-making chain from the political to the tactical level. Churchill’s six volumes 
of The Second World War are valuable in providing the insight of the man at the 
pinnacle of the British decision making system.
43
 However, Reynolds and Woods 
cautioned that they must be read carefully.
44
 Woods stated one can forgive ‘Churchill 
the beating of drums and the waving banners’.
45
 
But he cautioned the reader that: 
This new found benevolence is further reason why The Second World 
War cannot be taken as objective history, quite apart from its author’s stated 
intentions. It led to reticences that obscured the actual details of wartime 
difficulties, particularly in the sphere of personalities.
46
 
Nonetheless, Churchill’s work is an essential starting point even if it must be regarded 
with some caution. 
Churchill’s biographer Gilbert produced the most extensive work comprising 
seven comprehensive volumes.
47
 Gilbert addressed all aspects of Churchill’s private 
and public life and volumes VI and VII, which cover the war years are invaluable for 
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understanding the pressures that the Prime Minister (PM) faced and the War Cabinet 
had to address. Another dimension can be added by reference to his Private Secretary 
(PS), Colville’s diaries which add yet more colour to the context of wartime decision 
making.
48
 As to the background of the way in which British government was 
conducted in 1939 the biography of Lord Hankey is very important.
49
 So too is 
Hankey’s volume of Lees Knowles Lectures published in 1945.
50
 All of these 
references reveal the pressure of leading the wartime Government and the complexity 
of the challenges the War Cabinet had to face. This is further revealed in the excellent 
Grand Strategy series in the British Official History of the Second World War.
51
 
Gibbs’ Vol. I, Butler’s Vol. II, Gwyer’s Vol. III, Howard’s Vol. IV and Ehrman’s 
Vols. V and VI are vital for understanding the strategic context facing Newall and 
Portal as CAS during the Second World War. It shows the complex and competing 
pressures facing the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) 
and the political purpose of the operational plans that they developed.
52
 
From a primary source perspective, the decisions of the War Cabinet are 
contained in the CAB series held by the National Archives (TNA) many of which are 
conveniently available online.
53
 The next stage in the process, as far as the RAF is 
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concerned, is contained in the records in the AIR series at TNA.
54
 The British COS 
process is well covered by Jackson and Bramall who describe the creation of the COS 
system and cover in great detail its workings and its key personalities.
55
 Their 
chapters 6, 7, and 8 are particularly pertinent and add to the works relating to 
Churchill and grand strategy.
56
 
Below the COS sat the Air Ministry about which very little has been written. 
Grey published a general history of the Air Ministry in 1940 which is helpful but not 
particularly detailed.
57
 Most other works deal with the Ministry as part of their wider 
narrative, for example, Dean, who was PS to the CAS and later Head of the Air Staff 
Secretariat, includes useful insights into the workings of the organisation as part of his 
broader study into the RAF in both world wars.
58
 Senior officers who served in key 
posts such as Joubert de la Ferté, Slessor, Douglas and Harris all mention their 
experiences in the Air Ministry, but none detail its close inner workings.
59
 Probert and 
Cox, previous and current heads of the AHB respectively go into specific detail in a 
number of publications and offer the best analysis.
 60
 Furse added to this with his 
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chapters on Freeman’s time as Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS) under Portal.
 61
  
Orange also offered insights in his biographies on several senior RAF commanders, 
along with Probert’s excellent work on Harris.
62
 Fortunately the organisational 
handbook of the Air Ministry exists in the primary records from which the duties and 
organisational structure of the Air Ministry and its development over time can be 
deduced.
63
 On the other hand, neither Ellington nor Newall left any meaningful papers 
in their RAF Museum record or the AHB, and Portal’s papers, held at his college in 
Oxford, offers much but little on the workings of the Air Ministry.
 64
 
Below the Air Ministry, the historiography is extensive and highly variable 
covering issues as diverse as uniform design to the moral debate surrounding aerial 
bombardment.
65
 The reader can quickly become overwhelmed with reinterpretations 
or the sub-division of campaigns into daily or even hourly analysis.
66
 Many of these 
works are extremely interesting and revealing of tactical detail and human experience, 
but they are less informative on the higher direction of the air war. In approaching the 
literature one must be ruthlessly guided by the hierarchy of secondary sources and 
concentrate on those contributions that truly add value. For this study a relative small 
number of acknowledged authoritative works were central to the analysis. 
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Overy has produced many works relating to the Second World War air war of 
which three stand out covering the Battle of Britain, the overall bombing campaign 
and the air war in general.
67
 Terraine’s analysis also remains an invaluable reference 
despite its close reliance on the AHB Narratives.
68
 Similarly, recent scholarship by 
Bungay, Addison and Crang, and Holland on the Battle of Britain allied to older 
works by Mason and James give a new perspective on this important period.
 69
 These 
works also cover the operations in France and at Dunkirk, which are also well covered 
by Buckley.
70
 This period is also well covered in the comprehensive AHB narratives 
of the campaigns.
71
 Likewise the developments in 1941 and 1942 concerning Fighter 
Command and Coastal Command are addressed generally in the history of the RAF 
1939-1945 and associated AHB narratives.
72
 Beyond the official records, personal 




As far as the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) is concerned the 
historiography is vast requiring careful and targeted reading. The AHB narratives are 
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essential along with the Official History of both the British and US contributions.
74
 
Thereafter, Overy, Terraine, Richards and Saunders, and importantly Boog are 
essential sources.
75
 On the German side Caldwell offers an excellent modern 
summary, matched by the work of Keeney, Davis and Hammel for the US 
contribution.
76
 Concerning the interplay of the CCS during the CBO, Howard, 
Richards, Furse, Overy, Biddle, Mets, and Huston all offer important perspectives.
77
 
Finally, works by Middlebrook, Freeman and Foreman give the useful tactical details 
from which the operational narrative and broader conclusions can be drawn, 
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Strategy and Doctrine.  Building on Montgomery-Hyde’s comprehensive study of the 
development of British policy the later work by Smith introduces another perspective 
and lays out an alternative approach.
79
 Smith argues that whilst criticism of RAF 
leaders can be sustained, it should not be as all-pervading and intense as some declare.
 
Rather than adding to the view that the RAF entering the Second World War was a 
victim to the overbearing influence of Trenchard’s ill-conceived views on air power, 
Smith argues that Trenchard’s true views, though often misrepresented, were much 
more in line with the way in which the air war of 1939-1945 unfolded.
 
 
The picture of Trenchard being singularly wedded to a standalone independent 
air strategy is not one that Smith supports. Rather, Smith argues, the concept of 
‘Strategic Interception’, in which the maritime, land and air forces are focussed on the 
enemy through mutually supporting and interdependent operations was the theory 
advanced by Trenchard and Sykes as being the one that would best suit the UK in the 
age of air power. Smith argues that the concept, although fundamentally sound, was a 
sophisticated concept that demanded close and harmonious co-operation between the 
services. Unfortunately the inter-service disputes over the future of the RAF and the 
subsequent arguments over policy and resource allocation created a situation in which 
such a complex concept as Strategic Interception was almost doomed to failure from 
the outset. However, as Smith reflects, it was exactly a form of Strategic Interception 
that ultimately served the Allies so well. 
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Smith highlights that UK air policy in the 1930s went through three distinct 
phases.
80
 Initially, the Government used the RAF and its frontline as a tool to support 
its goals of disarmament. Thereafter, it sought parity with Germany as a means of 
deterrence, before finally shifting through political diktat the purpose of the RAF 
from one of strategic offence to strategic defence. For the RAF the effect of this was 
to shift its focus from defeating the enemy’s expected ‘knock-out blow’ by executing 
a strategic air counteroffensive, to parrying the expected initial blow from the enemy 
with defensive measures and offensive force conservation until the strategic situation 
developed to the point whereby the strategic air offensive could be launched with 
meaningful results. This analysis is a much more balanced and nuanced assessment of 
the period and one which undermines the more simplistic assessments found in more 
popular histories. It highlights the fact that far from their being an ill-directed drift to 
war, those in power during this critical period were faced with the complex problem 
of achieving national security at a time of acute economic and strategic threat. He thus 
exposes the challenges facing the RAF’s higher commanders as they sought to align 
policy with realistic strategy in a time when technology was transforming the 
potential of warfare. 
Smith’s analysis of the RAF’s strategic interception concept is the foundation 
work for the historiography of the concepts and doctrinal theories held by the RAF.
81
 
The view that the RAF adopted a concept of war that served its interests both to 
support its continuation as an independent service and to bolster the views that air 
power was a revolutionary way of warfare in which the role of the surface forces 
became increasingly subordinate echoed the vision set out by General Smuts in his 
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Second Report that paved the way for the creation of the RAF.
82
 But as Smith 
highlights it is also too simplistic an assessment.
83
 The concept of Strategic 
Interception envisaged to sophisticated co-ordination of the nation’s war fighting 
capability to defeat the enemy through a preliminary combination of blockade and 
strategic attack before the culminating land assault completed the defeat of the enemy. 
Nowhere in this concept was air power seen as an independent war winning 
capability, rather it was seen as a means by which strategic interception could be 
undertaken as it could attack directly the enemy’s war making capability whilst 
surface forces held the blockade. As Smith describes it was a combination of growing 
institutional extremism in the face of limited resource, and the attendant breakdown in 
inter-service co-operation which was always recognised as essential to the successful 
execution of a strategic interception strategy. Unfortunately, several subsequent 
authors glossed over this subtlety and emphasised the more contentious statements of 
some notable RAF personalities, especially Harris.
84
 
The notable work by Biddle is a case in point.
 85
 Although it remains a very 
good summary of the development of air power thinking between the wars and a good 
analysis of air warfare during the Second World War, it suffers from its analysis of 
the thinking of the RAF in the 1930s, where it is not as comprehensive as the work of 
Smith. Numerous other authors have addressed RAF conceptual and doctrinal 
development as part of wider works, but most have followed the line that RAF 
thinking was over dependent on Trenchard’s influence and too extreme, bordering on 
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fundamentalist, in subordinating land and maritime action to the primacy of air power. 
But, however much some may hold this view, it does not accord with the reality that 
was outlined by Smith or importantly the views held by both CASs during the war. 
Neither Newall nor Portal advocated the view that air power could win alone. Rather 
both were firm supporters of coordinated land, sea and air action. Unfortunately, 
many authors by underplaying the role of the CAS and Air Staff in their analysis 
inadvertently fail to address this point. 
Thesis Content 
The historiography suggests that decisions concerning RAF organisation made 
during the 1930s were dominated by expansion and administrative efficiency. 
Undoubtedly these factors were at play, but the dominant factor was operational 
effectiveness. In particular, the pressing need to transition the RAF from the centrally 
organised and controlled institution of the 1920s into a more flexible and adaptable 
war fighting force ready to face another major conflict with Germany.
86
 The chapters 
of this study are designed first to lay out the primary source material that underpins 
this contention and then to analyse the development of RAF high command during the 
Second World War. In offering a contrary view to such a well-rehearsed 
historiography this study treads on delicate ground. However, the primary material is 
compelling, and while expansion to maintain parity was concurrent with the 
organisational changes, it was subordinate to operational preparedness in terms of 
being the driver for change. Consequently, this study is split into two distinct parts. 
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Part I addresses the organisational changes of the 1930s and sets out in detail 
the primary source material underpinning the operational motivation contention of 
this work. It attempts to answer the obvious question of why all the other works are so 
consistent in their assessment that the changes were motivated by expansion. Chapter 
2 will look at the Air Ministry Review of 1934 and show that the motivation of 
Salmond in initiating the study was to prepare the Air ministry for the major war that 
in 1934 seemed inevitable. Chapter 3 will cast a new perspective on the Command 
Re-organisation of 1936, again highlighting the operational motivation and focus that 
underpinned the review that established the organisation of the MAF for the Second 
World War. Finally, in Part I, Chapter 4 will address, for the first time in detail, the 
debate held in 1937 concerning the RAF’s proposal to introduce a Supreme Air 
Commander into their command structure. 
Part II addresses the response of CAS and Air Staff to the varying demands of 
commanding the MAF in the Second World War in terms of adaptations required to 
address operational challenges, personnel issues, doctrinal changes, inter-allied 
pressures within the context of a truly global war, and the pressures brought about by 
the need to pave the way for OVERLORD with a successful and innovative major air 
campaign. Part II must also recognise that virtually all available works, including 
official narratives, have not acknowledged the operational thesis that is set out in Part 
I, namely the operational focus and motivation of the Air Ministry as revealed through 
re-analysis of the reforms of the 1930s. 
Chapter 5 will look at the adaptations Newall made to the higher command 
structure in the first year of the Second World War, particularly in relation to the 
operational pressures that grew as the real nature of the war was revealed. Chapter 6 
26 
 
will examine the Battle of Britain and the Blitz as a background to the study of the 
changes in high command appointments that occurred at the end of 1940. Chapter 7 
addresses the adaptation of doctrine and thinking that was a consequence of the shift 
in late 1940 towards a more offensive strategy, and the pressure brought about by the 
vital need in mid-1941 to support Britain’s new ally the Soviet Union. This strand of 
inter-Allied responsibility and its consequences for the higher command and direction 
of the MAF will be explored in detail in Chapter 8 through an examination of Portal’s 
role in the CBO, the essential air campaign designed to set the conditions for 
OVERLORD. Finally, Chapter 9 will draw all the themes of Parts I and II together to 
answer the question posed by this thesis, namely how effective were the RAF reforms 

















THE 1934 REVIEW OF THE AIR MINISTRY 
On 22 December 1932 John Salmond, the CAS, circulated a note stating that a 
committee was to be established ‘for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner the 
various questions of War Organization and War Training can, with the most 
advantage, be studied by, and fitted into the general organization of, the Air Staff’.
1
 
The Committee would be chaired by Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham who 
would begin his study on 24 January 1933. Salmond was beginning the process of 
adapting the RAF for war by realigning and bolstering the ability of the Air Staff to 
undertake the role of the ‘air general staff’ that Smuts had foretold in his second 
report of 1917.
2
 This review would determine the basis upon which the RAF would 
develop over the coming years and the manner in which it would prepare for war, 
especially in terms of how the CAS and Air Staff would relate to the frontline and 
command and control wartime operations.  
That this has not been highlighted before may relate to the simple fact that the 
study of staff re-organization is hardly the most exciting undertaking and offers little 
by way of traditional heroes. However, the actions of those heroes who were to 
emerge during the Second World War were grounded in the organisational 
foundations of the Service in which they served. Any air force is founded on the 
robustness of the many structures, functions, practices and procedures that support the 
obvious activity of operational flying. For an air force to enter combat without 
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securing its organisational base is as a grave an act of dereliction as failing to 
provision the frontline with the quality and quantity of equipment necessary to fight. 
Beginning with the Second Smuts Report of 17 August 1917 the purpose of 
the RAF was the subject of continual and, at times, continuous debate. The Air 
Council Minutes from the autumn of 1917 highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the 
implementation of the Smuts’ recommendations.
3
 Much of the discussion surrounded 
the need to establish an ‘air staff’ that could offer independent and expert advice on 
the application of the new military power that aviation offered.
4
 But how could 
independent advice come from officers who would owe their allegiance and career 
prospects to the Admiralty and the War Office? Eventually, Henderson stated that it 
was clear that the creation of an air staff meant the creation of a separate service.
5
 
Another founding principle of the RAF was that the air staff would be an 
operational staff and that the CAS was central to the operational efficiency of the 
Service.
6
 However, personalities quickly altered the organizational dynamics. 
Trenchard’s resignation as CAS in March 1918 set the conditions for an equivocal air 
command structure to develop during the final stages of the First World War. When 
Trenchard was eventually persuaded by Lord Weir, the Secretary of State for Air 
(SofS), to accept the command of the RAF’s Independent Force of bombers stationed 
in Eastern France around Nancy, he insisted that his chain of command would by-pass 
his successor as CAS, Sykes, and he would report direct to Weir and the War 
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 Meanwhile, the RAF in France in support of the BEF would be commanded 
by Salmond who would report to Haig.
8
 Thus despite the organisational theory, Sykes 
would remain one step removed from the field commanders who by virtue of their 
ownership of the equipment of aerial warfare would dictate the way in which it would 
be used, and would thus, in practice, determine the day to day contribution it would 
make to the overall strategy.
9
 Thus from the very outset the RAF, founded on the 
principle that the Air Staff of the Air Ministry would act as an ‘air general staff’, 
adopted through dint of strong personalities a method of localised field command that 
demanded central support but eschewed central direction. It was to address this legacy 
that the CAS directed the study to be undertaken by Brooke-Popham. 
The Brooke-Popham Report 
Brooke-Popham, began his study on 24 January 1933 and submitted his report 
to the CAS less than a month later on the 22 February 1933.
10
 Brooke-Popham stated 
that his proposals could be briefly summarized as follows: 
a. The Director of Training’s responsibility would be transferred to the CAS 
department from AMP. 
b. The Director of Organization and Staff Duties with the Works and 
Buildings section would be split with the Staff Duties element remaining with 
CAS and the remainder transferring to AMP. 
c. The Director of Training’s remit would expand to encompass War Training. 
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The personnel cost would be modest comprising the addition of a permanent wg cdr 
post, the temporary addition of a sqn ldr for 12 months, and the possible requirement 
for a junior officer. 
CAS initialled this note on 10 March 1933, less than a month before handing 
over to his older brother Geoffrey Salmond on 1 April 1933, and noted his thoughts to 
the AMP and Deputy Chief of Air Staff (DCAS) the same day.
12
 He began: 
 I shall not have time to deal with Sir Robert Brooke-Popham’s Report 
on the Reorganization of the Staff before my successor takes over.
13
 
This appears to be rather awkward and ill-timed for the deliberation of such an 
important piece of work. It is also remarkable that Brooke-Popham, who did not begin 
his study until 24 January 1933, was able to produce a researched, considered and co-
ordinated report of 18 pages with seven appendices in 30 calendar days by 22 
February 1933. Even allowing for superior staff work, this is a remarkable feat and 
suggests that the outcome had to a degree been pre-judged. Given the strategic 
importance of the Air Staff organization to the operational effectiveness and 
efficiency of the RAF, this staff process demands scrutiny. 
Brooke-Popham began his Report by re-stating his Terms of Reference which 
were to establish the ‘various questions of war organization and war training’ and 
how they could be best ‘fitted into the general organization of the Air Staff’.
14
 He then 
immediately recorded that ‘an examination of past history shows that these terms of 
reference imply that not a re-organization, but rather a continuance of development’. 
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He opined that three phases in the growth of the RAF and its Air Ministry were 
identifiable. 
The First Phase was termed the ‘Construction of the Framework’ during which 
‘centralization was desirable to ensure no divergence of policy’. The first Order in 
Council regulating the business of the Air Ministry had set the scene on 13 October 
1920 by establishing just two Service Members of the Air Council, the CAS and the 
Director General for Supply and Research (DGSR).
15
 Under this arrangement CAS 
controlled Operations and Intelligence, Training and Organization, Personnel, 
Medical Services, Equipment, and Works and Buildings. Meanwhile DGSR oversaw 
Research, Aircraft Supplies, and Inspection. 
The Second Phase which he termed ‘The Period of Consolidation’ emerged 
from the need to place administration on a broader basis, to have more Service 
Members and to have an ‘organization in close touch with Personnel’. Thus the Order 
in Council issued on 14 July 1922 led to the following allocation of duties: CAS 
would address Operations and Intelligence, Training and Staff Duties, Works and 
Buildings, and Communications; AMP would cover Organisation, Personnel, 
Services, Chaplains Branch; the Air Member for Supply and Research (AMSR) would 
oversee Research, Inspection and Equipment.
16
 
The Third Phase was consequent on the decision to establish the command 
structure known as the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB). It was realised that 
Organisation was strategically critical to the formation of the new command and that 
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Training had obvious and intimate links with personnel. To cement these changes a 
new Order in Council was issued on 19 December 1923 which allocated CAS 
Operations and Intelligence, Organisation and Staff Duties, Works and Buildings; 
AMP was responsible for Personnel Services, Manning, Training, Medical services, 
and the Chaplains Branch; AMSR retained his previous portfolio.
17
 
Beyond these three phases of Air Staff development, Brooke-Popham 
highlighted other minor changes such as the July 1932 decision to establish a 
Directorate of Equipment   responsible for the ‘efficiency of the system of repair and 
upkeep of RAF aircraft and engines whilst in Service use’. He then stated the 
fundamental purpose of the next Phase of RAF development: 
The Royal Air Force is now entering upon its 4
th
 Phase and is now 
ready to concentrate on its real function, that of Preparation for war, and it is 




Five guiding principles circumscribed the work: 
First, every effort had to be made to minimize staff increases. 
Secondly, as few changes as possible should be made. 
Thirdly, that although the division of duties should be logical there was a limit 
to that thinking especially if additional staff numbers resulted. 
Fourthly, the CAS Department must not be overloaded. 
Fifthly, although it might be impracticable to organize the Air Ministry purely 
on what was required for war, the arrangement must enable an easy and 
efficient transition to war.
19
 
In relation to the final principle he highlighted that the RAF must do all within its 
power to avoid a situation that could lead to their being criticized as the War Office 
had been by the Esher Committee of 1904.
20
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The need for the Review was reinforced by those activities which were 
receiving insufficient attention. Tactical training of units; war organization and co-
ordination of the administrative details of War Plans; expansion of the RAF to meet 
war requirements, especially with regards to Training and Maintenance; strategy for 
the offensive side of Home Defence; mobilization of the Air Ministry, including 
duties that would have to be delegated to commands at home in time of war; in short, 
the fundamentals of a fighting service. This catalogue of shortfalls could be seen as 
shocking to a modern audience looking back with the certainty of how events were to 
unfold. It is more understandable if one considers what the RAF had been through in 
its first 15 years of existence as a third service. And it should be remembered that 
Brooke-Popham’s Study was a self-generated attempt to set matters right. It is also 
notable that the contemporary view was that unit tactical training, war organisation 
and strategy for the ‘offensive side of Home Defence’ were centrally placed among 
the list of challenges to be addressed. Authors have criticised the RAF for not 
addressing these issues sufficiently, but have simultaneously ignored the Brooke-
Popham Air Ministry review.
21
 
Brooke-Popham pointed out that extra work would be required to address the 
shortfalls identified, and that the work could be accomplished in a number of ways. 
Duties could be reallocated so as to save energy, some work could be omitted, 
individuals could work harder, or there could be an increase in numbers. However, the 
lack of qualified and experience staff officers was a critical constraining factor, even 
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so, Brooke-Popham concluded that the RAF had reached the point at which it would 
have to expand to meet the challenges it faced in readying itself for war. Brooke-
Popham’s aimed to minimize staff growth whilst simultaneously encompassing the 
obvious staff shortfalls. Organization and Training became key areas for, on the one 
hand, they established the structure of the Service and how it should be fought, whilst 
on the other, they ensured the personnel were best prepared to carry out their duties in 
pursuit of the campaign plans devised. 
Dealing first with Training, Brooke-Popham concluded that although ab initio 
training was clearly connected to personnel matters it was a continuum whose 
ultimate purpose was the efficiency and effectiveness of the frontline.
22
 Given that 
tactics and strategy were central to the CAS’ remit to oversee the operational 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Service, then Training should be concentrated 
under the CAS who would then be wholly responsible for both the development of 
tactics to meet the threat and the preparation of the personnel to undertake the duties 
required to overcome that threat. He stated: 
I feel convinced that all Flying Training should come under one 
member of the Air Council, and since it is obvious that advanced training must 
come under the Air Staff, then elementary flying Training must go there too.
23
 
He did not suggest that Ground Training should be moved, indeed, he pointed out that 
the need to manage the transition of airmen into civilian life and ensure accreditation 
of their skills argued strongly for their training to remain in the hands of AMP. 
However, his eye for operational focus identified the School of Photography as 
needing to come under the new Directorate of Training he proposed to establish in the 
CAS Department. He stated: 
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I am of the opinion that the work of the School of Photography needs 
some further direction as regards policy: it should be told what are the Air 
Staff requirements as regards photography. At present there seems a tendency 




He also considered that co-operation with the other Services should be concentrated 
under the DofT, stating: 




He suggested a generous manning level to address the needs of Naval co-operation 
and the oversight of the then Fleet Air Arm (FAA) of the RAF. And he hoped that the 
proposed manning levels would: 
gradually tend to eliminate misunderstanding and establish confidence 
between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. Perhaps in two or three years’ 
time, when these matters are on a really satisfactory footing and thoroughly 
established, an amalgamation and consequent saving of personnel would be 
advisable. At present, though possible, it is in my opinion inexpedient.
26
 
Turning to War Organization, Brooke-Popham stated the stark truth that at 
present there was no definite organization in the Air Ministry to ensure the co-
ordination of the administrative details of war plans. He highlighted a process by 
which ‘The Plans Staff set out a project for some future operation, dealing almost 
entirely with the operational side’, without the necessary scrutiny by those responsible 
for the administrative details implicit in any such plans. In short, RAF war plans were 
developing in a vacuum of reality. 
Brooke-Popham proposed the creation of a section under the Director of Staff 
Duties (DSD) who would be responsible for the organizational aspect of the RAF’s 
preparation for war. He compared his proposal with the model employed in the 
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Admiralty which he thought inappropriate for the RAF. Far better was the structure in 
place in the War Office where war organization was actively co-ordinated by the 
Army SD branch in concert with the other elements of the War Office and Army 
structure. This federated approach had the further benefit of reducing additional 
manning requirements. 
Brooke-Popham also recommended the rebalancing of work areas among the 
Air Council Members to ensure an equitable split of responsibility and to ensure the 
CAS Department was not overloaded with peacetime duties as it was recognized that 
its war preparation workload had only just begun to reveal itself. Taking a further 
lesson from the War Office, Brooke-Popham was keen to ensure the CAS had enough 
time to reflect and consider the broader aspects of the employment of the Service and 
he was determined not to overload the CAS with administrative detail. Thus he 
recommended the movement of the Peace Organization department and the 
Directorate of Works and Buildings (DofWB) to AMP to balance workload and 
reflect comments previously made in Air Staff reviews. This seemingly simple 
recommendation occupied a single short paragraph, but would come to dominate the 
subsequent debate surrounding the Report. 
Brooke-Popham’s Report succinctly and logically laid out a series of change 
recommendations that would enable the RAF to prepare for, and transition to, the war 
that the international situation was making increasingly likely. In his Minute to CAS 
he recognized that the Air Staff now had to choose which approach they would take 
and withheld his final detailed assessment of manning requirements, writing: 
39 
 
If my proposals are approved I am ready to tabulate the detailed list of 
duties and also to work out the changes necessary in the list of Committees.
27
 
The task was now for the RAF to digest the Report and adapt to the challenges ahead. 
The RAF View 
Any organization reaches a conclusion through a complex interplay of logic, 
emotion and experience. The decisions are made by humans each of whom brings 
their personal experience and prejudice to the matter under discussion. The key RAF 
personalities in the early months of 1933 were the CAS, DCAS, AMP, and AMSR. 
The CAS was first, John Salmond, then his brother Geoffrey until his early death on 
28 April 1933, and then John Salmond again until Ellington assumed the post on 22 
May 1933. DCAS was Ludlow-Hewitt; AMP, Ellington until 22 May 1933 when the 
post was gapped until 31 July 1933 before Bowhill took over. AMSR was Dowding 
throughout, a post he had held since 1 September 1930.
28
 
CAS wrote to AMP and DCAS on 10 March 1933 enclosing the Brooke-
Popham Report for their consideration and took the opportunity to offer his views.
29
 
This would be poor practice were he attempting to gather viewpoints before he made 
the final decision, but J Salmond knew he would not be making that final decision, his 
brother would, so setting out one’s views to be known, by way of ‘guidance’ to 
subordinates, could well be seen as the act of someone wishing their legacy to 
develop in an acceptable way. Whatever his purpose he stated that: 
I have not been into the details of the Report, but notice it is suggested 
that the whole of Director of Training’s branch should move from AMP to 
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CAS. I think the advantage of this is doubtful, as, apart from overloading 
CAS, it will mean the divorcement of ab initio training from the same branch 
in which the Director of Postings works.
30
 
But he was not blind to the pressing need to improve advanced training and concluded 
that: 
I should have thought it possible, and would be more advisable to 
leave ab initio training where it is, and pass war training to CAS.
31
 
AMP tasked the DofT, Courtney, to study the Report and deliver recommendations. 
This Courtney did in a Minute to AMP on 1 May 1933.
32
 Courtney fully agreed with 
Brooke-Popham’s assessment that there was a shortfall in war training and he had for 
some time thought it advisable to put his Directorate in the Air Staff. He debated 
whether ab initio training should remain with AMP but concluded that it should 
remain intact and accompany war training to the CAS Department. He argued that the 
ab initio schools were already increasing their activity to address ‘advanced’ training 
skills so he felt it was desirable that one organization would be responsible for the 
harmonization of a complete training package. He recognised the point made by CAS 
about the need to maintain Training and Posting in close harness, but concluded that 
the benefits in war readiness were greater that the costs in increased co-ordination 
required between the Training and Postings Directorates. 
AMP drafted a response to CAS setting out his detailed views on the Report 
and, given his imminent assumption of the position of CAS, an interesting resume of 
his command philosophy.
33
 Unfortunately, no record of the letter having been sent 
exists in the records and it is possible that it was not actually sent. Ellington agreed 
that the proposals were ‘quite workable’ and should not over burden AMP or CAS. 
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Nevertheless, he was not satisfied that the proposals were the ‘best solution to our 
difficulties’. Going against the advice of his director of Training, Ellington supported 
John Salmond’s view that ab initio training and war training should be split. He 
observed that: 
What I think is essential is that the CAS’s Department, which must lay 
down the strategical and tactical doctrines which are to guide the RAF in war, 
shall supervise the study and application in peace of these doctrines.
34
 
Whilst offering a number of more detailed adjustments, AMP was broadly content 
with the Report’s conclusion, with the exception that he felt that the DofWB should 
remain with CAS rather than be transferred to AMP. 
The staffing of DCAS’s response was more extensive and not disrupted by the 
posting moves consequent upon the death of the CAS. The DSD, Air Cdre Mills, not 
surprisingly offered a fulsome response to DCAS the essence of which is contained in 
the following: 
I do not feel that there are any grounds for suggesting that the existing 
machinery is really unsatisfactory or lacking in efficiency, and the only serious 
defect is the lack of a branch to deal with war organization.
35
 
It would be easy to portray this as the type of bureaucratic complacency which is 
often associated with government institutions. But it may be more accurate to see it as 
a genuinely held view of a responsible officer confronting the enormous change that 
was about to befall the RAF. Seen in this light the subsequent changes enacted by the 
Air Staff are the more impressive. 
Mills gave a very detailed and reasoned exposition of his analysis of the 
Report recording his concern at a growing trend in the Service: 
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There are unmistakeable signs that our organization tends to drift 
towards the requirements of peace and further from a state of preparedness for 
war. Owing to financial pressure, civilianization of establishments has been 
carried to a stage which must inevitably embarrass mobilization.
36
 
He concluded his remarks by aligning himself with CAS’ view that training should be 
split and DSD expanded to address both War and Peace Organization. 
On 16 June 1933, Pierse forwarded a Minute to the new CAS, Ellington, 
outlining DCAS’s view on the Brooke-Popham Report. He began by confirming 
Brooke-Popham’s observation that ‘hitherto there has been no provision for the 
proper study of these subjects’, namely the study of war organization and war 
training.
37
 This admission is significant because the war for which these studies were 
to focus upon was a mere 6 years away, and the expansion schemes of men and 
materiel were clearly beginning from the foundation of weak or non-existent 
operational thinking. Far from being the product of conspiratorial institutional 
prejudice it appears that the predilection of the RAF for a way of warfare had far more 
to do with there being no mature thinking upon which to base their plans. This 
perspective is supported by the work of Smith who emphasises the irrelevance of the 
operational experience of the RAF in the 1920s and early 1930s to any European 
context and the politically driven focus on deterrence to underpin the recent 
disarmament talks in Geneva.
38
 
DCAS highlighted his concern that in attempting to balance workload between 
the Air Council Members, Brooke-Popham had proposed a less than optimum 
position. Thus he argued, supported by the DofT, DSD, and of course, the CAS in his 
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previous role as AMP, that the DofWB and the Director of Operations (DofOps) 
should remain with CAS. He ducked the debate on ab initio training suggesting that 
CAS might take this up directly with the DofT. Finally, he observed that the Report 
had been under staffing for a considerable time and that it had yet to receive the 
attention of ‘all the departments concerned in these important proposals’.
39
 
CAS gave his views to DCAS via a Minute on 29 June 1933.
40
 In a manner that was 
to become his routine whilst CAS, he laid out his decisions unequivocally. He decided 
that the DofT would remain under AMP. Advanced training would be placed under 
the DSD which would embrace, inter alia, the Staff College, Staff exercises, and air 
tactics. The DofWB would remain under CAS. In short, his views as AMP had 
transferred with him to the post of CAS. Ellington’s stated views are important for 
they reveal the inner thinking of the man who would guide the RAF for an important 
period of war preparation. They also reveal the organizational atmosphere in which 
the Air Staff had to work. Ellington, despite disagreeing in detail with Brooke-
Popham, accepted his overall argument that the RAF needed to focus on war 
preparations and that the issue of unit training and strategy development were crucial 
matters. This approach created the basis for a unity of thinking linking strategy, 
organisation, staff college education and training, unit training and development, and 
operational exercising and execution. As such it represented a significant step forward 
and an important foundation stone upon which to build.  
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The External View 
DCAS had alluded to the fact that the changes being proposed were of such 
importance as to be of interest to other departments, including of course the Air 
Ministry.
41
 The Air Ministry of 1933 was not only the ‘Whitehall HQ’ of the RAF, it 
was also the Department responsible for Civil Aviation and the SofS, Lord 
Londonderry, held a wide brief for all aviation related matters. Of particular relevance 
was the Department of The Secretary of the Air Ministry. Occupying a position of 
equivalence to the CAS and Controller General of Civil Aviation, the Secretary was 
the senior official responsible to the SofS, and someone whose support was essential 
if any organizational change was to endure within the RAF and the Air Ministry. 
Ellington wrote to the Secretary, Bullock, for the first time on this subject on 
21 September 1933.
42
 He reviewed the Report and the staff process by which he had 
come to his decisions and gave the Secretary a detailed briefing of the logic 
underpinning his conclusions. He emphasized the need for balanced workloads and 
the on-going requirement for co-operation between Air Council Members. Having 
reviewed the implications of the decisions made he proposed a new Branch directly 
under CAS to address War Training and SD, leaving DSD to address organizational 
matters, and would be called the DofO. The destiny of the DofWB was stated to be in 
the CAS department where it could be closely aligned with other aspects of the RAF 
expansion schemes under consideration. 
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The Secretary replied on 17 November 1933 some eight weeks later.
43
 His 
type written Minute ran to over five pages and must have come as a disappointment to 
a CAS who was keen to re-configure his Service for the challenges ahead. The 
Secretary began by emphasizing the importance of the issue and concluding that: 
As a result I agree that at present there is a gap in our organization 
which needs filling in one way or another.
44
 
He stated that but for the: 
closely reasoned conclusions of Sir R Brooke-Popham, the views of 
Sir Philip Game, who had almost unequalled experience in the matter of 
headquarters organization, the opinions of the last DCAS, and the numerous 
divergences of opinion which have found expression on the present file, I 
should have hesitated to question the main outlines of the latest proposals, 
despite my special responsibilities for the organization of the Air Ministry 
from the angles of establishment and finance.
45
 
This minute has the distinct feeling that it was, in part, intended to ensure that the new 
CAS, unexpectedly appointed, knew where power lay within the Air Ministry and that 
not including the Secretary earlier in the process was a serious tactical error. 
Paragraph 4 of his Minute set out his opening position: 
I frankly confess that I am myself much more drawn to Sir Robert 
Brooke-Popham’s recommendations than these latest compromise proposals, 




He went on to challenge virtually all of CAS’ proposals citing alternatives that were 
variously supported by other Air Council members. Comparisons with the War Office 
punctuate the Minute, for example, the Secretary urged the CAS to consider that 
although: 
equipment establishments bulk much larger with us than with the 
Army, the Adjutant General is apparently responsible for the organization and 
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administration (including establishment questions) of the Artillery and the 
Royal Tank Corps – no doubt working in close conjunction with AMSR’s 
opposite number the Master General of Ordnance, who is responsible for war 
equipment tables and equipment regulations for the Artillery, Tanks, etc.
47
 
To Ellington, an ex-artilleryman and Director General of Military Aeronautics at the 
War Office in 1918, this lesson in organizational structure must have seemed rather 
unnecessary. 
The Secretary moved on to challenge CAS’s proposals for the War and Peace 
Organization structures to be placed under the DofO in the CAS department, again 
arguing that there were precedents in the Army that supported an alternative 
approach. The retention of the Works and Building Directorate came in for particular 
opposition having been adversely commented on by the Estimates Committee in the 
summer of 1932. Once again the War Office and this time the Admiralty were held up 
as exemplars the RAF should follow. Having outlined his broad objections which 
extended to almost every part of CAS’ proposal he moved on to his points of detail. 
The main issue was the proposed increase in establishment. Here the Secretary 
undertook a forensic destruction of CAS’ argument: 
I do not doubt that we are at present rather behindhand, but, when 
arrears have been made up, I should have thought that all experience of the 
past decade suggested that new contingencies entailing completely new plans 
would arise with relative infrequency.
48
 
Continually, the Secretary referred to the structure of the War Office to underscore his 
conclusion that, rather than the modest increase of five staff officers proposed by 
CAS, two or at most three would be acceptable. He concluded that he would have 
preferred the Brooke- Popham proposals but would accept CAS’ views if he felt the 
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alternative could not be made to work but he was firm in his view that the DofWB 
should be transferred to AMP to satisfy the Estimates Committee. 
On 30 November 1933 CAS replied to the Secretary in his typical unequivocal 
style:  
I am quite sure that war training would not be better dealt with by 
transferring the whole of flying training to CAS Department.
 49
 
Furthermore he was entirely:  




As to the importance of placating the Estimates Committee CAS observed that: 
The criticism of the Estimates Committee in this matter is, I consider, 




Moving on to War Organization CAS opined that the manning levels proposed were 
the bare minimum: 
I do not think this would be nearly adequate for a branch of work 
which has been far too neglected. With the abrogation of the ‘ten years’ rule it 
is essential that we should take war organization more seriously.
52
 
After concluding with some details to address the Secretary’s Minute, CAS stated: 
I am desirous that this reorganization should be submitted to the 
Secretary of State for his approval as early as possible and hope that you will 
be able to deal with these papers without delay.
53
 
There is no record of the Secretary’s reaction to receiving this Minute from CAS but 
one might imagine that there was a growing realization in the Air Ministry that the 
unexpected CAS knew his mind and was not afraid to state it. 
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The Secretary replied to CAS 8 days later on 8 December 1933 and began by 
stating: 
Having placed my views upon record against any future review of 
these problems and stated my preference for something more resembling Sir 
R. Brooke-Popham’s proposals, I am ready to defer to your opinion over this 
re-organization as a whole save for two points only, viz, (a) the allocation of 
the Works and Buildings Directorate and (b) the size of the staff of the new 
Deputy Directorate of War Organization.
54
 
The Secretary argued strongly for the move of the DofWB to AMP’s Department and 
alluded to the organizational principles of the War Office which strove to ensure the 
CIGS was able to devote as much time as possible to the employment of the Army 
leaving the administration of the Service to other members of the Army Board. These 
arguments were more relevant to matters that would emerge in 1936 when the re-
organization of the RAF was under discussion and appear to be have been used by the 
Secretary to broaden an argument already lost in the specifics of the Air Ministry 
debate. 
After offering a compromise to enable a reduction in manning numbers the 
Secretary concluded with a pointed reference to the staffing process that had 
accompanied this Review: 
Finally, on a minor point of procedure, though I do not imagine there 
are likely to be any further major schemes of reorganization of this character 
for some time to come, if and when they should mature, it would be helpful to 
me if I could be brought into the discussions at an earlier stage.
55
 
He proposed a small committee of officials to ensure his awareness and involvement. 
CAS did not respond to this proposal in any recorded way. 
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On 11 December 1933 CAS wrote to the SofS to gain his approval for the plan 
before his departure for Egypt.
 56
 He stated simply that war training would move to 
his department, war organization would be bolstered and come under the CAS and 
that the Works and Building Directorate would remain with CAS for a further two to 
three years despite the Secretary’s objection. The next day Lord Londonderry replied 
that he approved the transfer of Higher Training to CAS.
 57
 However, whilst content 
for the Works and Buildings Directorate to remain with CAS in the near term he did 
not see this as a long term solution. He was also keen to bear down on manning 
numbers, but again to overcome the backlog of work would initially accept CAS’s 
requirements pending longer term review.
58
 Thus everyone was able to leave happy, 
CAS had training and Work and Buildings, and adequate manning; and the Secretary 
had made his point and it had been recorded for the future; in short a perfect British 
compromise. 
Despite the SofS’s approval the matter was not finalized and the early months 
of 1934 were taken up with lengthy discussions with the Treasury. Eventually an Air 
Council Command Letter was issued on the 22 February 1934 outlining the proposed 
changes which after consultation with the Lords Commissioners, communicated in a 
Treasury letter dated 2 March 1934, came into effect on 3 April 1934.
 59
 The CAS 
would have four Directorates: Operations and Intelligence; Organization; Staff 
Duties; and Works and Buildings. AMP would oversee ab initio training and 
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established personnel matters. War and Peace Organization would be the 
responsibility of the DofO. 
Operational Foundations – The Review in Retrospect 
As the RAF awoke on Wednesday 4 April 1934 very few would have realized 
that changes had been made that would have significant implications for the readiness 
of the Service for the Second World War. The RAF now had the means to address the 
significant gaps that were identified by Brooke-Popham and the operational 
foundations upon which the RAF would build were greatly strengthened. 
Higher Training was soon to become the responsibility of Tedder giving him 
the authority to focus the RAF’s rapidly expanding force on those activities which 
were considered to offer the greatest utility in war for the limited training time that 
remained in peacetime.
60
 But the task of creating a training system that was able to 
take a pilot from first flight to combat readiness in the timescale available with the 
equipment of the frontline was immense. Reality had to determine the way of warfare 
that was possible for the RAF. It would be pointless to establish complex tactics and 
procedures that were beyond the grasp of the aircrew available at the time. That the 
RAF never fell in the trap of deploying aircrew that were woefully inadequate for the 
task can, in no small measure, be attributed to the Brook-Popham reforms of the Air 
Ministry. Equally, the limitations in training and operational concepts that were to 
emerge in the coming years left future RAF field commanders with a similar 
challenge to the one faced by British Army commanders in 1916 when their tactical 
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schemes had to be constrained because the tactical ability of the volunteer soldier 
could not support the more complex and operationally effective alternatives. 
Whilst the review laid the foundations to address the training challenge, and 
Government policy was slowly expanding the size of the frontline, it was the balance 
of quantity and quality that continued to occupy the Air Staff. It was well recognized 
that the state of the British aircraft industry severely constrained the options for 
expansion that the RAF could explore.
61
 Ellington was extremely concerned that the 
RAF did not expand too rapidly and create a hollow force of numbers but of limited 
quality.
 62
 Over time the quality of equipment expansion, personnel recruitment, and 
training shifted to enable the foundations of a robust force to be built. Establishing the 
organizational structure that would underpin these new capabilities was the 
responsibility of the new DofO, Air Cdre Welsh and as with training a balance had to 
be struck between the optimum and the realistic. It was the role of the new DofO to 
ensure the RAF was structurally configured to enable the integration of the trained 
airman with the new equipment, and importantly to ensure the force was task 
organized for operational success. The staff work involved in this was enormous and 
not surprisingly, the hoped for reductions of the Secretary never came to fruition, in 
fact quite the reverse. But the Review had set the conditions to support the expansion 
and allow for later adaptation. 
The debate over the organizational location of the DofWB was instructive. 
Everyone was right to a degree and all were equally wrong. There can be no doubt 
that AMP’s Department could have undertaken the task but that was not what the 
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CAS wanted and given that RAF Expansion demanded the biggest works and airfield 
construction programme the Service had faced, it was fortunate that the Directorate 
remained with the CAS close to the organizational and operational staff who would 
create the demands for works and buildings. 
The Secretary constantly highlighted comparisons with the Army in his 
discussion with the CAS in an attempt to persuade the CAS that the prosaic and 
functional Directorate covering Works and Buildings had no part in the CAS’ 
Department.
63
 But Ellington held firm to his view that an air force was intimately 
linked to its supporting infrastructure in a way that had little comparison in the Army 
and limited in the RN. In this events were to prove him right for the sustainability of 
the airfield was to become a key element of operational resilience and the parlous 
state of airfield infrastructure that greeted the RAF in France in 1939 amply 
demonstrated that Ellington was right to stick to his guns. This perspective of 
Ellington is at odds with the view expressed by Montgomery-Hyde who quoted 
several comments by Ellington’s contemporaries that are deeply critical of the CAS.
 64
 
However, analysis of his conduct over the Air Ministry review shows him to be far 
more determined and robust than he is generally seen as being.  
The staffing of the Brooke-Popham Report gave Ellington an opportunity to 
assert his authority in the Air Ministry. He was a CAS who has been harshly judged 
by history including being described by Freeman as the ‘worst chief we ever had’.
65
 
However, others including Terraine and Dean have recognized the great debt the 
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Service owes him during those difficult years of the middle 1930s.
66
 If Bullock had 
been attempting to assert his position in the Air Ministry with his initial response to 
Ellington, then it must be concluded he failed, because the final outcome was almost 
exactly what Ellington had drafted in his response to Salmond when AMP.
67
 And 
neither was this a pyrrhic victory that was dismantled by the bureaucracy when the 
senior’s attention had moved on to more pressing matters. The Air Ministry reforms 
of 1934 were sustained throughout the war expanding in scale but not in principle as 
the RAF grew to it greatest size and fought its most demanding conflict. In one area 
though Ellington learnt a useful lesson and in future he made a more determined effort 
to include the Secretary and his department at the earliest opportunity. That he did not 
in 1933 could be partly excused by the turbulent way in which he became CAS and it 
is understandable that in his early days his attention was demanded across a wide span 
of control that had been greatly upset by the unexpected changes at the top of the 
Service. 
Another factor lingering in the background at the time was the unresolved 
tension concerning the role of the Air Ministry in the command of operations. In part 
the Brooke-Popham reforms were intended to address this issue and to make good the 
principle that Smuts had highlighted in his Second Report of 1917 and Henderson had 
referred to in his statement concerning the establishment of an Air Staff within the Air 
Ministry, namely that the CAS, the Air Staff, and the Air Ministry should command 
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and fight the RAF in time of war in a way analogous to the Admiralty and the War 
Office.
68
 The 1934 reforms laid the foundation for this to be done.  
As 1934 unfolded the Air Ministry changes began to take hold and allowed the 
CAS greater confidence that the shortfalls in war preparation were beginning to be 
resolved. On 5 June 1935 CAS would write to DCAS to initiate the next major phase 
of the RAF’s adaptation for war, the re-organisation of the Home Command structure 
that would lead to the creation of Bomber, Fighter, Coastal, and Training Commands, 
the task organization with which the RAF in the UK would fight the Second World 
War.
69
 That work would build on the Air Ministry Review of 1933/34 and would be 
fundamental to the RAF’s war fighting capability. 
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THE 1936 RE-ORGANISATION OF THE FRONTLINE 
Introduction 
The Air Staff re-organization that came into being on 4 April 1934 addressed 
the immediate needs of directing the RAF during the turbulent period of expansion 
and change that was underway to address the growing threat from Germany.
1
 At that 
time the MAF, was organized under a unitary command known as the ADGB 
commanded by the C-in-C Brooke-Popham. His Command was headquartered in 
Hillingdon House at Uxbridge and consisted, under the terms of the Scheme A 
expansion programme, of four Bombing Areas, a Southern Fighting Area, and a 
Northern Fighting Area consisting of a Northern and Central Fighting Group. Coastal 
and Inland Areas were also established to handle maritime and training matters.
2
 
The ADGB had been created in 1923 to handle the 52 squadron RAF then 
envisaged.
3 
As an operational command construct it had the advantage of having a 
single commander in charge of both the offensive and defensive forces thus allowing 
for close co-ordination between the main arms of the RAF’s striking power. With the 
expansion now under way the practical limits of this approach, in terms of span of 
control, were becoming clear. This chapter covers the development of the thinking, 
staffing, and implementation of the RAF Command re-organization begun in 1935 
and enacted in July 1936. It reveals the more operational focus underpinning the re-
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organization and sheds light on the working practices of the Air Ministry under 




A Memo from CAS 
CAS wrote to DCAS, Courtney, on 5 June 1935 to outline his thoughts and 
task an urgent study into the organizational structure of the Service.
5
 By mid-1935 it 
was apparent that the structure of the RAF would not withstand the increasing 
pressures of expansion and war preparation and Ellington began by setting the overall 
context: 
We shall shortly have to make up our minds as regards the 
organization of ADGB when it reaches a size of 105 squadrons besides having 
under its operational control a large body of Territorial guns and lights.
6
 
Admitting that he had yet to finally make up his mind, he informed his DCAS that: 
I am inclined to think that ADGB as one Command with 6 Bombing 
Areas, 2 or 3 Fighting Areas, even if grouped under a super Fighting area, 2 or 
more Territorial Anti-Aircraft Command, and a large number of Observer 
Groups, is going to be so large as to be unwieldy.
7
 
From this outline analysis flowed his tasking to Courtney; 
Consequently I should like your views as to a proposal to separate the 
defence part of the organization from the offensive part.
8
 
Several authors have suggested that the primary reason for the 1936 re-organization 
was the need for the RAF to accommodate the demands of physical expansion and 
attend to the obvious administrative challenges that such growth would create.
9
 
However, Ellington’s memo makes it quite clear he was more motivated by 
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operational factors than the prospect of easier administrative of the increasing 
frontline. He stated that the suggested separation of the defensive and offensive parts 
of the Service: 
would be more in the direction which I believe things will develop 
after the outbreak of war, if not on its outbreak, if a large part or the whole of 
the bombing squadrons were sent overseas.
10
 
This important memo in the development of the RAF shows that the twin 
pressures of expansion and war preparation were at the heart of CAS’ ambitions for 
the re-organization of the Service. Once again, Ellington had openly signalled the 
direction in which he wished the changes to develop and the subsequent staffing of 
this work must be seen against this background of clear direction from the CAS.
11
 
Courtney responded on 11 June 1935, the following Tuesday, beginning with 
a safe statement: 
I am inclined to think that we ought, as you suggest, to separate the 




However, the remainder of his Minute suggested that a significant amount of thought 
had been given to this topic ahead of CAS’ tasking Minute of the previous 
Wednesday and DCAS went on to outline the supporting arguments for his opening 
statement. He was firmly of the mind that the two organizations would be ‘performing 
in war two quite separate functions.’ The fighter organization would have to 
concentrate on the relatively straightforward and obvious defensive function, whilst 
the bomber forces would undertake the more complex mission of the offensive with 
its direct and indirect effects. He argued that the bombers would be: 
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endeavouring by bombardment, to weaken enemy resistance and his 
power to continue the war, and incidentally, will be assisting the defence. 
By separating these two distinct functions DCAS considered that each commander 
would be able to concentrate on his responsibilities without distraction from other 
priorities. However, he thought that there would, without re-organization, be too 
many subordinate groupings for a single commander to effectively command, and he 
was adamant that the imposition of a super C-in-C over the proposed offensive and 
defensive parts would: 
not only produce a very top-heavy organization, but will be tantamount 




This was a very interesting statement in light of the debate that would emerge 
in 1937-39, and was the first reference to the concept of there being a super C-in-C, 
for it was not something CAS had raised in his Minute.
14
 It can only be concluded that 
it was under discussion in the Air Staff and that the DCAS was addressing a subject 
and dismissing it before it could gain traction in the staff process. Nonetheless, it was 
obvious that the DCAS was opposed to any higher co-ordination of the emerging 
commands by anyone other than the Air Staff. He argued that if a super C-in-C were 
established he would be distracted from the needs of the offensive campaign by the 
pressing demands of the defensive battle.
15
 This could lead to his being continually 
called to the War Cabinet. He even considered that the stress of responsibility for the 
success of the defensive campaign and its impact on the population of the UK would 
‘be likely unduly to influence the selection of objectives for the counter-bombardment 
campaign.’ 
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Courtney then went on to emphasize that the demands of the offensive battle 
and the additional complexities that would arise from part of the offensive force being 
deployed overseas, demanded that the defensive duties should fall to another 
commander. In a sentence that clearly revealed the mood of the time and the relative 
priority the RAF felt should be accorded the offensive over the defensive function, he 
concluded this section by suggesting that the challenges of the offensive mission 
would ‘undoubtedly absorb the activities of one man without the distractions of the 
defensive campaign.’
16
 Thus in the mind of DCAS the separation of the two functions 
was a sound operational move that would allow the parallel campaigns to be 
conducted without overloading commanders or distracting them with the pressures 
and demands of the other mission. The offensive held primacy and was the more 
complex and the offensive commander must be protected from the ‘distractions’ of 
the defensive battle.
17
 Finally, he could see no need, and several drawbacks, to the 
establishment of a super-C-in-C to co-ordinate the offensive and defensive missions. 
As a summary of Air Staff thinking in 1935 it was succinct and unequivocal. 
However, despite his sentiment that the offensive and the defensive could and 
should be seen as 2 separate campaigns with limited interconnection, Courtney went 
on to suggest that: 
it must be realized that there are several points of contact between the 
offensive and defensive parts of the organization which, if separated, would 
require the closest liaison.
18
 
He considered that there would need to be close co-ordination of intelligence, safe 
bomber routing through the defensive zones, and close co-ordination in peacetime 
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training to allow mutual development and understanding. DCAS concluded by saying 
that his thoughts are ‘by no means exhaustive’ but that he understood CAS intended 
to hold a small conference to discuss the matter.
19
 
In mid-1935 the Service membership of the Air Council consisted of the CAS, 
the AMP, Bowhill, the AMRD, Dowding, and the AMSO, Newall, with Sir 
Christopher Bullock as the Secretary of the Air Ministry
20
. All these senior colleagues 
needed to be consulted and make their contribution to this pivotal debate that would 
shape the ability of the RAF to function successfully in war. Over the coming days 
their responses to CAS’ Minute began to emerge. 
On 12 July 1935 Newall wrote to CAS introducing a Memorandum prepared 
by the DofO Welsh, on ‘The Organization of the Home Commands – 1935 Expansion 
Scheme C’.
 21
 Newall recommended Welsh’s paper as the basis for further discussion 
and highlighted where it differed from CAS’ stated views.
22 
He supported Welsh’s 
contention that the present Air Staff were over-worked and thus incapable of 
addressing all the issues necessary for the preparation of the RAF for war. He stated: 
There is no doubt in my mind that the Service as a whole, particularly 
at Home, is under-staffed. There is no pool to meet war requirements and, 
practically speaking, there is no time available to mobilize a Home Defence 
Force for war. It is, therefore, essential that our staffs and organization in 
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He then summarized that: 
I agree also with D of O that as a Service we are prone to over-




I am convinced some co-ordinating authority, other than the Chief of 
the Air Staff, and freed from the burdens of administration, will be required 




He was, thus, in opposition to DCAS on the emerging issue of the need for a super C-
in-C, a subject that was to be further addressed in the submission of AMP. 
Bowhill’s contribution was sent to CAS on 18 July 1935, just ahead of the 
meeting planned for 22 July 1935, the following Tuesday.
26
 In it he recorded for the 
first time several issues and opinions that events were to prove over the coming years 
to have been particularly prescient. Bowhill began his service career in the RN where 
he was an acknowledged and courageous leader.
27
  Immediately prior to taking up the 
appointment of AMP from Ellington, he had served as AOC Fighting Area in ADGB, 
the DSD in the Air Staff under Salmond, and as Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO), HQ 
Iraq Command under Ellington.
28
 He was, therefore, amply qualified to offer an 
operational perspective on the re-organization proposals. 
He began by offering equivocal support to CAS’ central premise: 
I am of the opinion that to have a C-in-C Offensive and a C-in-C 
Defensive is the ideal solution except for one most important point, namely 
that it will really mean that the CAS will become Commander in Chief in 
wartime as far as home defence goes.
29
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He considered this inevitable because: 
The tendency nowadays with wireless and improved communications 
is definitely for Commanders-in-Chief to get orders of what to do from their 
respective heads. I think this was proved during the last war as far as the Navy 
and the Army were concerned.
30
 
Having set out a logical position he homed in on what he saw as the nub of the issue: 
I think the whole question revolves round the point: can CAS divorce 
himself from the operations of a home air defence war? It would be an ideal 
solution if he could, but I do not think it will be possible for him to do so. The 
Cabinet will continually refer to him in respect to the operations and in this 
new warfare with our intricate social obligations so many departments will 
also be involved. Co-ordination will have to be carefully worked out between 
the fighters and bombers, and also we must not forget the aircraft which are in 
our commands under Coastal area and Inland area.
31
 
This led Bowhill to conclude that it was inevitable that the Air Staff would have to be 
‘the co-ordinating body to give the main directions of the campaign.’ If his views 
were accepted, he suggested the Air Ministry would need an operational room and 
that the COS for the CAS would be the DCAS who would require enhanced staff 
support. Offering an alternative which involved the IG acting in the central co-
ordinating role, Bowhill conceded that such a scheme could work. But whichever 
approach was chosen there would be a requirement for co-ordination, a view in 
contrast to that espoused by DCAS, and that co-ordination, Bowhill felt, would be 
best offered by an enhanced Air Staff in which DCAS acted as CAS’ operational 
executive. Bowhill concluded his Minute by offering alternative arrangements for the 
Inland, Armament, and Maintenance areas, all of which would eventually find favour 
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The CAS Conference - 22 July 1935 
Having received their submissions, CAS wrote to AMSO, AMP and DCAS on 
22
 
July 1935 ahead of the Conference he had convened to discuss the issue.
33
 He 
began by stating that he did not agree to the proposed super C-in-C and that the duty 
of co-ordination would be undertaken by the Air Staff in the form of the DCAS who 
in wartime would shed his DOI duties which would be allocated to a new 
appointment.
34
 He was content with the Fighter Command proposal but thought that 
three Groups would be required to meet the operational demands as he saw them 
unfolding. Issues remained with Coastal Command and the allocation of 
reconnaissance bomber squadrons which he felt would necessitate different 
arrangements for peace and war for these units. He cautioned against too high a rank 
being allocated for some appointments, particularly those relating to administration in 
the Command HQs. Finally, he expected the Groups to be commanded by a mix of 
AVMs and Air Cdres not just by AVMs as had been proposed. He concluded with a 
detailed listing of appointments and ranks to summarize his thoughts and direction.
35
 
The meeting proceeded in close harmony with the views set out in CAS’ note, 
and first addressed the question of whether the C-in-C ADGB was still required.
36
 It 
was concluded that it was not and that in peacetime the duties of supervising Fighter 
Command and Bomber Command would be undertaken by the Inspector General 
(IG), the newly appointed Brooke-Popham, supported by the DSD in the Air Staff.
37
 
In wartime the responsibility for co-ordination would fall to the CAS who would be 
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assisted by a deputy, the exact appointment of whom would be decided once the 
future of the IG post was established
38
. They agreed that there should be a C-in-C for 
both Fighter Command and Bomber Command and that their initial locations would 
be Uxbridge and Bentley Priory respectively. Fighter Command was to have three 
groups and Bomber Command six, commanded by a mixture of AVMs and Air Cdres. 
Organizational flexibility would allow the Torpedo Bomber squadrons to come under 
Coastal Command in peacetime before transferring to Bomber Command for 
operations in war. The previous term ‘Area’ was to be dropped and the new title of 
‘Group’ was to be adopted to recognize the functional vice geographic structure of the 
new organization.
39
 AMP was to make a broad assessment of the career implications 
of the decisions reached and co-ordinate with his Air Council colleagues.
40
 
Thus, in the space of less than seven working weeks the senior staff of the 
RAF had reached a conclusion about the future structure of the Service. The only 
record of the civilian staff being engaged is contained in the CAS Memo of 22 July 
1935 in which he notes that S.7, the Air Ministry Secretariat, had recorded on 17 July 
1935 their concern that the proposed rank allocation could imbalance the overall 
officer career structure. But Ellington could not be accused of leaving the civil 
servants in the dark over his intentions as the original note to DCAS had been copied 
to S.6, another part of the Secretariat. However, there is no record of any significant 
involvement in the debate by the civilian staff, or of CAS consulting directly with the 
Secretary, Bullock, who had asked CAS to ensure there was early engagement in 
future matters after difficulties they had had in the Air Staff review completed in 
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 This apparent oversight aside, what is obvious is that Ellington was dominant 
in the debate from his initial Minute tasking DCAS to undertake the study, to his 
Memo prior to the 22 July 1935 Conference which so clearly focussed discussion and 
would have indicated to his subordinates what their senior had in mind. Aside from 
the primary sources it is notable that the key works that deal with this period, namely 




CAS tasked AMSO to co-ordinate the broad details with the wider staff.
 43
 
This second phase of the re-organization addressed the consultation with civilian staff, 
field commanders and their staff, and the critically important Treasury, who were 
being asked how the structure would and could work, not what the structure should 
be, that had already been decided. And it is important to keep in mind that the 
discussion among the Air Council Members was focussed on the operational aspects 
of the re-organization not the administrative aspects of expansion. 
Welsh approached Bullock on 2 August 1935 suggesting that he would ‘wish 
to see this file’.
44
 On 10 August 1935 the Air Ministry Deputy Secretary, Ross 
outlined his concerns that the proposals involved ‘some highly important questions of 
financial control and procedure and of accounting organization’ and that the 
‘Secretary will wish himself to review these points and thereafter to remark on the 
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proposals as a whole’.
45 
Welsh approached the Secretary again on 15 October 1935 
highlighting the keenness of the Air Staff to begin the process of re-organization.
46
 
Ross offered his view to Bullock on 19 October 1935 pointing out that the re-
organization involved 3 sets of questions: the organization of the commands; the 
organization of the administrative services; and the details of the personnel 
establishments.
47
 He did not debate the proposed Command re-organization but 
produced a note for the Secretary’s consideration on the administrative services which 
he considered was the key to the successful implementation of the scheme. The tone 
of the Deputy Secretary’s Minute was entirely helpful and contained an 
acknowledgement that Welsh was aware of the need to address the detail of 
administrative arrangements and personnel issues.
48
 
Bullock minuted Welsh on 30 October 1935 his broad support and agreement 
with Ross’ issues.
 49
 He confirmed that he was in favour of air rank administrative 
officers at the commands but wanted to be reassured that administrative functions 
would not be repeated further down the chain of command. His views on financial 
decentralization are revealing: 
I am afraid there is little prospect of such decentralization on any 
extensive scale. My personal opinion is that financial control tends to be over-
centralized throughout the Government machine, e.g., I do not consider the 
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that the theory and practice of centralization are so deep rooted in our 
system of National Finance that the Treasury would never agree to any 
extensive further devolution of financial powers.
51
 
Bullock then observed: 
On the other point canvassed on this file, I myself, feel that an AOC-
in-C Air Defence of Great Britain, outside the Air Ministry, will be inevitable 
later on – with a minimum staff, primarily for operations.
52
 
However, he also noted that CAS proposed to let this matter rest until more 




The Decentralization Conference - 18 November 1935 
The meeting Welsh had hoped to hold in August was finally convened in the 
Air Ministry on 18 November 1935 with AMSO taking the Chair. Newall began by 
stating that the purpose of the gathering was ‘to obtain the views, particularly of the 
Commands, regarding the possibility of decentralizing administration from the Air 
Ministry’.
54
He also highlighted the need to remove administrative duplication, or 
‘post offices’ in the chain of command, and to delegate the fullest authority to 
subordinate commanders to allow them to act without ‘constant reference to higher 
command’. He then went on to inform the Conference that the CAS ‘wished to have 
only one link in the administrative chain between Stations and the Air Ministry’. 
Accordingly, it was proposed that the Groups would have full operational staff but 
practically no administrative personnel, while the Commands would be given a full 
complement of both. He observed that: 
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This would mean that the general work of administration was carried 
out directly between the Commands and the Stations, leaving the main 




The Conference began with the C-in-C ADGB, Steel, observing that he 
believed both the Commands and Groups would require full administrative staff and 
that there was little, in his opinion, that the Air Ministry could ‘off-load’ on the 
Commands. Unsurprisingly, the Group commanders believed that if there was to be 
only one filter between the units and the Air Ministry, it should be the Groups and 
that they would require administrative staff. Steel explained that a similar experiment 
in India, when No. 1 (Indian) Group at Peshawar had been given only operational 
staff, had failed because the AOC lacked the essential administrative detail to carry 
out his duties. That AOC was now DSD, Barratt, who supported C-in-C ADGB 




The debate continued with two viewpoints emerging which pivoted on the 
need for full staff support at the various levels of command. The Deputy Secretary of 
the Air Ministry, Ross, pointed out that the Service was short of experienced staff 
officers and would be for the foreseeable future; therefore it was essential to place 
these valuable personnel in the location where they could have the maximum effect. 
Barratt observed that comparisons which were regularly made between the 
organization of the Army and that of the Air Force were of limited value given the 
fundamentally different natures of the two Services. He argued that Group 
Commanders needed full staff support as did the Cs-in-C but that the exact detail of 
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the balance of duties could be developed later. Picking up on comments by the 
Deputy Secretary, Barratt pointed out that the Esher Committee has recommended 
that the ‘number of units which should be controlled by any formation was from 3 to 
5’. Barratt saw no reason to depart from that view. 
Representatives of the Inland, Coastal, and Fighting Areas all supported the 
need for administrative staff at group and command levels. Steel then suggested that a 
Sub-Committee should study the matter and examine how much decentralization was 
possible or desirable. He went on to observe that a Group Commander ‘could not 
divorce himself from technical development and maintenance.’ Therefore, he was 
forced to conclude that two filters were required between the Air Ministry and the 
units. 
At this point the Conference moved on to the discussion of which units would 
form which Groups. A lengthy debate ensued in which idea and counter idea were 
explored without any clear outcome.
57
 If the purpose of the Conference has been to 
reach broad consensus, then it had failed. If, on the other hand, its purpose was to 
flush out positions, allow all parties to have their say, and to explore alternatives that 
the Air Staff could then incorporate into the final proposal, then it was a success. 
The year concluded with an exchange of staff notes setting out respective 
positions for the record but with no major alterations to the re-organization as 
envisaged by the CAS. Indeed, Lord Swinton wrote to Lord Wigram at Buckingham 
Palace on 12 December 1935 seeking His Majesty’s approval to a series of senior 
appointments he wished to make and informing the King that: 





I am proposing to divide the Command into two, one Command of 
bomber squadrons and one of fighter. The squadrons will be organized in 
groups under these two Commands, and responsibility for co-ordination will 
rest with the Chief of the Air Staff.
 58
 
It would be somewhat awkward for the Secretary of State to walk away from such an 
unequivocal statement to the Sovereign, whose constitutional position was that of 
Chief of the Royal Air Force.
59
 
Air Council Deliberation 
On 15 January 1936, AMSO wrote to Lord Swinton, the Under Secretary of 
State, Sir Philip Sassoon, CAS, AMP, AMRD, and the Secretary, Bullock.
60
 
Enclosing provisional establishment outlines and a memorandum outlining the details 
of the new organization, he asked his colleagues to ‘consider this organization and to 
agree to it in principle after which Treasury approval will be sought.’ He pointed out 
that initial discussion with the Treasury had exposed their concerns as to the number 
of groups and staff proposed, but he advised his colleagues that if they continued to 




AMP contended that he was unclear as to what useful function the TC would 
perform in peacetime.
62
 He felt the Training Groups were sufficiently distinct as to 
require no greater co-ordination and to thus the case for a C-in-C was dubious. 
Nonetheless, he supported the idea of decentralization and minimizing the duplicative 
staff that some were insisting upon. He suggested that a Maintenance Liaison Officer 
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at the Group level could ensure the Group Commander was sufficiently briefed on 
maintenance issues without the need for additional technical staff.
63
 
AMRD, Dowding, replied on 1 February 1936 in his own hand and as far as 
AMSO would have been concerned, in a less than fully supportive way.
64
 He stated: 
I am sorry to say that I should find the greatest difficulty in agreeing to 
this organization in principle. It is often the case that a system, not 
theoretically sound, can be made to work by energy and good will, and it may 
be that this is such a system, but I have my doubts. [Emphasis in the original] 
 
I presume, although it is not precisely stated, that the basic fact is that 
it is impossible to find the individuals to man Command and Group Staffs for 
some years to come, and that some device must be found to for overcoming 
this difficulty. But this is only a surmise, and without the basic facts and 
figures, I could not put forward any constructive criticism. 
I should very much like to see the Minutes of the November 
Conference (para 10) if they exist. My main apprehensions are that, instead of 
decentralization, a terrific centralization will be created at Command HQ, and 
that the difficulty of visiting stations so numerous and widely scattered will 
result in a loss of touch in technical matters; and that the proposal to allot 
Personnel Work to Groups, and the remainder of the Administrative work at 
Commands, will result in confusion.
65
 
One wonders what AMSO must have thought on reading such a submission. 
However, with typical efficiency and speed, CAS had already written to AMSO on 20 
January 1936 stating: 
I agree in principle with this organization.
66
 
This swiftness of response, and the close working and personal relationship Newall 
enjoyed with the Secretary of State, Lord Swinton, were to be pivotal in securing the 
decision he and the CAS sought.
67
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The Secretary replied to AMSO on 29 January 1936 the same day he minuted 
the Secretary of State.
68
 To Newall he offered a lengthy critique by Ross of the re-
organizational proposals and the opinion that ‘there is need for further consideration 
and elucidation of the major points raised.’ But he endorsed Ross’ final summary and 
with the exception of clarification regarding 12 and 13 Groups and the organization 
and control of the Training Groups, was broadly content, especially as AMSO’s 
purpose was to obtain Treasury approval for the general scheme to enable the 
necessary work to institute the Commands to proceed.
69
 However, in his note to 
Swinton, the Secretary adopted a different tone: 
What I think is wanted before there can be any question of taking an 
Air Council decision is further examination and elucidation between branches, 
and I have asked AMSO to discuss the points raised by the Deputy Secretary 
with him in the first instance. 
 
I think the proposals are certainly not quite ripe for discussion at a 
special meeting of the Air Council and unless you particularly wish I am not at 
all certain that such a meeting will necessarily be the best procedure.
70
 
A day later, 30 January 1936, Lord Swinton replied to the Secretary: 
I now understand the main proposals, which I think are sound.
71
 
He then endorsed the principles of decentralization, the desire to eliminate ‘post 
offices’, the concept of a Maintenance Liaison Officer at the Groups, the need for an 
AOC to command and oversee the Training Groups, and the general desire to 
minimize staff size, stating clearly that: 
While I am satisfied as to the general principles, it is the duty of the 
Air Council to ensure that the number of Groups does not exceed what is 
really necessary, and that the staffs provided are no larger than is necessary.
72
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A day later the Secretary forwarded a Minute to AMSO with the Secretary of State’s 
decision: 
I have always had a very open mind about the Training Command, and 




There is no indication of written contact between CAS, AMSO and the S of S. But the 
swiftness of Swinton’s response in the face of the Air Ministry’s Secretary’s urging 
for delay and further study, suggests that some pre-briefing of Lord Swinton must 
have occurred. Either way, the stage was now set for Newall and Welsh, assisted by 
Ross, to engage with the Treasury and gain their approval.
74
 
This process was concluded on 25 April 1936 when Mr Parker from The 
Treasury wrote to Ross giving the Treasury’s overall approval
75
. A number of issues 
needed clarification but none were significant. Ross was thus able to issue the Air 
Council commanded letter, promulgating the establishment of the new command 
structure, on 4 May 1936
76
. The letter summarized the background to the changes and 
provided Appendices that illustrated the new structure. It directed that Bomber and 
Fighter Commands would come into existence on 1 July 1936 and that the Training 
Command would form ‘a little later’.
77
 In actual fact DofO sent a directed letter on 20 
May 1936 clarifying the establishment dates.
78
 Fighter and Bomber Command would 
now form on 14 July 1936 and Training Command would form with 24 Group on 10 
July 1936. He also clarified that 22 (Army Co-Operation) Group would be 
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administered by Fighter Command but for operations and training it would remain 
directly under the Air Ministry.
79
 
Bowhill and Dowding - Unfinished Business 
This, however, was still in the future. Newall still owed his colleagues AMP 
and AMRD a response to their earlier correspondence. He used a similar opening 
paragraph to both asking them to accept in principle the proposed re-organization of 
the Home Commands.
80
 He pointed out that the proposals had already been accepted 
by the S of S and CAS and that there was a pressing need to reorganize in advance of 
the new squadrons forming. To both he offered the concession that he did ‘not pretend 
that this re-organization is perfect and at first sight there may appear a number of 
anomalies.’ And then went on to address the various issues they had raised in their 
correspondence with him. Once again the discussion related to operational focus, 
administrative viability and the necessity for staff duplication. His note to Dowding 
concluded with the sentence: 
I am asking you to accept it in principle now so that we may proceed to 
work out the details and have the organization given an adequate trial.
81
 
AMP replied on 25 March 1936 repeating some of his concerns about the Training 
and Armament Groups but concluding: 
I note the S of S and CAS have agreed in principle to the proposed re-
organization. Having put the above opinions on record, however, I will spare 












 Ibid., E 30c, dated 25 March 1936. 
75 
 
AMRD’s response, sent on 27
 
March 1936, deconstructed virtually every element of 
the proposed structure. Dowding began simply: 
You put me in a very difficult position. 
 
If my agreement is of any importance or value, I wish that I had been 
consulted before CAS gave his approval, instead of being presented with a 
‘chose jugee’ and asked to accept it blindly. 
I am afraid I am not convinced by your arguments in minute 3.
83
 
Dowding’s arguments were based on a basic difference of opinion in which he 
felt that the way to achieve less upward referencing was for the Air Ministry to 
demand less information. He was not convinced that the approach taken was the best, 
or that alternatives had been given a fair assessment, or that the RAF’s propensity to 
employ officers in staff appointments vice warrant officers in the manner of the Army 
was the most efficient way ahead. He also challenged the immediacy of the need for 
change given that the expansion of the Service would take place incrementally and 
not all at once, therefore, there would be time to evolve new structures. 
In view of his approach to command during the Battle of Britain his comments 
at paragraphs 17 and 18 are interesting: 
I consider that the alternative of leaving the Groups devoid of staff and 
concentrating staff at Command Headquarters is still less desirable because I 
am convinced that, in large formations, great congestion of work would occur, 
and the staff will be quite out of touch with the units. But I think the system 
might be made to work after a fashion if Group Commanders were considered 
not as being intermediate links in the chain of Commands, but as being 
inspectors of training and operations acting under Command Headquarters. 
 
I do like the idea but, even so, I would prefer it to the proposal with 
which I am now asked to agree, which, in my opinion, is a system foredoomed 
to failure. Neither the C-in-C nor the Group Commander will be in a position 
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to have complete information about his units. A divided control and 
responsibility will ensue, which is bound to lead to inefficiency.
84
 
Dowding, finished his critique with an expression of loyalty: 
If and when it should ever be my duty to command a Formation under 
the system now approved by CAS, I need hardly say that I should make the 
most loyal and wholehearted attempt to make it a success. 
 
What you are asking me to do is something quite different and that is 
to accept, in principle, as a Member of the Air Council, a scheme which I 
believe to be basically unsound, on the grounds that it has already been 
submitted to, and accepted by, the senior Members of the Council.
85
 
To put this comment in context, Dowding was due to handover the post of 
AMRD to Freeman in four days on 1 April 1936 in preparation for assuming the post 
of C-in-C Fighter Command, an appointment approved by HM The King in 
December 1935. If his colleagues were of the opinion that Dowding was difficult and 
‘prickly’, this letter will have done nothing to change their minds. But, as with most 
of Dowding’s viewpoints, there was a great deal to be said for what he raised. The 
problem was that his response arrived a month after CAS and S of S had signalled 
their agreement to the plan. Whereas AMP accepted this with good grace, Dowding’s 
response could hardly be seen as displaying the levels of collegiate responsibility 
hoped for in a senior Air Council member.  
Newall let the matter rest with Dowding but informed CAS on 16 April 1936 
that he had gained the agreement of AMP but not AMRD.
86
 Nonetheless, AMSO 
requested CAS’ permission to proceed with the final Air Council endorsement. He 
added a hand written note to CAS: 
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Possibly when the late AMRD assumes his new command you may 
wish to consider writing him a line?
87
 
The following day, 17 April 1936, CAS minuted AMSO: 
I agree that this organization should be given a fair trial, and I have 
already discussed the matter with A/M Sir H Dowding. I think we can rely on 
him to give the scheme a fair trial, and I think, also, that it may require 
considerable modification in detail. The aim is sound; it is the difficulty of 
getting a commander to dissociate himself from one aspect of the activities of 
his Command which is likely to give trouble.
88
 
Barratt - an Alternative View 
Barratt, DSD, arrived at the Air Ministry on 12 January 1935 from the post of 
SASO, HQ RAF India and prior to that appointments commanding No 1 (Indian) 
Group, Chief Instructor at the RAF Staff College, and more distantly Commandant of 
the School of Army Co-Operation. He was both an accomplished staff officer and 
seasoned commander. On 4 October 1935 he wrote directly CAS to outline his views 
on the proposed re-organization.
89
 That he should feel able to do this says much for 
Ellington’s openness and approachability, traits which he is often not credited with 
having in abundance.
90
 That the nature of Barratt’s note was one of criticism of the 
position taken by CAS further supports the contention that the Ellington Air Ministry 
was one where staff felt able to speak up and offer their views. 
Barratt began by recognizing that CAS had already offered his clear view on 
the future organization of the Home Command and stated that: 
It is therefore with considerable diffidence that I submit this note 
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He suggested that: 
the centralization of control under the CAS of the Bomber and Fighter 
Commands is likely to be dangerous from two points of view: 
(a) The Staff side. 
(b) Operations. 
Barratt felt that on the outbreak of war the demands on CAS would be enormous, so 
much so, that he would rarely be able to dedicate sufficient time to pure operational 
matters. This would necessitate the DCAS assuming the operational role, ‘in other 
words the DCAS becomes a virtual C-in-C’.
92
 
He also suggested that if the Air Ministry were to become pivotal in the 
conduct of day to day Home Defence Operations there would be an inevitable 
tendency for the Air Staff to over focus on that campaign to the detriment of other 
actions taking place elsewhere. To support this argument he highlighted the partial 
focus created in the War Office during the First World War in part by the tendency for 
the General Staff officers to become over immersed in the daily conduct of Western 
Front operations. Quoting Sir William Robertson in Soldiers and Statesmen, he 
argued that the CAS would need to act as a ‘shock absorber’ between the Prime 
Minister and the overall C-in-C of RAF forces. 
He argued for the creation of a small operational staff for the C-in-C that 
would conduct exercises and training with the forces they could expect to command 
in war. He deprecated the alternative whereby peacetime staff officers would take up 
war appointments with little experience or knowledge of the structures and units 
under command. 
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In terms of operational factors, he found himself at variance with DCAS in 
considering that although the offensive and defensive organizations had separate 
functions, they were and would remain, mutually dependant. He suggested that there 
would be occasions when the bomber force might need to be directed against enemy 
aerodromes, and he asserted that he believed that ‘this action is better controlled by a 
C-in-C who is freed from all other distractions.’ 
He summarized his position: 
I therefore submit that in order that our organization may proceed from 
peace to war with the minimum of dislocation and improvisation and be ready 
to operate at full efficiency from the outset, there should be a C-in-C 




He thought it sensible that both the bomber and fighter units of the RAF 
Contingent should be organized under a single group which would ensure the AOC 




CAS responded to AMSO on 8 October 1935 stating that he had read DSD’s 
Minute but he did not intend to change what was settled in July 1935.
95
 He observed 
that: 
DSD’s proposal really means introducing a super C-in-C between the 
Air Ministry and the organization proposed last July. Should it be considered 
necessary to do this, it can be done later. In any case during the expansion I 
am satisfied that we should adopt the organization by which Fighter and 
Bomber C-in-Cs come direct under the Air Ministry.
96
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Barratt became the Commandant of the RAF Staff College with promotion to 
AVM on 1 January 1936 and so it would seem that speaking his mind in a reasoned, 
logical, and loyal way to a CAS willing to listen and be challenged was no hindrance 
to Barratt’s future prospects, and shows that the RAF and Air Ministry of the 1930s 
was an organization of which tolerated debate and the expression of well considered 
but contrary views. 
The Re-organisation in Retrospect 
The background and debate surrounding the re-organization of the RAF in 
1936 has been reproduced in great detail for this information does not exist in any 
other publication, and its absence from the record inadvertently supports the view that 
the 1936 changes were primarily a response to the needs to manage the physical 
expansion of the Service.
97
 The primary sources do not support this theory and the 
records reveal that the discussions overwhelmingly focussed on the operational and 
war preparedness needs of the Service. CAS, in particular, constantly referred to the 
requirement to construct a system that could transition from peace to war with the 
least possible disruption and maintenance of efficiency.
98
 Even the opposing views 
offered by some were cast in terms of operational need. The greatest critic, Dowding, 
whose contribution to Newall effectively opposed almost every element of the 
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The operational thesis is not to say that the re-organization did not facilitate 
the receipt and induction of the newly forming units and the various new aircraft that 
were to come into service after 1936. Clearly the new structure was better placed to 
administer the expansion. The decentralization of administration and the 
establishment of the Air Officer Administration (AOA) posts at the Command HQs 
was undoubtedly a more robust structure to oversee the myriad of issues created by 
expanding the RAF to meet the growing threat of war. On the other hand, the creation 
of the AOAs was primarily designed to ‘relieve the Commanders-in Chief of 
operational commands of as much administration work as possible’.
100
 And this was: 
intended to allow Commanders-in Chief to devote more time to the 
strategical, operational, and training aspects of their commands, to allow them 
to visit units to a greater extent than has hitherto been possible, and to attend 
to others matters which they are called upon to perform from time to time by 
virtue of their high rank and appointment.
101
 
Thus the plans to address administration were grounded in the need to allow the 
commanders to focus on the operational aspects of their responsibility, a strand of 
thinking that can be easily traced back to the Brooke-Popham Report on Air Staff re-
organization.
102
 Likewise the new SASO posts established in the Commands and 
Groups added further operational focus and oversight. 
Relieved of their administrative responsibilities the SASOs were now able to 
focus exclusively on operations, training, and war preparation. That they were 
intended to be junior in rank to the AOAs was deliberate because they would be 
working on a daily basis with the C-in-Cs whose rank would ensure the authority and 
focus required for the primary purpose of the command or Group. The AOAs were 
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officers of the General Duties branch, ie, they were aircrew with an operational 
background, and were expected to work independently using a combination of their 
own authority and that accorded them as the representative of the C-in-C.
103
 However, 
the limited staff capacity of the RAF in the 1930s is highlighted by the fact that the 
intended rank differential between the AOA and the SASO did not emerge until the 
promotion of Evill to AVM as AOA Bomber Command in March 1938.
104
 Until then 
the AOA and SASO posts were held by Air Cdres.
105
 Nonetheless, the intent was for 
the AOA to work more independently and to allow the C-in-C and SASO to 
concentrate on operational matters. 
The difficulty in populating the staff structure with officers of the correct rank 
illustrated one of the enduring aspects of life in the RAF of the mid-1930s. The 
Service had been so small in 1934, approximately 31,000 officers and men, that the 
expansion expected was too great and at too fast a pace for it to expand without a 
drastic reduction in rank experience and expertise.
106
 If the RAF had existed in a 
vacuum, then this would not have been an issue as it would have been its own 
reference point. But it did not, and it had to maintain equality of rank and talent with 
its sister Services, who would be all too quick to highlight any shortfall in standards 
by the junior Service. Thus, Ellington and Bowhill, as AMP, were acutely aware that 
despite the pressures of expansion, rank still needed to be earned and its recipients 
must be respected as having achieved a comparable standard to their Army and Navy 
colleagues. Allowing officers time to grow at a controlled pace in the new structure, 
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as the structure also grew, ensured those officers were well grounded and ready for 
the challenges ahead. The same approach guided the development of the Services 
equipment. 
Ellington is often criticised for his reluctance to advocate more rapid 
expansion of the RAF in the early years of expansion.
107
 His logic was twofold. First, 
he doubted the realistic pace of German re-armament particularly in the air, and 
secondly, he did not wish to fill the RAF with aircraft that would be obsolete before 
the beginning of the war for which he was preparing.
108
 This last point placed him at 
variance with those who wished to maintain a numerical dominance over Germany to 
underpin diplomacy.
 109
 Ellington would appear to have had his focus on the need to 
build a Service of the correct quality to meet the expected quality of the Luftwaffe 
when the war came.
110
 Montgomery-Hyde recorded Ellington as saying: 
There is no reason to change the view that Germany will not be ready 
for or is not intending to go to war before 1942.
111
 
In this Ellington was to be proven wrong, but he was merely repeating the common 
view of the time. In the meantime, support to diplomacy and qualitative preparation 
for inevitable war with Germany remained very hard imperatives to harmonize in 
1934-6. 
The general shortage of experienced junior staff officers also had its impact on 
the plans for the re-organization. Dowding addressed this with Newall in their 
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exchange of letters in early 1936. Newall countered Dowding’s assertion stating that 
although: 
it would be impossible to produce in the time sufficient staff officers 
for the Groups and the Commands on the present basis, this was not the basic 
reason for changing the organization.
112
 
Nonetheless, the shortage of qualified staff officers was a clear planning factor 
in determining the proposed structure. But it appears that Newall, in particular, was 
using this obvious constraint as a virtue to drive through bigger changes in attitude 
that he, and others, especially Welsh, felt were needed if the RAF was to be properly 
configured for war. Newall told Dowding that the main reasons for the organisational 
changes were: 
the necessity for speeding up the administrative machine, for giving 
officers responsibility concomitant with their rank and appointment and to free 
Commanders of certain details of administration to enable them to devote 
more time to operational training.
113
 
He then went on to highlight the practice that he felt had developed during the early 
years of the RAF’s post-war existence: 
Up to the present, as pointed out in the draft Air Council letter, owing 
to the necessity for producing a common doctrine there has been a tendency 
for subordinate commanders to lean on their superiors in matters which it is 
now considered they are capable of handling themselves. This habit of leaning 
goes right up the ladder from the Units to the Air Ministry and if we do not 
change our organization, will persist.
114
 
Newall hoped that by removing one of the administrative ‘links in the chain’, self-
sufficiency would be encouraged and the decentralization they sought would be 
achieved.
115
 Dowding remained sceptical.
116
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The working practices of the inter-war Air Ministry are not well covered in the 
literature. Few publications address this rather mundane topic as most focus on the 
more exciting narrative surrounding the development of the aircraft that formed the 
backbone of the expansion schemes. Even the various Official Histories and AHB 
Narratives throw little light on exactly how the Air Ministry worked and Dean, 
Ellington’s PS, paints only a sketchy picture of the actual staff practices.
117
 
The Air Ministry at Work 
Although CAS had his detractors: 
What is rarely mentioned is Ellington’s superb quality as a Staff 
Officer. He had an acute mind and a remarkable memory. He was quick to 




Ellington is one of those senior officers of the RAF whom history has cast into the 
shadow of seemingly greater men. It is undoubtedly true that his assumption to the 
post of CAS came about in the most unfortunate of circumstances surrounding the 
death of Sir Geoffrey Salmond, and he was, therefore, clearly not the first choice.
119
 
He was also a shy man whose military background did not include any operational 
flying, but that did not inhibit his ability to get on with his Service contemporaries, 
particularly his COS colleagues in the Royal Navy and Army. But Freeman’s 
assertion that Ellington was ‘the worst we ever had’ probably reveals more about the 
opinionated Freeman than it does about Ellington.
120
 He was clearly much more than 
that as the following summary will show.
121
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The initiating note to DCAS was sent by CAS on 5 June 1935. By 22 July 
1935 CAS had held a Conference and confirmed in writing to his colleagues the broad 
details of the Re-Organization as it would unfold in 1936. The consultation with the 
Civil Service, Treasury and RAF operational commanders was undertaken by Newall 
and Welsh during the winter of 1935/36. But the S of S had been sufficiently briefed 
and convinced, presumably by Ellington and Newall, that in December 1935 he was 
confident enough to reveal the main details of the plan to the King. The Air Council 
and Secretary were engaged in January 1936 but their objections were circumvented 
by the CAS and S of S taking and recording their views before their objections could 
be raised. The subsequent harmonization of AMP and ARMD/C-in-C Fighter 
Command was handled directly by Ellington while Newall addressed the final details 
of the scheme with Ross, the Deputy Secretary in support. Just over a year after 
tasking the study, Ellington presided over the creation of the operational organization 
with which the RAF would fight the Second World War, and the basic structure had 
been decided within seven weeks in June and July 1935. It was a remarkable 
achievement and a repeat of the success Ellington had in reforming the Air Staff in 
1934. But what does it show of the way the Air Staff worked? 
The first observation is the central role of Ellington. He appears to have had a 
very clear idea of what he required before tasking the DCAS to study the matter. His 
habit of making his views clearly known also had the effect of focussing his 
subordinates to deliver his wishes not those of the assembled staff. Some would 
criticise this as being poor management because by making his views known he 
would inevitably limit the options that the staff would offer. On the other hand, his 
approach would today be called ‘command-led’ decision making, after which the staff 
87 
 
enact the commander’s desire.
122
 However, given the complex nature of the re-
organizational challenge it is debateable whether it required a more collegiate and 
consultative approach.
123
 And it could be argued that by not fully satisfying the 
counterviews of senior colleagues that the ground was set for continual debate and 
unnecessary adaptation in the future, as in fact occurred. But Ellington’s main aim 
appears to have been to break the mould and create a new structure that he readily 
acknowledged was far from perfect. In terms of effective change management this 
was an essential step. 
The second observation is the small circle of personnel who were actually 
within the decision-making group. Although CAS addressed his request to DCAS, 
AMSO and DofO dominate the subsequent staffing. The Secretary’s Department had 
been informed via S.6 and probably updated by Dean, Ellington’s PS, but Bullock 
was not officially informed until well after CAS had firmly concluded the shape of re-
organized RAF. Air Council Members were handled personally by Ellington but their 
concerns expressed in early 1936 were only partially accommodated within the final 
plan. Finally, Swinton was clearly engaged and positively so. How this took place is 
unclear as Swinton’s biographer suggests that Swinton only enjoyed a relationship 
with Ellington that was ‘never close’.
124
 It is likely that both Ellington and Newall 
engaged Swinton who was only too pleased to receive their support, for Swinton had 
                                                          
122
 K Grint, Leadership, Management and Command – Rethinking D-Day (Trowbridge: Cromwell 
Press, 2008), pp. 13-16. 
123
 Ibid., p. 16. 
124
 Cross, Lord Swinton p. 150. On the other hand, Cross records that ‘he had high regards’ for Newall, 
whom he first met in January 1934 when on his East African tour as Colonial Secretary. 
88 
 
a reputation for active engagement in his duties and a determination to be at the heart 
of senior decision making.
125
 
Thus, it is possible to identify a central group of decision makers that included 
Swinton, Ellington, and Newall with Welsh in senior staff support. In support were 
the other Air Council Members whose ‘agreement in principle’ was vital but whose 
views were of interest but little more. Next came the Secretary and Ministry civil 
servants whose task, as seen by Ellington, was to enable his decisions. Finally, the 
affected commanders in the field needed to be engaged in a way that allowed their 
views to be incorporated but not to the extent of altering the fundamental structure the 
CAS desired. 
There was little wrong with this approach. It delivered an outcome swiftly that 
was to prove more than fit for purpose. It allowed significant a change programme to 
be undertaken in parallel with the other major changes that were underway in the RAF 
at the time. And it kept up the tempo of change in the wake of the re-organization of 
the Air Staff. It is also true that this small group was but one of many that orbited with 
Ellington at the centre. Other equally exclusive groups addressed equipment 
developments, training matters and financial scrutiny. The trio of Swinton-Ellington-
Newall was not the only close group of decision-makers in the Air Ministry at that 
time, and there is no evidence to suggest that Ellington was exercising command 
through an early form of ‘kitchen cabinet’. What he appears to have been doing was 
to gather trusted advisors close for specific matters. He kept the SofS informed 
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because Swinton was well respected by the RAF and central to the final agreement of 
the scheme, as his role in January 1936 shows. 
The final observation is that there appears to have been a deliberate distance 
between the RAF element of the Air Ministry and the Civil Service staff. That is not 
to say that at the more junior levels the working relationships were not close and 
harmonious, they clearly were and there is much primary evidence to support that 
assessment. In this case the distance appears to have been at the more senior level. In 
handling the Air Staff re-organization in 1934, Ellington had had difficulties with 
Bullock because the latter thought he had not been included early enough in the 
process. Ellington had, nonetheless, achieved his aim and reinforced his position in 
the ensuing staff exchange. In 1935/36 Ellington again engaged Bullock after the 
main decision had been made and again had difficulties in gaining the Secretary’s 
agreement at the Air Council. Notably, unlike the Air Staff debate, Bullock chose not 
to engage with Ellington directly over the Command re-organization, which he left to 
Ross the Deputy Secretary. But Bullock’s parallel submission to Newall and Swinton 
on 29 January 1936 suggests that Bullock was not above playing one off against the 
other to achieve his aims.
126
 
The insight the 1936 Re-Organization gives into the working practices of the 
Air Ministry is of a structure that, although confronted by monumental challenges, 
was well led and capable of reaching decisions and seeing them to fruition. The staff 
processes were tight, the committees and conferences focussed and well recorded, the 
engagement with other Government Departments was well handled and the 
communication and engagement with the RAF structure outside the Air Ministry was 
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continual, broadly harmonious and productive, especially at the director level. Big 
personalities did stride the stage but these appear to have been quietly handled by the 
CAS himself. Constructive criticism was allowed and indeed encouraged. Those with 
a valid view needed to have no fear of offering their views, within the strictures of 
normal politeness, right up to and including a direct approach to the CAS even after 
he had made his final views quite clear. 
This is a picture of an organization far removed from the staid, hierarchical 
structure that brookeding no dissent that is often portrayed as the military culture of 
the 1930s. What is indisputable is that by the summer of 1936 the RAF had re-
organised its Air Staff and Air Ministry and established a frontline command structure 
that was founded on the then agreed assessment of how a future war would develop. 
That concept envisaged largely separate campaigns being fought in distinct 
geographical settings. Thus the changes from the geographically defined ‘Area’ to the 
functionally defined Command and Group was accompanied by a conceptual view 
that the functionally defined commands would fight in geographically separated areas, 
thus obviating the need for intimate co-ordination. Were future operations not to 
develop along these lines then the functional model would be strained and the 
pressure placed on the CAS/Air Staff co-ordinating role could become unbearable. 
However, in 1936 there was little reason to believe any meaningful variation from the 
widely held view of a future war would unfold, indeed, a Joint Planning Committee 
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(JPC) report would shortly re-confirm the underlying principles that the RAF had 
used to establish the basis for its new Command structure.
 127
 
The Super C-in-C Debate Returns 
Barratt, Newall, and others had supported the idea that a super C-in-C should 
co-ordinate the operations of the Commands in war and prepare them in peace. CAS, 
in responding to Barratt’s note to him on the subject had suggested that if the idea 
gained traction it could be accommodated at a later date. On 11 December 1936 CAS 
wrote to DCAS, AMSO and the new DSD, Air Cdre Douglas, stating: 
The method of exercising higher command or control of the Fighter 
and Bomber Commands in War will have to be settled before long. During the 
present stage of the expansion, and while I was CAS and Sir Robert Brooke-
Popham, Inspector General, I had intended to exercise the control by making 
him DCAS on the outbreak of war, and the existing DCAS, D O I only.
128
 
What the current DCAS thought of this is not recorded, but CAS had opened the 
debate on one aspect of the unfinished business of the 1936 Re-Organization. The 
outcome of this debate was to have significant implications and consequences for the 
higher direction of the war not just in the RAF, but in the other Services and the 
Nation’s War Cabinet.  
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THE 1937 SUPREME AIR COMMANDER DEBATE 
By July 1936 the RAF had established the basic structure of the Air Ministry 
and the Metropolitan Command organization that would operate throughout the 
Second World War. Ellington oversaw both reviews and his guiding and determining 
influence is clear in the surviving records. It is also clear that that he remained 
concerned about the higher command of the RAF in war and particularly the manner 
in which the new command structure would work.
1
 The simple questions of who 
would ‘command’ the Commands and how that mechanism would operate remained 
unanswered. 
Some clues to Ellington’s thinking can be seen in the documentation relating 
to the 1936 Command Review. CAS’ Minute to DCAS on 5 June 1935 highlighting 
the need for the RAF to adapt its command structure to meet the challenges of 
expansion emphasized far more the need to adapt the service’s structure to meets the 
challenges of war.
2
 In particular it emphasised the need to ensure that the limited 
number of experienced staff officers in the RAF were effectively positioned within a 
system that could make best use of their talents with the minimum of duplication and 
friction.
 
 The efficiencies demanded by Ellington were required to meet the stark 
reality that the RAF was insufficiently manned with experienced staff officers to 
undertake the roles and responsibilities that would inevitably fall upon it in wartime.
3
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This theme pervades the paper circulated by Welsh, on 19 June 1935, and was the 
central topic for debate at the critical CAS meeting held on 22 July 1935.
4
 
A further Memo from CAS 
CAS circulated a memo firmly setting out his viewpoint and the organizational 
structure he wished to see.
5
 He was clear that the new commands would work directly 
to him via the air staff who would oversee the co-ordination of the functional 
commands proposed. At the Meeting he addressed whether the C-in-C ADGB was 
still required and concluded it was not and that in peacetime the duties of supervising 
Bomber Command and Fighter Command would be undertaken by the IG, the newly 
appointed Brooke-Popham, supported by the DSD. In wartime, Ellington said he 
envisaged he would be assisted by a deputy, the identity of who would be decided 
when the future of the IG was finally established. Clearly, CAS had in mind an 
operational command war role for the IG and a complementary peacetime role 
supervising the preparatory work of Bomber Command and Fighter Command.
6
 
Ellington returned to this theme when he made public his concerns that the 
higher co-ordination of the RAF was still unresolved, on 16 November 1936, in 
another telling memorandum to his colleagues inviting their views on his proposal 
that the IG should now formally act in the role of senior co-ordinator of the functional 
commands.
7
 Writing to the Cs-in-C Bomber and Fighter Command, he stated: 
                                                          
4
 Ibid., Welsh’s Paper entitled Memorandum by D of O on the Organisation of the home Commands – 
1935 Expansion Scheme C, is filed as E1A dated 19 June 1935, and E7a dated 22 July 1935. 
5




 TNA AIR 2/1950, S39818, E 1A, 2A dated 16 November 1936. 
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I have recently been considering how the control of the Fighter and 
Bomber Commands is to be exercised in war, and I am quite clear this cannot 




As long as Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was available as Inspector-
General, and during the period when expansion puts the greatest strain on our 
resources for the provision of staff, I have intended to make him my deputy 
should war break out while he was Inspector General and I was Chief of the 
Air Staff. Now, however, his time as Inspector-General is nearly up, and it is 
not yet settled whether or not there will be an Inspector-General to succeed 
him; and I also am approaching the end of my time.
 9
 
Although not previously officially stated it was clear Ellington intended to use 
Brooke-Popham and the small IG staff to carry out the function of higher co-
ordination alluded to at the Command review meeting in July 1935. In a Minute to 
DCAS, AMSO, and DSD he was more specific in his thoughts: 
During the present stage of the expansion, and while I was CAS and 
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Inspector-General, I had intended to exercise the 
control
10
 by making him DCAS on the outbreak of war, and the existing 
DCAS DOI only. This I have always recognized as a temporary expedient 




Both Steel at Bomber Command and Dowding at Fighter Command replied promptly 
the same day, 20 November 1936.
12
 
Steel began by reassuring Ellington that he and Dowding had been considering 
the co-ordination of the two Commands for some time.
13
 He felt that peacetime co-
ordination and liaison between ‘must be continuous’ but that appropriate guidance 
from the Air Ministry through DSD would suffice for non-routine matters such as 
RAF Displays, Army Manoeuvres etc. He observed that the established mechanism of 
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Air Ministry co-ordination conferences sufficed and that from them grew the staff 
integration necessary for efficient operations. Turning to the requirements of War, 
Steel offered the following: 
In War time the situation is somewhat different, in fact, I think co-
ordination as such will naturally be far less. We are now considering the 
simplest method by which Fighter Command is kept accurately informed of 
the movements of our own Bombers and for dealing with the Intelligence 
brought back continuously by our own Bombers. Our object is to provide the 
most simple machinery for producing what is required and cutting out any 
unnecessary links in the chain of communication.
14
 
He summarised his opening thoughts thus: 
You will see from the above remarks that as far as the actual carrying 




C-in-C Bomber Command then addressed the question of how Bomber Command and 
Fighter Command would get the ‘necessary strategical direction in War.’ After 
summarizing Ellington’s proposal he stated simply: 
May I say straight away that I think such an arrangement would be 
most unsatisfactory and very inefficient.
16
 
Steel then developed his strongly held view that the responsibility for the overall co-
ordination and command of the RAF could rest only with the CAS and if that 
argument was accepted that challenge then became one of creating sufficient capacity 
within the Air Staff to carry it out. Clear no fan of the post of IG, Steel was blunt: 
Before giving you my ideas on how this might be done I want to refer 
to the question of an Inspector-General. I do not think there is a place for such 
an individual in the RAF and I think the appointment should be abolished.
17
 
Ellington highlighted this passage in the File with his characteristic double pencil 
sidelining.
18
 It should be borne in mind that at the turn of 1936/37 Ellington was 
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expected to serve as CAS for no more than nine months and that the discussion over 
whether the post of IG should continue naturally intertwined with the debate over who 
should occupy that post. Ellington would have been a clear candidate. Thus, the 
situation facing the Cs-in-C was that a new CAS was about to be announced and the 
out-going CAS could very well be appointed to the IG role with responsibilities for 
the peacetime co-ordination and training of their Commands and their direction in 
War. This cannot have been a particularly appetizing prospect for the two main Field 
Commanders, Steel and Dowding. 
Dowding’s reply was more concise comprising six short paragraphs but 
equally non-supportive.
19
 As ever, Dowding was swiftly to the point: 
The Commanders-in-Chief of the Bomber and Fighter Commands will 
be conducting two separate campaigns abroad and at home respectively, and I 
think that there is no necessity for the creation of any additional Command 
outside the Air Ministry. In fact, I think that the creation of any such 
Command would be definitely harmful as introducing an additional wheel of 
the chariot. 
 
I think that the two Commanders-in-Chief should get their instructions 
direct from the CAS or from the Air Staff speaking on his behalf. 
If the CAS is too pressed to exercise direct control, and if he feels that 
the existing Air Staff will be inadequate for the purpose, he could appoint a 
senior officer as his Deputy and allow the existing DCAS to revert to his 
primary function of ‘Director of Operations and Intelligence.
20
 
Dowding concluded by suggesting that his proposal could be useful in peacetime to 
alleviate the pressure he felt the Air Staff were already facing.
21
 The similarity of 
opinion and construct of these two letters suggests a measure of co-ordination 
between the respective offices of the Cs-in-C, despite Steel’s request to CAS to be 
permitted to share a copy of his letter with Dowding. Both were firmly of the opinion 




 Ibid., E 5A dated 20 November 1936. 
20





that a SAC was unnecessary. Both believed the Air Staff needed enhancement and 
additional senior deputies needed to be appointed. And both either explicitly, or 
implicitly, opposed the continuation of the IG position. This commonality of view 
from the two field commanders could not be ignored and was assessed by James to be 
the deciding factor in the ultimate decision.
22
 
Separate to the Cs-in-C, Ellington had written to Trenchard and Brooke-
Popham seeking their views.
23
 Trenchard’s hastily dictated reply, signed by his PS, 
gives a feel for the mood of the time: 
I am dictating this letter on the platform at Euston Station, so I shall 
not see it before it is sent to you, nor shall I be able to sign it. 
Thank you for your letter and also the enclosures with reference to a C-
in-C. 
I am afraid I have never read anything that so fills me with alarm as the 
two letters you have sent me, as not, in my opinion, showing a grasp of the 
problem. As far as I can see both advocate the Air Ministry being Commander 
in Chief. This, of course, means eventually the Secretary of State – Quite 




Brooke-Popham’s reply was more measured and comprehensive, and 
developed ideas that he had raised during the Air Ministry Review of 1934.
25
 As a 
summary of what would be required in a future war it stands out for its foresight and 
clarity. 
Beginning with an accurate summary that the ‘main functions of the C-in-C 
Bomber Command’ in war would be the allotment of tasks to the Groups and the 
ordinary duties of a C-in-C regarding maintenance and the sustainment of morale. He 
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thought the commander should ‘spend a lot of his time going round the squadrons, 
especially those that had had a rough time.’ C-in-C Fighter Command would be 
‘responsible for the general direction of Fighter activities as between his Groups and 
must also keep a general watch on the enemy offensive’. In a sentence that would 
have great resonance in 1940, Brooke-Popham felt that C-in-C Fighter Command: 
should not concern himself with the immediate details of raids but 
should watch methods and trend of enemy activities so as to be able to deduce 
what they are likely to do next.
26
 
Demonstrating a broader view of the interdependence of offensive and defensive 
operations than was evident in the replies of the responsible Cs-in-C, Brooke-Popham 
was unequivocal in calling for co-ordinated command and control: 
There must be someone in supreme control to co-ordinate the Bomber 
and Fighter activities. For instance, if the Fighter Command are having great 
difficulty in dealing with one particular type of enemy aircraft, the Supreme 
Commander might have to order the Bomber Command to attack the depots 
that feed this particular type of enemy aircraft, or the aerodromes whence they 
operate, possible after consultation with the War cabinet through the CAS.
27
 
In pencil, Ellington sidelined this passage and commented ‘Certainly’.
28
 
Brooke-Popham concluded his letter by summarizing his views on the post of 
IG which he felt was of great use during the period of expansion but could be difficult 
to sustain once the expansion was complete. Nonetheless, he felt there was much to be 
done and described a process which today would be seen as corporate mentoring 
which could enhance the capability and capacity of Service, acknowledging all the 
time that the appointment called for someone who besides: 
possessing considerable tact, must have sufficient prestige and length 
of service to enable them to visit squadrons and Commands without causing 
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offence, and he must also carry out his duties without encroaching on the 
authority of the CAS.
29
 
Ellington’s correspondents emphasized the diversity of viewpoint that his 
proposal would have to harmonize. At the heart of the matter was the vision of air 
warfare that the various individuals held. If air warfare could be compartmentalized 
into offensive and defensive activities, then a process of staff co-ordination and 
liaison would probably suffice to ensure the necessary de-confliction and information 
flow; the view held by the two Cs-in-C. However, if air warfare was to be the 
interplay of offensive and defensive action integrated into a wider campaign of 
mutually supporting activity, then the need for more active and engaged command 
and control emerged. This was the view espoused by Brooke-Popham, and one 
suspects, also by Ellington. 
Within the Air Staff, Ellington officially began the debate with the Minute to 
the DCAS, AMSO, and DSD on 11 December 1936.
30
 Once again his responses 
highlighted the difference of viewpoints held by the staff. The DCAS response was 
sent 3 February 1937 and supported the views of the Cs-in-C.
31
 Agreeing with the 
view that the need for co-ordination between the two commands was ‘very small 
indeed’, DCAS offered the view that the type of ‘control’ that would be necessary in 
war would be the ‘issue of instructions and directives’ which would be very different 
in nature between the two commands. He felt Fighter Command’s role was ‘a cut-
and-dried job’ that was not ‘susceptible of orders or instructions from above.’ Indeed, 
he felt that: 
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It may be that the Air Ministry would wish to give instructions on 
points of detail but in regard to the major policy of the campaign there is really 
nothing to be said to them except to do their best to defeat the enemy attacks.
32
 
The direction of Bomber Command was a different proposition. DCAS concluded that 
the flexibility of attack offered by Bomber Command would lead to a situation in 
which it would be pulled in a ‘variety of ways and a variety of directions’. He felt sure 
the War Cabinet: 
would take a very direct and real interest in the operations of the 




He then offered a view that would be central to the future conduct of the air offensive: 
In my view, a decision as to how the bombers are to be used cannot be 
made by the Bomber Commander-in-Chief nor indeed by anyone except as a 
result of discussion and agreement at the War Cabinet or Chiefs of Staff Sub-
Committee. I maintain that no CAS would abrogate his responsibilities for 
giving advice to the War Cabinet or to the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee as 
to the proper direction in which the bombers should be used, and for this 
reason  hold that there is no place for a super Commander-in-Chief.
34
 
Addressing Trenchard’s criticism that the proposals risked turning the Air Ministry 
into a ‘Commander-in-Chief’, DCAS pragmatically highlighted that whatever 
arrangements would be concluded there would always be a need for the Air Ministry 
to pass on the direction of the War Cabinet and that that, in itself, did not constitute 
the assumption of ‘Commander’ status by the Air Ministry. He concluded by agreeing 
with Steel and Dowding that the time may have come for the post of DCAS to be split 
from that of DOI but he reaffirmed that he was firmly of the view that the CAS must 
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On 3 March 1937, AMSO, Newall, sent his reply.
36
 He began by highlighting 
a challenge the RAF continued to face, namely the acceptance of its method of 
command and stated his view that: 
I can see no real analogy with C-in-C in the Field but I feel most 
strongly it is essential that the basic principle of a supreme commander should 




Disagreeing wholeheartedly with Steel and Dowding to the point of suggesting he 
understood their ‘parochial point of view’ that they would like ‘to be left alone to get 
on with their jobs and resent any possible interference’, he raised a potentially 
significant point concerning the nature of warfare fought over the Metropolitan area. 
Newall considered that in the event of a major air attack the population would demand 
the appointment and identification of a ‘generalissimo’ who would be responsible for 
all aspects of the aerial battle. He was convinced that: 
No kind of committee control, divided responsibility, Air Council 
direction or anything of that kind would satisfy the public and what was really 
required is the inspiration and confidence such as that inspired by Kitchener at 
the commencement of the late War.
38
 
But the problem would then become how to protect the authority of the CAS and 
prevent the SAC from being constantly summoned to the War Cabinet.
 
In outlining 
his ideas he had encapsulated the dilemma the RAF faced. 
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Newall also took exception to the view expressed by DCAS that the co-
ordination between the Commands would be ‘very small indeed’. With prescience 
which hindsight confirms he went on to state: 
I am convinced that this will prove a fallacy and in addition to the co-
ordination between these two Commands there will be the operations of the 
Coastal Command, possible air striking forces and contingents with the Army 
on the Continent, and further, as each year passes and the range and speed of 
aircraft increases, air forces in the Middle East at any rate are becoming 




In 1937 this was the stuff of dreams but by 1943/44 it was a matter of fact and an 
issue of command still demanding resolution. 
Newall concluded with five summary points including his view that Home air 
defence presented an enormous task which must be undertaken by a commander, or 
‘generalissimo’ as he termed the appointment, who enjoyed government and public 
confidence. That commander would need a good staff and a location close to, but 
outside London.
 40
 Douglas, replied on 11 March 1937 concurring with Newall before 
stating that the CAS should set out the strategic policy determined by the War Cabinet 
to the ‘generalissimo’ who should then ensure it was carried out in the most efficient 
and effective manner by the various forces at his disposal.
41
 He would, in effect, ‘allot 
the tasks to the various Commanders-in-Chief’. He also emphasized that there were 
great advantages in having the detailed direction of the air war in the hands of a single 
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At the end of this consultation process Ellington faced two firmly held 
viewpoints from within his own Air Staff and from the Commanders-in-Chief. His 
method of resolution gives further evidence that he was a man of far firmer conviction 
than historians have previously credited. While various staffs were responding with 
their views, Ellington had already gained the support of the SofS, Swinton, to the 
main elements of his proposal. On 5 February 1937 CAS wrote to DCAS to inform 
him that the SofS had agreed to the establishment in time of war of an operational 
command interposed between the CAS and the Cs-in-C of the four commands at 
home.
 43
 The command would probably be formed from the IG and his Staff and 
would be located close to the Air Ministry; its function would be to issue directives 
and instructions at the behest of the CAS and the War Cabinet. Internal staff 
discussions continued but on 19 April 1937 the Secretary, Sir Donald Banks, wrote to 
the Home Commands informing them that an overarching operational command 
would be formed in wartime to oversee and co-ordinate their operations.
44
 The SofS 
signalled his agreement on 15 April 1937 adding in a hand written footnote that he 
assumed that there would be ‘no public announcement of any kind’.
45
 No such public 
announcement was planned and as far as the CAS was concerned the matter was now 
settled along with 3 other matters that developed in parallel with the SAC debate. 
First, the PM established on 15 February 1937 a Standing Sub-Committee of 
the CID to examine defence plans from the point of view of Government Policy and 
to ‘Provide a possible nucleus of a War Committee or War Cabinet in the event of 
                                                          
43
 TNA AIR 2/1945, S39754, minute M14 dated 5 February 1937. 
44
 TNAAIR 2/1950 S39818, E28D dated 19 April 1937. 
45





 Second, the future of the IG position had been finalized following a 
discussion between the SofS and CAS.
47
 Ellington would assume the role on standing 
down as CAS on 1 September 1937 and thus become the inaugural SAC. And third, 
the selection of Ellington’s successor which the SofS and CAS had also discussed at 
their meeting on the afternoon of 13 January 1937 was also finalised.
48
 Swinton chose 
Newall who would assume the role on Ellington’s departure on 1 September 1937. 
Given the juxtaposition of all these various decisions and events, it would 
reasonable to conclude that Ellington’s determination to steer his plan through largely 
unmodified, and in the face of unanimous opposition from his Cs-in-C, would have in 
some small part been influenced by the foreknowledge of his appointment as the IG. 
Likewise, Newall’s support for the proposal, but with the caveat that the 
‘generalissimo’ should be located outside the Air Ministry, suggests that he too was 
aware of his likely succession when drafting his reply to Ellington almost a month 
after Ellington had informed the Staff that the SofS had agreed the plan. The 
subsequent speed with which matters were concluded and the absence of any obvious 
further dialogue with the Cs-in-C or Trenchard, again suggests the Air Ministry was 
engaged in a formal process of consultation for procedural propriety, perhaps behind a 
more informal dialogue, to ensure an outcome that it had sought in the first place. 
However, the internal decision making of the Air Staff and Air Ministry now had to 
be exposed to the scrutiny of the other Services and the COS Secretariat under 
Hankey. Unfortunately for Ellington and Swinton, their ‘internal organizational 
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matter’ now became entwined and complicated by the arguments designed to support 
the RAF’s staffing of the Inquiry into the future organization of the FAA. 
Wider Implications of the FAA Dispute 
By early 1937 DD Plans, Harris, had developed a wide ranging, but somewhat 
strongly worded, paper addressing the higher command of air power in general and 
the FAA in particular.
49
 Harris argued that the only way to exploit the air arm that the 
Nation could afford was to ensure it was used in the most efficient and effective way 
and that that required a flexible command structure that was able to allocate scarce 
resources to the most important areas for as long as required and no longer. Proposals 
that allocated aircraft to self-sufficient organizations were, according to Harris, 
wasteful, inefficient and indicative of a Service, the Royal Navy, which did not 
understand the nature of air power and the need for flexible command arrangements.
50
 
On 8 March 1937 he wrote to DCAS, Pierse, emphasizing the need to reach 
some measure of agreement over the method of exercising effective co-ordination, in 
this case, of operational planning.
 51
 He identified four areas of co-ordination that 
events were to prove to be particularly troublesome once war began; integration of 
Coastal Command into air and naval plans, apportionment of Bomber Command to 
naval co-operation, inter-communication between the Services, and the method by 
which the air striking force would integrate its activity with naval and military 
operations. These issues were intimately linked with the wider role that some 
envisaged for the SAC, that of horizontal co-ordination with the sister Services and 
                                                          
49
 TNA AIR 9/81, HA/1/59 AHB, Plans archives Vol 59, Co-ordination and Control of Defence 
Operations, Memo by DD Plans The Organization, Control and Co-operation of the Defence Services 




 TNA AIR 9/81, M1 dated 8 March 1937. 
106 
 
anticipation of evolving operational needs and pressures. It was increasingly 
impossible to separate one specific aspect of higher operational command and control 
from another and Harris’ plea was summarised in typical hand written candour: 
I suggest, therefore, that there is urgent need for ‘Coordination’ to be 
brought to the fore forthwith in the hope that, as soon as the FAA controversy 
is settled, we can get down to planning the operational control of the future 
campaigns in a manner permitting departmental details to be settled in the 
light of overall policy rather than ad hoc guesswork.
52
 
On 10 March 1937, the DCAS wrote to Ellington seeking his agreement to 
broaden the circulation of a modified form of DD Plans paper with the aim of adding 
a new strand of thinking into the FAA debate, arguing that the paper would help to 
‘ventilate with everybody the foundation upon which our arguments against 
Admiralty contentions are based’.
 53
 Ellington refused on the sound grounds that the 
SofS would not permit the paper’s wider circulation until he had had an opportunity to 
consider its implications himself.
 54
 However, he was content for the paper to be re-
worked into a broader piece addressing the Higher Co-ordination of Defence.
55
 
The RAF operational perspective was based on the belief that the advent of the 
aeroplane had fundamentally changed the nature of warfare.
56
 It was not that the 
creation of a third service that had complicated matters, but that a faster national 
decision-making process, able to exploit the advantage of air power still needed to be 
created. Regardless of the unfolding expansion schemes, the RAF knew that they 
would never have sufficient resources to perform the ever growing list of tasks they 
were being expected to deliver. If the response from the other two services was to 
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press for self-sufficiency to address their own environmental needs, then the resources 
the Nation was prepared to allocate to air power would be unnecessarily divided and 
effectively reduced. If this were to happen then the RAF would be nothing more than 
the source of ancillary support to the traditional means of warfare.
57
  
Following Ellington’s earlier direction, a much modified version of Harris’ 
original paper was offered to the DCOS Committee bearing the title DCOS 49 
‘Higher Co-ordination and Control of Defence’ on 16 April 1937.
58
 As the summer 
passed into autumn the changes of CAS and IG took place. Pierce remained as DCAS 
and the RAF representative on the DCOS Sub-Committee of the COS Committee, the 
committee that would study the RAF’s proposal with its embedded concept of the 
SAC. 
DCOS 49 outlined the need for co-ordination of operational control; the 
problem requiring solution under the headings of co-ordination of the defensive, co-
ordination of the offensive, and co-ordination of the offensive and defensive together; 
the factors and difficulties affecting a solution, before concluding with its 
recommendations. Accepting that progress had been made in several important areas, 
e.g., co-ordination of planning and intelligence, it argued that it was now vitally 
important to develop a ‘satisfactory system for co-ordinated control of actual 
operations’. 
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It highlighted a particular aspect that continually troubled the Air Staff and 
which grew out of the flexible weapons systems they were introducing to service. It 
stated: 
That inherent limitations in the total strength of our armed resources 
make it impossible to provide permanent allocation of separate and specialized 




This was the nub of the RAF’s command and control philosophy and a viewpoint that 
put them squarely at odds with their naval and military colleagues. The flexibility 
claimed by the airman inspired his vision of the command structure required for the 
efficient and effective use of the air arm. It was this difference in philosophy that had 
increasingly marked the boundary lines between the Services in their various inter-
war debates. The second half of the paragraph quoted above illustrates this point well: 
In any case it would be wasteful, even if it were otherwise possible, to 
adopt that course seeing that the flexibility of air forces enables them to be 
transferred from one task to another at very short notice.
60
 
Echoing comments made by Newall, this quote encapsulates the goal the Air Staff 
sought, namely the creation of a dynamic decision-making system to enable the 
flexible exploitation of the air arm with its wider utility, rapid re-tasking potential, 
and greatly increased operational tempo. 
The Air Staff also argued that the air arm, and its utility in all forms of 
warfare, meant that: 
Defence problems, in short, cannot be solved by a division into 
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Despite the attempt to sanitize that paper from the more extreme rhetoric of Harris’ 
original, it is not hard to identify the main target of the RAF’s concern. The RN was 
firmly wedded to the concept of ‘tactical self-sufficiency’ and was at constant pains to 
point out that their considerable operational experience supported their view. The 
RAF was equally sure that the air weapon would be in far greater demand than could 
ever be met from any realistic expansion scheme and that to avoid a situation in which 
air assets were underutilized in one area whilst in great demand elsewhere, the 
principle of ‘tactical self-sufficiency’ had to be modified. 
The remainder of the paper developed the central themes and argued for the 
establishment of more specific arrangements to meet the various scenarios conceived. 
While the paper put forward a strongly held conviction it is notable that the tone was 
neither dogmatic nor prescriptive. For example, the cornerstone of the RAF’s 
thinking, the SAC was placed in its broadest context: 
As regards the Royal Air Force, the Air Staff have reached the 
conclusion that for a Home Defence war the appointment of a Supreme Air 
Commander will be essential in order to secure the requisite operational co-
ordination between the various Royal Air Force Commands. Whether similar 
appointments of supreme commanders of the whole of our sea and land forces 
respectively is a feasible proposition is a matter for consideration by the 




The paper concluded that the establishment of a permanent combined 
headquarters and staff manned by the three Services would alleviate the problems it 
had identified. This would help to ‘correct the parochial outlook of individual staffs, 
and to stimulate a broadminded spirit of co-operation at the seat of control’. The 
combined headquarters would provide the needed ‘reporting centre and clearing 
house’ in the face of enemy attack and ensure ‘effective counter-measures’. The 
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‘permanent and consequential wasteful, allocation of air forces to particular forms of 
specialized employment could be avoided’ but accurate and prioritized requests for 
support would be enabled through the combined staff. The Cs-in-C of the ‘offensive’ 
forces would have a single centralized authority with which to deal and co-ordinate 
requests for support, this, it was concluded, would prevent the ‘dispersion of effort 
through overlapping or un-coordinated operations.’
63
 
As a charter for integrated command it had few equals, but that was its 
weakness as it continued a theme associated with the RAF of calling for the greater 
integration of the three Service Ministries into a singular Ministry of Defence. 
Trenchard had long advocated this approach and Hankey, the Admiralty and War 
Office had long objected on the grounds that it would place too much authority in the 
hands of one individual.
64
 The fundamental problem from the perspective of the 
Naval and Military authorities was that to agree to a Ministry of Defence would mean 
their agreeing to an equal status within the structure for the new Service, the RAF. 
Seen from today’s perspective this appears perverse in the extreme, seen from 1937, 
when the RAF was barely a 20 year unpleasant departure from sound naval and 
military organizational principles, conceding the establishment of a combined 






 Meeting of the DCOS Committee took place on 15 October 1937 
with Hankey as Chairman, VAdm James, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS), 
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Maj Gen Harding, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, AVM Peirse, 
DCAS, Col Ismay as Secretary, and Mr Ryan as Assistant Secretary.
66
 Hankey began 
by setting out the ‘arrangements contemplated for the exercise of control in war’. 
Supreme control would rest with a War Cabinet in a major war or a War Committee 
of the Cabinet in a war of secondary importance. The established Defence Plans 
(Policy) Sub-Committee of the CID would constitute the foundation of the War 
Cabinet, as envisaged by the PM earlier in the year. He envisaged that the COS would 
have to be present at all meetings of the War Cabinet ‘at which military matters were 
under consideration’. Hankey was content that ‘in practice the system would work 
smoothly and quickly’. He foresaw no insurmountable reasons why rapid decisions 
could not be achieved at short notice and considered that below the War Cabinet or 
War Committee the COS Committee would work as currently configured. He then 
asked Peirse to outline the main features of the DCOS 49 paper. 
DCAS described the SAC role and the method of directives to the Cs-in-C that 
was envisaged as the means of ensuring co-ordination of the air fighting. He stated 
that the Air Ministry felt the CAS would be too occupied with ‘major questions 
arising in all theatres of war and in their relation to the political situation at home’ and 
that he and his Air Staff would not have time to ‘undertake the day-to-day control of 
air operations’. Harding outlined the role of C-in-C Home Forces in the Army 
structure pointing out its similarity to the SAC position. With the seeming beginnings 
of a positive outcome at hand, DCNS entered the debate. 
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James stated that: 
in the case of the Navy, the Chief of the Naval Staff of the Admiralty 




the Admiralty did not accept the that the Chiefs of Staff were going to 
be so taken up with the study of future possibilities that they would be unable 
to maintain contact with day to day operations.
68
 
James made his case that the CNS would make the operational decisions 
relating to the Service for which he was ultimately responsible. Difficulties in the 
allocation of resources, extensive communications established in the Admiralty, the 
need for orders to be framed against the broadest canvas all argued against the Air 
Ministry proposal being adopted by the Navy. He was also concerned about the role 
of the DCOSs which he believed the Air Ministry paper had overlooked. The Navy 
believed the DCOSs would control the day to day operations as had happened during 
the First World War. Nothing appeared so compelling as to demand an alternative, 
and in the Admiralty’s view expensive and duplicative, system be developed along 
the lines proposed by the Air Staff. James then re-iterated the operational viewpoint 
that was at the heart of the Air Staff’s desire for greater flexibility: 
the Admiralty felt that in principle the best form of command was 




Hankey then stated that he had expected the Admiralty to take that view and 
proceeded to recount his experience in the Admiralty at the start of the First World 
War by way of further illustration that the 1SL/CNS should act as supreme 
operational commander. Partially closing off further debate on the matter of naval and 
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military counterparts for the SAC, Hankey then focussed the meeting onto matter 
relating to the sharing of intelligence and the conduct of joint operations. Repeatedly 
James emphasized the need for ‘tactical self-sufficiency’ and focussed on methods by 
which the RAF could provide better support for the coastal defence mission.
70
 
The Meeting subsequently rehearsed and re-rehearsed the RN and RAF 
positions. The Army offered little but was concerned that established procedures 
should not be upset, particularly; they could see no benefit in the establishment of a 
Joint Staff as this would merely duplicate work that must be undertaken in the War 
Office. Somewhat exasperated Pierse repeated his question: 




The Supreme Air Commander should go to the Admiralty. The 




On reflection he added: 
In actual practice the officer with whom the Supreme Air Commander 
would get into touch would be the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.
73
 
Hankey again summarized the situation as he saw it: 
it would be necessary to adapt the Air Ministry scheme so as to make it 
conform to the present machinery for naval control. The Supreme Air 
Commander should work through the Chief of the Air Staff on questions of 
major importance, but should go direct to the deputy Chief of the Naval Staff 
in matters of secondary importance.
74
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Despite Pierse attempting to address the complications caused by the time factor, 
Hankey then moved on to intelligence co-ordination. In his final summing up Hankey 
concluded that: 
co-ordination in operational control between the Navy and the Air 
Force could not be worked out in the way shown in the chart attached to the 
paper under discussion. In theory that layout might be correct and 
comprehensive but past experience showed that there would be practical 
difficulties in the way of working it, Some other plan must be concerted.
75
 
The Meeting agreed, or at least the Minutes recorded that it had agreed, that 
the RAF could retain its concept of a SAC but that naval procedures would not be 
altered and the SAC should liaise with the Admiralty at CNS or DCNS level. The 
proposed Joint Operations Staff were considered redundant because the COS were not 
Commanders responsible for the actual conduct of operations, but the RN and RAF 
would establish closer intelligence links.
76
 
Pierse cannot have left this meeting in good humour. The Chairman had 
heavily influenced the debate, James’ interventions were given significantly greater 
authority than the proposals set forth in the Paper, attempts to address the unanswered 
challenges posed by increased operational tempo were diverted into debates about 
intelligence sharing, and the proposal to establish the basis of an integrated joint 
operations staff was dismissed with barely any serious consideration. Viewed in 
retrospect, Pierse had been ambushed, out manoeuvred and left the meeting empty 
handed; it would be easy to portray James as the villain but his subsequent behaviour 
paints a different picture. 
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DCNS wrote to Hankey on 18 October 1937 stating that he had been 
‘reflecting on our recent discussion about the proposal emanating from the Air 
Ministry’.
77
 In his third paragraph he developed his basic difficulty with the SAC 
concept: 
in view of the vital importance to the sea-going forces of the 
reconnaissance and attack air forces attached to them, decisions to re-orient 
the war effort of those forces would always be a matter for the highest 
authority and could not be a responsibility for an interposed commander.
78
 
He also suggested that ‘it is the time factor in relation to the movements of the human 
body that causes our apprehensions on this question’ whereas the RAF was concerned 
with the time factor as it related to the operation of aircraft that had caused them to 
propose the solution that he had opposed. He then developed this somewhat obscure 
analogy into the compromise that he hoped would allow the matter to be resolved. 
Reiterating the Admiralty experience of the First World War, James suggested 
that by establishing a ‘central war room’ properly manned and continually updated, 
the COS, or their Deputies, could meet and quickly give direction and decision to any 
short notice issue that might arise. He explained his time analogy by stating that he 
‘had in mind the difficulty of the three COS getting quickly together and making 
important decisions of an immediate nature.’ He copied his proposal to Haining and 
Peirse and wrote separately to DCAS on 21 October 1937.
79
 
James suggested to Pierse that he might wish to consider ‘the possibilities of 
establishing your officer who is to control the British aircraft at your Ministry in the 
same way as the DCNS is located here.’ He asked whether it might be that a DCAS 
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would be ‘a better practical solution in view of the inevitable centralization of all 
information at your own Ministry?’ Once more reverting to Admiralty experience in 
the First World War, he explained that DNCS was responsible for the main operations 
while the ACNS concentrated on the specifics of the anti-submarine war. He 
suggested to Pierse that he felt DCAS embraced the duties of both DCNS and ACNS 
and wondered if the time had not come for the Air Ministry to expand its organization 
and introduce an additional senior officer onto the Air Staff to allow DCAS to operate 
in a manner analogous to DCNS?
80
 Pierse acknowledged James’ letter on 23 October 
1937 thanking him for his helpful and positive suggestion which he found ‘very 
heartening’ and convinced him that a practical solution could be found.
 81
 
In the space of eight days from the 15 October 1937 DCOS Meeting to the 23 
October 1937 when Pierse replied to DCNS, the RAF’s position on the establishment 
of a SAC fundamentally shifted towards the methods and procedures of the 
Admiralty. While James’ counterproposal had much to recommend it, it stopped short 
of addressing many of the underlying challenges identified in the original DD Plans 
paper. It also failed to meet published Air Council policy, namely the creation of a 
SAC.
82
 That such change could take place so quickly suggests a number of 
possibilities; the idea was fundamentally flawed and a great error of organization was 
prevented by the helpful intervention of the DCNS; the RAF singularly failed to 
prepare its case and gain support for a sound concept; or the RN were determined to 
resist change, protect their ownership of allocated aircraft, exploit a favourable period 
of institutional advantage following the FAA debate, exploit the dominance and 
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prestige of the 1SL, and the sympathetic ear often given by Hankey to RN viewpoints. 
Or perhaps the Air Staff, and especially the DCAS’ heart, were not truly committed to 
the idea. 
Pierse had opposed the concept at the start of the year and could see that a 
SAC would seriously complicate his appointment’s war role and significance in the 
eyes of the CAS. Newall was a supporter of the overall concept but one wonders what 
his view was, having assumed the post of CAS, of his predecessor occupying such a 
critical role in war. Could that have been partly behind his suggestion that SAC 
should not be located in the Air Ministry? Either way, the argument was shifting 
significantly towards the Admiralty solution and a memorandum published by the 
DCNS on 11 November 1937 added further weight to the RN argument.
83
 
Entitled ‘Operational Control in War’ James set out over three closely typed 
pages the rationale behind the Admiralty’s position. It was an expertly argued paper 
and an important document in the development of Britain’s command structure for the 
Second World War. Its basic premise was encapsulated in the opening sentence of the 
third paragraph: 
Furthermore, the Admiralty were not convinced that it would be 
necessary or desirable for the Chiefs of Staffs to remove their hands from the 
pulse of operations to the extent suggested in the Air Ministry proposal.
84
 
This was an important point of disagreement and one which the Admiralty had 
every right and responsibility to argue. The 1SL, CIGS, and CAS, stood, 
constitutionally, ahead of their Service Board colleagues responsible to the Sovereign 
and Government for the fighting and operational effectiveness and efficiency of their 
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 While other commanders would of necessity be charged with 
the detailed execution of the allotted operational plans, it would remain the COS 
responsibility for their ultimate success. It is difficult to see, given this constitutional 
position, how the RAF proposal would not have resulted in the CAS being weakened 
in the eyes of his War Cabinet and COS colleagues. 
James developed his argument embracing the need to integrate the most up to 
date information into the decision-making location.
86
 He was adamant that reliable 
and secure communications were essential to all sub-commands to enable efficient 
control but was realistic that the cost of providing such communications argued that 
the RAF proposal to establish an additional ‘combined headquarters’ was 
unaffordable given that the Service Ministries would also require them. A balance 
also had to be struck between the proposed structures for the co-ordination of Home 
defence and the wider requirements of Imperial security, both of which would be the 
pressing responsibility of the various COS. Against this background, and supported 
by First World War experience, DCNS concluded that the most cost effective and 
pragmatic way ahead was in line with his suggestion to Hankey and Pierse that a 
Central War Room should be formed and permanently manned to enable the Chiefs of 
Staff and their Deputies to exercise the detailed control of operations that would be 
necessary in war. 
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His final paragraph offered a telling perspective that subsequent events were 
to bear out. It was in contrast to the picture painted by the RAF in its paper and gives 
the insight that was important in sealing the decision: 
When thinking in peace time of the conduct of war, it is inevitable that 
a tempo is visualized which is seldom, if ever, reached. Occasionally matters 
move very fast, but those occasions are rare. The history of war shows that for 
weeks on end nothing very startling happens, nothing requiring important new 
dispositions of forces or re-orientation of war effort. It is therefore suggested 
that those in responsible positions would have time to meet, either for quiet 
consideration of the future or in order to make a quick decision to counter a 
sudden and unexpected move on the part of the enemy.
87
 
This was especially wise counsel and illustrated a potential false analysis 
within the RAF case. While aircraft could indeed move quickly over the battlefield 
and shift from one mission to another far quicker that forces on land or at sea, the 
relevant ‘time factor’ in relation to the higher co-ordination of defence was the ‘time 
factor’ relating to the human decision making not the aerial vehicle. 
Whilst the contents of DCNS’ Memorandum were being digested by the 
respective staffs, the Air Staff were considering the proposal for reforming the DCAS 
role.
88
 Quickly it was concluded that DCAS was overloaded: 
Turning to the past it may be said that while the system has never 
actually broken down, successive DCASs have been forced to chose between 
delay and decisions given upon insufficient consideration. This highly 
undesirable dilemma is however unavoidable under the present system.
89
 
More damningly it continued: 
it is contended that the DCAS’ responsibilities as at present defined 
have been drawn upon so wide a scale that he is denied the leisure, except 
upon the rare occasion, to give the attention to the more important class of 
problem which they certainly demand.
90
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Despite the tortuous and dated language, the message was clear; the DCAS post had 
evolved into a bottleneck within the smooth running of the Air Staff because its remit 
had expanded too far. 
To resolve the issue, DCAS would focus on RAF longer term planning 
covering the Plans and Operational Requirements Directorates, while the Deputy DOI 
would be raised to Director status and work directly with the CAS on operational 
matters. To ensure DCAS could continue to discharge his duties as the Deputy to the 
CAS, he was to be closely informed of all relevant operational matters. This was a 
different structure to the one proposed by the DCNS in detail but not in principle. The 
CAS would retain his primacy over operational matters. He would be supported by a 
Directorate responsible for the integration of operations and intelligence, which would 




On the 29 November 1937 the DOI issued a memorandum ambitiously 
entitled ‘Co-ordination of Higher Control of Operations by the Three Services in time 
of War and the Organization of the Higher Command of the Royal Air Force’.
92
 The 
paper sought to consider: 
The war organization of the Air Staff in the Air Ministry, with whom – 
whether a Supreme Air Commander is appointed or not – must remain the 
higher direction of the RAF in war.
93
 
This was unequivocal in reaffirming the role of the Air Staff and the Air Ministry and 
stated firmly that: 
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There is a discernible tendency to imagine that the supreme air 
commander on his own responsibility could, for instance, divert large numbers 
of squadrons engaged on trade protection duties under Coastal Command, to 
take part in the main bombing offensive against Germany; or from the main 
bombing offensive to objectives connected with the operations of the Army on 
the Continent. It must be agreed that any such assumption is based on a 
misunderstanding of the responsibilities and functions of the Chief of the Air 
Staff, and, moreover, is very dangerous in its repercussions upon the attitude 




Of course the alternative view emphasized by Harris in the original paper 
could be argued to be more efficient, but it ignored the political reality of the military 
system. It was unanimously agreed that higher direction of the war would be the 
responsibility of the War Cabinet and it political elected leaders. A scheme that 
presumed a subordinate senior officer would be able to act in ways that could 
seriously alter the nature of the operations being fought, without reference and 
sanction from the War Cabinet, was fanciful as DOIs paper highlighted. 






Considerable doubt has emerged within the Air Staff as to the 
functions of the Supreme Air Commander, and in fact of the wisdom of having 
such an appointment at all.
96
 
On the other hand, DOI welcomed the compromise proposal put forward by DCNS to 
create a Central War Room ruefully observing: 
This idea no doubt falls short of the ideal; but it is in the character of 




Turning to the ‘War Organization of the Air Staff’ the paper argued that the initial 
idea of placing longer term planning in the hands of DCAS while DOI focused on 
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operations was flawed in that it would either undermine the post of DCAS relative to 
his naval and military colleagues, or create unnecessary work to update and brief him 
to undertake his DCAS role. Either way a better solution could be achieved by 
mirroring the Admiralty structure in which the DCAS would be responsible for main 
operations and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) for subordinate activity. In 
peacetime the ACAS would undertake the majority of the committee work relieving 
the DCAS to concentrate ‘more time for his proper function as Deputy to the CAS. 
The paper then deployed a compelling and conclusive argument against the 
post of the SAC based on the previously aired concerns of undermining the role and 
status of the CAS, the inability to make meaningful re-dispositions without recourse 
to higher authority, the danger of creating duplicative staff structures, and the refusal 
of the other Services to establish equivalent positions with whom the SAC could 
work. It went on to highlight that because Coastal Command would operate as a co-
ordinating headquarters above the broadly ‘self-sufficient’ Groups, the opportunity for 
the SAC to make a meaningful contribution was reduced by a third adding more 
evidence against the appointment.
98
 
This document was an important stepping stone in the development of the 
RAF’s Second World War command structure. It showed that the Air Staff, regardless 
of the CAS and Air Council’s decisions, were unconvinced about the concept of a 
SAC. Undoubtedly they benefitted from the opposition to the proposal by the DCNS 
and the difficulties that arose from harmonizing the role of the CAS with the role of 
the SAC, but it was also apparent that the idea was not popular and that its debate 
offered an opportunity to address a matter that had more resonance with them, namely 





the establishment of an ACAS to redistribute the growing workload within the Air 
Ministry more sensibly. However, Newall was not prepared quite yet for the staff to 
administer the coup de grace to the SAC concept. 
When Pierse attended the 23
rd
 DCOS Meeting on 14 December 1937 he 
outlined the RAF’s position as it had developed over the previous weeks.
99
 He stated 
that: 
it had become clear to him that an organization for the High Command 
based on a Supreme Air Commander outside the Air Ministry would not 
provide satisfactory co-ordination in the absence of his counterpart in the army 
and navy. For good reasons, the naval control was to be centralised in the 
Admiralty, and the Air Staff therefore recognized that command would have 
to be exercised from within the Air Ministry.
100
 
As a consequence, ‘co-ordination would need to be effected from some central 
position by the three Chiefs of Staff either working through the deputies or other 
officers specially appointed for the purpose.’ 
Pierse told the Committee that the CAS had approved the re-organization of 
the Air Staff in line with the DOI Memorandum but that the SofS had yet to give his 
final approval. Nonetheless, the Air Ministry structure would conform very closely to 
that of the Admiralty and the post of SAC was under close scrutiny: 
Under the scheme outline above, there was really no place for him, but 




His next statement is particularly relevant to the manner in which Newall commanded 
as CAS in 1939-40: 
in the opinion of the present CAS there might be some political outcry 
if there was no individual designated as responsible for the co-ordination of 
the air offensive and defensive. This uncertainty, however, need not affect the 
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consideration of the problem before the Sub-Committee. If a Supreme Air 
Commander were appointed, his functions would now be limited to co-
ordinating the air offensive and defensive. He would have no functions in 
regard to the Coastal Command, nor would he be able to decide, in Committee 
with representatives of the other Services, such as major policy questions as 
the degree of pressure to be exercised, or whether bombers were to be taken 




The DCNS spoke next and said that ‘he greatly appreciated the way in which 
the Air Ministry had now approached the problem’.
103
 
Inter-service harmony was further reinforced in a letter sent by DCNS to Hankey 
on 11 January 1938 on behalf of himself and DCAS stating ‘DCAS and I have had a 
most successful meeting on the problem of operational control in war time’ and 
setting out their plans.
104
 
Pierse then circulated his Draft Report on the Co-ordination and Control of 
Defence Operations.
 105
 Over the next few days it was commented on by his 
colleagues, re-drafted and issued as DCOS 57 ‘The Co-ordination and Control of 
Defence Operations in a War against Germany’.
106
 Hankey thought it ‘admirable’ 
while DCNS had ‘no comments’ and assumed it would be issued forthwith.
107
 On 22 
April 1938 following Ismay’s advice, the DCOS 57 Paper was re-worked into CID 
Paper 1425-B and circulated by the COS in Sub-Committee of the CID summarising 
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the winter’s discussions and setting out the agreed process for the higher co-
ordination and control of defence operations.
108
 
High Command in War - CID 1425-B 
In line with Hankey’s earlier summary, the responsibility for the supreme 
direction of the war at the highest level and embracing all aspects of Government 
responsibility rested with the Cabinet.
109
 The PM would discharge that duty through 
the War Cabinet or War Committee as determined by the size and scope of the crisis. 
It was expected that the Defence Plans (Policy) Committee, recently re-titled the CID 
for the Consideration of War Plans, would form the basis of the war time structure. 
The machinery for submitting advice to the War Cabinet would be the same as 
had been developed in peacetime. The ‘mainspring of this machinery was the COS 
Sub-Committee of the CID under the Chairmanship of the Minister for Co-ordination 
of Defence’.
110
 The COS Sub-Committee would support the War Cabinet in all 
matters relating to the planning, execution, and assessment of the war situation. They 
would propose changes and enact the decisions reached by the War Cabinet and be 
present or represented at the War Cabinet whenever discussion of military matters 




The JPC would provide the COS Sub-Committee with the necessary 
appreciations and reports for submission to the War Cabinet; the Joint Intelligence 
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Committee (JIC) would provide the joint intelligence appreciations for the Joint 
Planning Staff (JPS) and the COS Sub-Committee; and the DCOS Sub-Committee 
would ‘produce agreed reports containing advice and recommendations on matters 
usually of current as opposed to long range importance.’
112
 
The COS would receive the Minutes of the War Cabinet meetings but their 
actual instructions would be transmitted to them through the recognized channels, 
namely, the PM, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Service Ministers and/or the 
Secretary of the War Cabinet depending on the degree of urgency of the matter. Once 
received the instructions would be translated into ‘terms of action’ for each Service by 
the Chief of Staff concerned.
113
 
This process would prove satisfactory for the handling of strategy and long 
range planning but the co-ordination of day to day operations in war required new 
processes and procedures. The paper reprised the path to the final decision, conceding 
Newall’s requirement for the SAC role to be retained for possible use but only for the 
‘co-ordination between the action of the bombers and fighters.’
114
 It highlighted that 
the Air Staff had already been re-organized and an ACAS introduced into the 
structure so that: 
the air war will be exercised from the Air Ministry on lines similar to 
those in force in the Royal Navy.
115
 
Against this background the proposed system for operational co-ordination assumed 
that ‘direct control of the operations of the forces of any one Service must be vested in 
that Service; and only when the necessity is proved beyond doubt should any Service 
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assume control over any of the forces of another Service.’
116
 Thus, it was argued, the 
problem boiled down to ‘the provision of an organization whereby, while each 
Ministry controls the operations of its own Service, those operations shall be co-




To accomplish this goal each Service Ministry’s War Room would act in 
concert and harmony with the Central War Room that would be situated ‘in some 
convenient building in proximity to all the Ministries concerned.’
118
 The Central War 
Room would act as the meeting place for the COS or their Deputies ‘for discussion on 
the current situation or plans for the immediate future.’
119
 Decisions taken would ‘be 
implemented by each COS through his own individual Ministry.’
120
 Addressing the 
issue that had caused much previous discussion particularly over the authority the 
SAC might enjoy, it was clearly stated that: 
If a situation arises which demands any major modification of the 
strategical employment of any one Service in the interests of the combined 
national armed effort as a whole, the necessary arrangements should be 
concerted by the Chiefs of Staff or their Deputies in the War Room.
121
 
The process for short notice and day to day events was, in effect, a compressed 
version of the higher level process but one that relied heavily on the establishment of 
the War Rooms and a spirit of co-operative working among the Joint and Single-
Service staff. It lacked the singular authority that Harris had sought but it embraced a 
far stronger element. It was the agreed position of a complex institutional structure 
that had grown from discussion, compromise and co-operation, indeed it was a 
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quintessentially British compromise, but one that preserved the teamwork necessary 
to face the uncertainty of the unfolding international scene.
122
 
The SAC Debate in Retrospect 
James stated emphatically that the concept of establishing a SAC positioned 
between the CAS and the Cs-in-C was abandoned in the face of stiff opposition from 
the Steel and Dowding.
123
 It is true that both Steel and Dowding were strongly 
opposed to the idea but their views were not decisive. The chronology of the debate, 
set out for the first time outside the primary sources, shows the much more complex 
process that ultimately influenced the manner in which the Nation fought the Second 
World War. 
Once again, Ellington had a vision, that of a SAC, that he wished to see 
become established RAF policy. With his characteristic determination and ruthless 
authority, he drove the concept through the normal internal consultative process. 
Gaining the early agreement of the SofS to his idea he brushed aside opposition from 
the Cs-in-C and gave his senior staff officers little time to mount an effective 
opposition before effectively declaring that the SofS had agreed to his proposal and it 
would now be enacted as Air Council policy. In a manner similar to his behaviour 
during the 1934 Air Staff review and 1936 Command structure re-organization, he 
showed his strengths and weaknesses in equal measure. He was certainly willing to 
tolerate debate and dissention and not afraid to consider alternative views. He 
exercised a quiet benign authority within the Air Staff and among his Air Council 
colleagues but at the same time was very clear in his mind what it was that he 




 James, The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940, p.23, footnote 8. 
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ultimately wanted. The central core of his vision was operational preparedness and the 
three RAF reforms of the 1930s are linked by that common theme of preparing the 
RAF organizationally and structurally for war. Ellington epitomised this continuity 
and his thinking about the role of the SAC can be traced in various forms back to the 
start of his time as CAS. 
He had a clear idea of how he wished his Service to develop and was 
determined to see that vision enacted. While he possessed complete authority, if he 
wished to use it, within the bounds of the Air Staff and Air Force Board, he had far 
less authority in the wider sphere. In 1934 he ran into difficulties with his own 
Secretariat for not including them early enough in the Air Ministry review to allow it 
to be smoothly enacted. In 1936 he repeated the error over the Command Re-
organization and came up against difficulties with the Treasury. In 1937 the stumbling 
block occurred within the wider tri-Service debate, but on this occasion he no longer 
had any continuing authority to ensure his vision survived his retirement as CAS on 1 
September 1937 and his assumption of role of IG. Moreover, Newall was not 
prepared to force through his ideas in the face of compelling opposition. 
Ellington’s time as CAS was pivotal in preparing the RAF for war. He is 
regularly credited with being responsible for the establishment of a frontline of 
aircraft that ultimately proved enormously successful, and a training scheme that 
provided the training excellence necessary to man the frontline.
124
 What has not been 
acknowledged is the contribution he made to the war readiness of the RAF. This 
contribution is equally and arguably more important than his role in the development 
                                                          
124
 Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 44-45. 
130 
 
of radar, the fielding off the eight-gun fighters, and the commissioning of the heavy 
bomber force that would ultimately lead to counter-offensive in the air. 
What separates the debate surrounding the SAC from the Air Staff and 
Command restructuring is that the essential elements of the proposal did not survive 
the wider consideration necessary for their adoption. However, while both the Air 
Staff and Command re-organizations were enacted, it would be wrong to argue that 
the failure of the SAC concept was due to the absence of Ellington from the CAS 
appointment in 1937/38. The alternative views that Ellington ignored, from the Cs-in-
C and DCAS, contained all the elements that were to carry the day when the topic was 
debated by the DCOS. Also the removal, or at least diminution, of the authority of the 
CAS for the conduct of the RAF’s operations implicit in the proposal was ultimately a 
step too far for the Admiralty and War Office to similarly adopt, who in retrospect, 
we certainly correct. 
Ellington appears to have become enmeshed in a combination of a personally 
held view, borne of his own experience and close relationship with Brooke-Popham, 
that he would need a ‘deputy’, and the implications of a series of wider arguments 
relating to the nature of air warfare and air command that formed part of a paper 
designed to address a totally different subject, namely the FAA debate. There also 
emerged the irresolvable problem implicit in the proposal that Newall added to with 
his reference to a publically recognized figure to act as the ‘generalissimo’, but who 
was concurrently not supposed to undermine the position of the CAS. This was a 
dichotomy that no amount of procedural sophistication or nuance could address. To 
create a ‘generalissimo’ for the reasons advanced by Newall was to undermine the 
CAS regardless of what protective measures were to be put in place. The Admiralty 
131 
 
and War Office appear to have been very alert to this and there was little likelihood 
they would adopt it within their own structures. 
Although there were common strands contained in the various arguments put 
forward, the Air Staff appear to have conflated these thoughts into a paper that, when 
exposed to wider scrutiny, failed to compel or win support. For those opposing 
Ellington’s and Newall’s view this proved fortunate but it was not they who changed 
the policy. A combination of DCNS and DCAS were instrumental in shaping the now 
broadened debate concerning the higher direction of defence operations. The 
compromise reached in CID 1425-B bore many of the features that Steel had put 
forward in his reply to Ellington the previous year.
125
 On the other hand, virtually 
none of the advice offered by Newall, when AMSO, survived except for the caveat 
that a SAC might be established to co-ordinate the bomber and fighter forces. In the 
end the structure that emerged from the debates over the autumn and winter of 
1937/38 was better and more robust than the ideas offered in the original Air Ministry 
proposal. 
Newall was too experienced a Whitehall staff officer and too aware that high 
command demanded compromise and an agility and adaptability of mind and purpose, 
to fight a peripheral battle on a matter of principle.
126
 The Central War Room, 
enhanced Air Staff personnel and organization, coupled with a broad agreement 
across the Services and CID, was more than adequate compensation for the loss of a 
previously preferred solution to the problem of operational co-ordination. Moreover, 
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it would have been an unwise COS that chose to alienate his peers so early during his 
time in office. 
However, one must spare a thought for Ellington. As the new IG he was the 
putative SAC but had to stand to one side as the final piece of his re-organizational 
work was dismantled within four months of his departure from office. It is hard not to 
feel sympathy for a man who had worked so tirelessly to steer his Service through 
such turbulent times and who anticipated continuing to make a useful contribution as 
the SAC. As was typical of the man he made no fuss and continued to give loyal and 
helpful service as the IG. 
It would be dramatic to conclude this chapter with newly discovered evidence 
of a scurrilous conspiracy by the Cs-in-C, the ex-RN DCAS, the DCNS and Hankey, 
who combined to manipulate the outcome to their advantage after Ellington’s 
departure and before Newall could establish himself in post. No such evidence exists. 
The final decisions were made with an open mind and in a pervading atmosphere of 
compromise and collective endeavour to create a system of co-ordination that would 
best serve the nation. In many ways it showed the British institutional committee 
system at its best, not at its worst. Ellington’s plan was flawed and the solution that 
emerged was significantly better. 
Part II will explore how the system for higher co-ordination faired in the 
conduct of the Second World War. Hankey was pivotal to the development and 





 Thus the CID 1425-B process could reasonably be termed the Hankey 
System in recognition of his constant goal of collaboration, compromise and the 
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The course of the Second World War is now well known, but from the 
perspective of September 1939 the unfolding crisis was one of unknown risk and 
uncertainty. The preparations of the 1930s had created a far better air force, but its 
readiness to meet the demands of war had yet to fully evolve. In retrospect it is easy to 
criticize but a more mature and nuanced assessment is called for to fully understand 
the pressures of the time. 
As war broke out the War Cabinet and COS were content with the 
arrangements set out in CID 1425-B for the control and co-ordination of the nation’s 
defence forces.
1
 The COS delivered the strategy agreed by the War Cabinet after 
discussion informed by the input from the COS. It was expected that the frequency of 
War Cabinet meetings would make it possible to balance policy with practical 
military reality through an iterative process of directive, action, assessment, and re-
assessment that would enable the necessary adjustments to be made. It was inevitable 
that pressure would build to carry out actions for which preparations were scant or 
absent but that was the reality of war, where the enemy could always dictate the 
tempo or direction of events. But this was not a phenomenon new to Britain in 1939, 
or resulting from the years of equivocation and appeasement in the 1930s. It was how 
all crises and wars developed and the British War Cabinet process, borne from hard 
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won experience in the First World War, was as developed as any to cope with the 
pressure, indeed paragraph 1(a) of the first War Cabinet meeting stated that its work 
would be conducted ‘in accordance with the practice of the War Cabinet in the last 
War’.
2
 For the RAF, CAS was at the heart of its policy making and operational 
performance. It was his duty to ensure, through accurate briefing and advocacy, that 
War Cabinet policy was fully aware of operational capability so that strategy was 
achievable.  
Strachan neatly summarised the essence of strategy as ‘a profoundly pragmatic 
business’ in which it ‘has to deal in the first instance not with policy, but with the 
nature of war’.
 3
 Newall held a vital role in ensuring the War Cabinet was aware of the 
actual capability of the RAF, especially given the incomplete outcome of the years of 
re-armament and the attempts to dissuade Germany through a policy of air parity that 
was inevitably compromised through the limited availability of modern weapon 
systems. And it was Newall’s responsibility to ensure that the RAF’s contribution to 
the agreed strategy was as efficient and effective as it could possibly be. This was the 
key operational role of the CAS and the Air Ministry, and the reforms of the 1930s all 
emphasised that CAS and the Air Staff would act in high command, with the CAS as 
SAC in effect, to ensure the direction and co-ordination of the MAF and overseas 
frontline commands. It is a key point which many histories of the RAF in the Second 
World War underplay in favour of focussing on the Cs-in-C and their frontline 
Commands. 
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Newall accepted that the debate over the SAC post was closed but he left the 
matter with a clause that the post could be considered if events were to develop that 
made it advisable. Between 1938 and 1939 events did not suggest that the SAC debate 
needed to be resurrected.
4
 However, Newall, who left no meaningful private papers 
and was not given to expressing private thoughts in official papers, had strongly 
supported the need for a SAC to act as the point of effective co-ordination and as the 
‘generalissimo’ to whom the public could look for reassurance in command of the 
air.
5
 Against this background it is reasonable to conclude that Newall still felt that a 
form of the SAC role might have a part to play and might be required as the 
complexity of the war unfolded. 
At 9 am on 2 September 1939, Newall convened his first Morning Conference 
with his senior staff and advisors.
6
 Slessor, who in 1939 was Director of Plans (DofP) 
commented that it was ‘broadly true the 1939-45 War was the first air war, and before 
1939 we really knew nothing about air warfare’.
 7
 He further reflected that ‘Where we 
went wrong in those pre-war days was not in our estimate of what air power could do 
when it had the tools, but in our estimate of the tools required to do the job.’ The 
critical feature of any higher command structure was the system by which direction 
was given, action co-ordinated, and progress assessed towards the desired outcome.
8
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If the system was too rigid then initiative was stifled and opportunities were lost. If it 
was too loose, then un-co-ordinated activity can take on the image of real 
achievement only for the shock of operational reverses to prove otherwise. What was 
required was that fine balance between control, local freedom and in-built initiative, 
what today is called ‘mission command’.
9
  
CAS was supported by Pierse as DCAS, Peck as DOI, soon to become ACAS 
(Ops and Int), Douglas as ACAS(OR and T), and in time Joubert de le Ferte as 
Advisor on Combined Operations. These officers formed his senior staff and were his 
closest advisors. Below them came the key Directorates led by officers of Air Cdre or 
Gp Capt rank. Peck’s organization was the hub containing the War Room and its staff 
and the operational directors who were responsible for the issuing of instructions to 
the Commands and ensuring their co-ordination and performance. There were four 
directorates of operations, D Ops(H) under Stevenson, D Ops(O)under Coryton, D 
Ops(NC) under Durston and D Ops(MC) under Fraser.
10
 If these Directorates ensured 
operations were in accord with higher direction and agreed strategy, the Plans 
Directorate was responsible for the development of the plans the Operations 
Directorates and the Commands were striving to accomplish.
11
 The Plans directorate 
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 These appointments sat below the posts of DCAS and ACAS; Directors of Operations for Home, 






was headed by Slessor who had been in the post since 17 May 1937.
12
 Intelligence, 
the understanding and knowledge upon which plans and Operations should be built, 
was the responsibility of the DOI Major Boyle whose organization was about to grow 
significantly as the reality of war struck home.  
The Air Ministry Handbook listed the responsibilities of the Air Staff.
13
 
Newall was charged with ‘all questions of Air Force policy’, ‘advice on the conduct 
of air operations and the issue of orders in regard thereto’, the ‘fighting efficiency  
and collective training of the Royal Air Force, and , inter alia, the ‘collection of 
intelligence’ . This placed Newall squarely in the role of a commander as the Hankey 
System intended. Pierse was responsible for the ‘plans and orders for air operations 
and home defence’, the work of the CID and League of nations, the collection and 
distribution of air intelligence and liaison with attaches. To undertake the detailed 
work Peck’s duties were summarized as being ‘operational policy’ and liaison with 
the War Office Admiralty, Home Office and other agencies as required. This cascade 
of increasingly detailed responsibility emphasized the central role envisaged for the 
Air Staff in the conduct and oversight of operations. The detailed liaison with the 
Commands would be undertaken at a lower level. 
Stevenson was responsible for operational policy, issuing orders and questions 
relating to the conduct of defensive and offensive operations conducted from the UK, 
dealing mainly with Bomber and Fighter Commands. This Directorate was to bear the 
greatest strain as war unfolded and as pre-war concepts and plans were severely 
tested. In parallel, Durston performed a similar function in support of Coastal 
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Command and the Admiralty. These Directorates were linked to the Commands 
through the respective SASOs, whose role was to support the Commanders in the 
conduct of operations. Direct liaison between the CAS, DCAS, or ACAS and the C-
in-C was normal, but invariably it was supplemented by written correspondence, in 
the form of an Air Council Directive or directed letter, to record the decisions taken or 
opinions expressed. As war began Ludlow-Hewitt led Bomber Command, his SASO 
was Bottomley; Dowding led Fighter Command and had Park as SASO; and Coastal 
Command led by Bowhill, had Hards as SASO.
14
 
These men were all well known to each other. Some were friends, some rivals, 
some worked harmoniously while others were best kept apart. The RAF of 1939, 
while expanding very rapidly was still commanded and staffed by a close knit group 
of men who knew a great deal about each other’s strengths and weaknesses. They 
were also subject to many of the dangers that over familiarity and homogeneity can 
bring to any organization. The numbers were small, in January 1939, there were 3 
serving ACMs, 6 AMs, 22 AVMs, and 35 Air Cdres in the RAF giving total of 66 
officers above the rank of gp capt on whose shoulders the enormous responsibility of 
wartime command would fall.
 15
 
North Sea Operations - Informal Adaptation 
The War Cabinet instructions from the first meeting on 3 September 1939 for 
the RAF to dispatch bombers against the German fleet set the scene for the anti-
shipping air operations in the early months of the war.
16
 The aim was the continual 
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pursuit of offensive action of the German Navy in order to inflict a serious setback on 
the German High Command whilst strengthening the superiority of the RN in the 
North Sea.
17
 It seemed a simple task but it became one which exposed the deficiencies 
of pre-war thinking and the limitations of the current frontline capability and higher 
command structure. Not only were the means of reconnaissance extremely limited but 
the ability to disseminate that knowledge once gained, and act upon it effectively 
before events had moved on, were to be frustratingly elusive for many months to 
come.
18
 The operational story is well recorded but the higher command aspects are 
much less well documented.
19
 
Operations in the North Sea area against the German Navy were exactly the 
type of activity for which the Hankey System had evolved. They required the 
integration of various operational elements which were not under single command or 
control but which had to act as one if the fleeting opportunities presented were to be 
exploited. However, gaps and friction created a sub-optimal situation as Durston 
commented in October 1939: 
the striking force for these operations consists of Bomber Command 
squadrons, but as the target is a Naval one the operation requires the closest 
liaison with the Admiralty, and the control of the operation is, therefore, 





It is not possible to put the operation entirely under the direction of the 
A O C-in-C Coastal Command owing to the fact that the necessary 
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communications between Coastal Command and Bomber Command units do 
not exist. The result is, therefore, a form of joint control.
21
 
Durston encapsulated the gap between the theory of the Hankey System and 
the practical implementation of War Cabinet direction. The lack of a single individual 
responsible for the execution of the operations and the provision to that individual of 
the means necessary to deliver the desired outcome all illustrate that the compromises 
necessary to address the wider issues of inter-service command and control contained 
the impediments to the successful and efficient prosecution of operations. The 
organisational tactic to solve this disparity of capability was the time bounded re-
allocation of assets to Coastal Command from Bomber or Fighter Command or both 
when the need arose.
22
 But as Durston illustrates, the gap between practice and theory 
was wide. 
On 20 November 1939 CAS briefed the War Cabinet on the ‘Policy as to the 
Attack on the German Fleet’.
23
 He followed this on 22 November 1939 with a 
meeting to discuss ‘The Arrangements for an Operation against the Heavy Ships of 
the German Fleet’.
24
 The Minutes clearly illustrate the state of preparedness for air 
operations over the North Sea and the contemporary performance of the higher 
command structure of the British forces. The CAS stated that the War Cabinet now: 
desired some modification of the existing policy for attacks on units of 
the German Fleet. At present our policy was to attack only ships at sea and to 
avoid going into the “Hornets’ Nest”. The War Cabinet felt that our control 
over the North Sea had weakened somewhat recently.
25
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He emphasized that the War Cabinet felt that in the ‘present atmosphere it was 
considered to be a matter of capital importance to sink or damage one of the five 
German heavy ships’.
26
 The discussion on 22 November 1939 demonstrates, with the 
great benefit of hindsight, the gulf between contemporary expectation and subsequent 
experience and offers a clear insight into the difficulties that were faced by the RAF 
commanders in the early months of the war.
27
 
In answer to a question by CAS concerning the possibility of operating at 
night during the upcoming moon phase, Ludlow-Hewitt felt there was a serious 
chance of a mistake in recognising ships at night. Nonetheless, he agreed that night 
reconnaissance might be possible and agreed to investigate it. Pierse thought it ‘a pity 
to miss any opportunity of carrying out a successful attack’. He thought the chances 
of ‘doing damage by night were greater than the chances of sinking a ship by day’ and 
thought there was a reasonable chance of carrying out a night attack at heights well 
above 3,000ft, the figure that Ludlow-Hewitt considered to be the height from which 
that attacks would have to be made. Then Ludlow-Hewitt thought night attacks might 
be possible from 6,000ft, before upping the figure to 7,000-12,000ft in response to a 
question from CAS. Finally, he concluded that it might be possible ‘to bomb from 
17,000 to 18,000 feet.’ On the matter of the number of aircraft required the debate 
concluded that 24 would suffice, only to be de-railed by Stevenson who pointed out 
that practice camp results ‘showed that 36 (aircraft) were required to ensure the 
likelihood of destructive damage, ie, two hits by a 500lbs S.A.P bomb’.
28
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This narrative is not included to lampoon the participants, rather the opposite, 
namely to demonstrate the openness of mind with which they approached the 
unknown. For all the attendees the matters at hand were new and way beyond the pre-
war planning or contingency operations. That history would record that they were 
somewhat off the mark should not detract from the rigour and endeavour with which 
they undertook their tasks, and in the face of a pressing demand from the War Cabinet 
that ‘something must be done’, their options were limited. On 8 December 1939 the 
Air Ministry signalled Bomber Command explicit instructions to carry out the attacks 
‘with the object of destroying the German battle cruisers and pocket battleships’.
29
 Of 
note, considering Stevenson’s comments regarding the number of aircraft needed to 
guarantee 2 hits with 500lbs SAP bombs, the signal instructed that the striking force 
‘should not exceed 36 bombers unless Air Ministry approval has been obtained’.
30
 
In early December Newall appointed Joubert de la Ferté to a new Air Ministry 
post responsible to him for the direct Co-ordination of Air Operations.
31
 This post, 
with dedicated staff, was to act in concert with Pierse, to enable the Air Ministry to 
discharge its responsibilities under CID-1425B for the operational co-ordination of 
the RAF’s frontline forces. In mid-December Peck wrote to Joubert addressing his 
views on the command and control aspects of the current arrangements for air 
operations over the North Sea.
32
 An earlier directive to C-in-C Bomber Command had 
instructed him to place 24 aircraft at the disposal of C-in-C Coastal Command ‘for 
operation under his direct control as a striking force for the attack of enemy naval 
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units of the battleship or cruiser class.’
33
 This Directive exemplified the procedures 
that the Hankey System required and is good evidence that the system as a whole was 
well practiced within the Air Staff and the subordinate Commands. However, in his 
Minute to Joubert, Peck went on to address the practical reality of the operations 
envisaged in the 12 October 1939 Directive.
34
 
Peck recorded that Ludlow-Hewitt, had already pointed out the consequences 
of the Directive which made it ‘very difficult for him to take the responsibility which 
he should take for the conduct and result of operations ordered by another 
Commander–in-Chief’.
35
 Ludlow-Hewitt’s argument centred on the lack of authority 
which the Directive gave him for the actual conduct of the forces under his command 
when compared to the complete responsibility he bore for the success of the operation 
carried out at the command of another C-in-C. Too many operational variables were 
at stake in the conduct of winter operations over the North Sea for it to be reasonable 
to just instruct a C-in-C to act without giving him the discretion to assess the 
battlefield and act accordingly. Despite Ludlow Hewitt’s concerns Peck felt he could 
see a way ahead which he proposed to Joubert. In paragraph 5 of his Minute he made 
his case: 
I am inclined to think that the right solution, now that your 
organization has been formed, is to cancel the arrangement by which 24 
aircraft are placed at the disposal of Coastal Command and substitute for it an 
arrangement by which Bomber Command retains 24 aircraft at short notice for 
similar operations but at the disposal of the Air Staff, and when such action is 
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The operation would then be one laid on by the Air Staff but only one 
Commander in Chief would be responsible for its conduct instead of, as at 
present, dividing the responsibility between two.
37
 
The proposal was clear evidence the consequences of the Hankey System were 
having a negative impact on the conduct of operations. What Peck was suggesting 
was the establishment of the structure that was at the heart of the SAC concept in 
which a ‘super C-in-C’ based close to the Air Ministry, the CAS and the Air Staff, 
would act as ‘co-ordinator in chief’ of the functional commands. The Hankey System, 
heavily influenced by the Admiralty structure, required the RAF frontline to operate 
largely as the RN in which vessels were allocated to at-sea commanders for specifics 
missions. But that was not how the RAF was organised and that difference was 
critical to the ease with which the Hankey System could work. Ludlow Hewitt’s 
concern regarding operational responsibility and intelligence provision were but two 
manifestations of that difficulty.
 38
 
Joubert responded to Peck on 19 December 1939 stating that: 
As you know I consider it wrong in principle that C-in-C Coastal 
Command should have a mixed force of bombers, fighters and GR (General 
Reconnaissance) at his disposal, but in the present circumstances I think it is 
unavoidable. May I suggest we leave the matter until after Christmas, when 




This perspective is shows that the logic of a mono-functional command structure 
remained well supported and that Joubert’s role appears to have been intended to be 
one of more effective co-ordination rather than overt air command. Newall was 
clearly attempting to make the Hankey System work even if events were making its 
operation difficult. To formalize the appointment of Joubert, DCAS sent a letter to the 
                                                          
37
 Ibid., M35, dated 16 December 1939. 
38
 Ibid., M38, dated 20 December 1939. 
39
 Ibid., M36, dated 19 December 1939. 
149 
 
respective C-in-Cs on 28 December 1939 informing them that a new branch of the Air 
Staff was being established under Joubert to co-ordinate the North Sea air operations 
and that the detailed arrangements would follow in due course.
40
 
Joubert was quick to enter the debate with a note released the next day, 29 
December 1939 concerning the ‘Control of Operations in the North Sea’.
41
 Joubert 
summarised the situation: 
The present control of Air operations in the North Sea is very largely 
the responsibility of Coastal Commd (sic). This Headquarters is in the closest 
touch with the Admiralty and is very experienced in these operations. 
 The present system has resulted in Coastal Commd (sic) practically 
taking commd (sic) of that portion of the bomber forces which daily stands by 
for the operations over the North Sea.
42
 
There are two important conclusions to draw. First, Joubert’s appointment was 
initiated to address the emerging shortcoming in the Hankey System. Second, the 
need for Coastal Command to take control of Bomber Command assets to undertake a 
Coastal Command mission was a direct criticism of the mono-functional logic of the 
1936 command restructuring. Thus by 29 December 1939 two foundations upon 
which RAF high command was based were beginning to give way under the pressure 
of wartime reality. 
Joubert proposed that while much could remain as was, the difficulty, raised 
by Ludlow-Hewitt of having his squadrons under the direct orders of another C-in-C 
while he retained responsibility for their performance and operational effectiveness, 
demanded that changes be made.
43
 He suggested that a North Sea Intelligence Section 
be established at Bomber Command to address the intelligence gaps; that C-in-C 
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Coastal Command should continue to request Bomber Command support but that C-
in-C Bomber Command should be free to deliver that support as he saw best. Most 
controversially his final paragraph concluded that: 
Owing to the urgent necessity to co-ordinate naval action on the higher 
plane with the requisite air action, I feel that all important operations should be 




The staff response to this was not wholeheartedly positive. Durston could see 
little to support Joubert’s arguments and conclusions and cited the CID-1425B 
conclusions to underline his argument that the system that what was in place was 
adequate.
45
 His central argument was that the difficulties that had arisen were due to 
the Air Staff’s failure to allocate the correct resources to Coastal Command to enable 
them to undertake what was clearly a more important mission than the one that was 
keeping the assets allocated to Bomber Command. To Durston the problem was one 
of a failure to analyse the operational situation and allot resources appropriately, not 
one of malformed command and control structures. But this approach required the 
expansion of multi-functional capability within Coastal Command, a development 
opposed by Joubert and showing all the signs of ‘self-sufficiency’ that Harris had 
abhorred in his original paper.
46
 
Internal to the Air Staff, Peck wrote to Pierse on 9 January 1940 outlining his 
perspective.
47
 Interestingly, he records his view of the role of Joubert as being the 
continuous study of the sea/air situation and the recommending, in consultation with 
the Operations Staff, of courses of action for the decision of the DCAS. This was a 
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limited portfolio and one that only partly filled the role of SAC, nonetheless, events 
had demanded such adaptation and thus it offers a telling insight into the validity of 
pre-war assessments concerning the requirements for RAF higher command. Peck 
broke the problem down into the need for a rapid response force to take advantage of 
the fleeting opportunities presented by the German Navy, and the provision of a 
follow up force to exploit the first attack and deliver a decisive blow. This neat 
segregation allowed him to conclude that Coastal Command should be made 
responsible for the initial striking force, with appropriate assets to undertake the task, 
and that Bomber Command should deliver the follow-on forces. In the margin 
alongside a comment from Peck that the initial striking force could continue to be 
supplied by Bomber Command but be ‘despatched and controlled by the Air 
Ministry’, Pierse wrote an emphatic ‘No’. Clearly the role for the Air Ministry in the 




On 26 January 1940 DCAS held a meeting to discuss the allocation of Bomber 
Command squadrons to Coastal Command.
49
 Joubert highlighted various 
shortcomings in the current arrangements whereby different squadrons were allocated 
each day to Coastal Command. This negated any attempts to improve training and 
operational awareness which was exacerbated by the lack of communication facilities 
between HQ Coastal Command and the allocated Bomber Command squadrons. This 
created the situation highlighted earlier by C-in-C Bomber Command whereby his 
squadrons effectively had two masters and he was left with operational responsibility 
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but limited operational authority over when missions would be mounted. DCAS 
responded by pointing out: 
The supreme importance of keeping intact and maintaining the 
efficiency of the bomber striking force, which had a bigger role to perform 
than the attack on units of the German Fleet. He did not consider it desirable 
that a Commander in Chief who was primarily concerned with the war at sea 
should be able to dispatch at his discretion a considerable part of the bomber 
force on operations which might involve severe casualties.
50
 
Peirse’s last point referred to the loss of two of three Wellington aircraft on 2 January 
1940 in a sweep in the Heligoland area that had been the subject of a meeting chaired 
by CAS on 4 January 1940.
51
 Pierse continued by stating that: 
It was for this reason that we had laid down a restricted area within 
which no targets could be attacked without the concurrence of the Air Staff.
52
 
To counter DCAS, Joubert: 
emphasised the importance at the present time of the war at sea. Every 
German capital ship destroyed would release units of our own fleet for 
essential duties of trade protection.
53
 
DCAS, however, maintained that: 
we must not lose sight of the larger issue. In general, anything which 
tended to break up the homogeneity or reduce the efficiency of the bomber 
force must be regarded as undesirable.
54
 
To which ACAS, Peck, agreed and went on to suggest: 
That one only of the Bomber Groups should be selected for co-
operation with Coastal Command; that the squadrons of this Group should be 




Eventually the meeting concluded, inter alia, that ‘no detachment of bomber 
squadrons to Coastal command should be made’; that the ‘Air Staff had come to the 
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view that it would be more effective if one Group in Bomber Command were 
specialised in amphibious air war’; that ‘because C-in-C Coastal Command would 
have only one Group commander to deal with he should be given direct telephone 
access’; that ‘not more than two squadrons of aircraft should be employed’; and that 
‘C-in-C Coastal Command should inform the Air Ministry at the same time he 
contacted the Bomber Group’.
56
 
Over the coming months the debate ebbed and flowed with Coastal Command 
requesting greater access to Bomber Command assets and Bomber Command and the 
Air Ministry resisting. The role of Joubert as advisor continued but never broke 
through the firmly held views that were exposed at the 26 January 1940 DCAS 
meeting. On the one hand, Newall had attempted to solve the problem of co-
ordination in the developing multi-functional campaign in the North Sea, through the 
introduction of an informal ‘SAC’. On the other hand, the purpose of Joubert’s role 
was never clearly defined and his authority was always limited. DCAS and ACAS 
both resisted attempts to broaden Joubert’s co-ordination role for to have allowed it 
would have been to recognise the increasing importance of the North Sea operations 
vice the bombing campaign that formed the cornerstone of RAF strategy. It would 
also have diminished their personal authority under the terms of the Hankey System. 
Joubert mentions his time as the Advisor to CAS on combined operations only briefly 
in his autobiography. He states that he ‘led an uneasy existence’ and that ‘fortunately 
this period of my service did not last long’ and his biggest concern was that within 
both the RAF and the RN he had ‘little or no authority’.
57
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Operations in France - Formal Adaptation 
If the introduction of Joubert into the command structure for operations in the 
North Sea was to address a relatively simple set of tactical matters, the creation of the 
British Air Forces in France (BAFF) under the command of Barratt was needed to 
settle a complex mix of national and later international tensions. The available sources 
covering RAF operations in France are considerable. Primary sources and narratives 
cover all aspects.
 58
 Secondary sources are equally comprehensive and have 
undergone innovative review and reappraisal in recent years.
59
 For the purposes of 
this study, however, it is not necessary to recount the course of the campaign. The 
issue here is the adaptation of the RAF command structure in France in response to 
allied, inter-service and internal pressures for change. 
In 1939 there were two RAF formations in France.
60
 The Advanced Air 
Striking Force (AASF), formerly No 1 Group, commanded by Playfair was a 
detachment of Bomber Command deployed to airfields around Reims with Battle 
light bombers. The reason for their being in France was to bring them in within range 
of targets in Germany covered in the Western Air Plans (WAPs) that Bomber 
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Command might be tasked to attack
61
. This forward basing was to compensate for 
their range limitations, just as the Independent Force commanded by Trenchard in the 
First World War had occupied similar areas for the same purpose.
62
 The AASF was 
accompanied by four squadrons of Hurricanes from Fighter Command to provide base 
area defence and escort which were grouped under No 60 Wing.
 63
  They were part of 
the Air Component commanded by Blount which had been formed from No 22 Group 
in secret on 24 August 1939. The remainder of the Blount’s Air Component was 
allocated to support of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) under Gort. Overseeing 
this bifurcated structure sat Barratt as Head of No 1 British Air Mission to the French 
CAS, Vuillemin. In parallel there was a No 2 British Air Mission that existed to co-
ordinate bombing matters between Bomber Command and the 1
st
 French Air Army 
under Mouchard. The convoluted act of explaining these arrangements demonstrates 
their inadequacy. 
To task an aircraft of the AASF following a forward reconnaissance mission, 
the information would first be passed to No 2 mission who would pass it on to 
Bomber Command, who would consider it and, if satisfied, instruct either their 
Groups in the UK or the AASF to undertake a mission against the revealed target. 
There was a caveat that if the situation demanded, Barratt at No 1 Mission could step 
in and order No 2 Mission to task the AASF directly, but the terms of his intervention 
were not set out and the dangers of interfering when so much depended on 
institutional co-operation were obvious. However, changes within the French Air 
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Force command structure provided the opportunity for the RAF system to be 
rationalised. 
In late 1939 the French re-organised their air army structure and removed 
Mouchard’s organisation altogether. This led to alterations in the structure of No 2 
Mission and the creation of sub-units to interact with the French ‘zones’. Viewed 
from the perspective of Barratt this merely created even more difficulty in 
harmonising activity and ensuring it was focussed against the main point of effort. In 
the words of the AHB Narrative the situation was ‘little short of fantastic’. In addition 
to the pressures arising in France for organisational change, at Bomber Command 
Ludlow-Hewitt was also coming to the view that improvement were necessary. He 
argued that a co-ordinating HQ was required ‘to button up the divergent or convergent 




Powell highlighted that the War Office was also pressing for both changed 
command structures, and increased aircraft allocation.
65
 Their immediate goal was for 
‘large numbers of bombers directly under their control’ because the current command 
arrangements gave them little confidence their requirements would be met.
 66
 The 
CIGS had also been concerned for some time that the tasking procedures needed 
tightening to allow the Army commander more direct control of his allocated air 
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 However the simple arithmetic of available numbers continued to provide the 
real stumbling block. 
On 2 November 1939 Hore-Belisha the SofS at the War Office submitted a 
paper to the War Cabinet entitled ‘Air Requirements of the Army’.
68
 To address the 
Army’s perceived shortfall, Hore-Belisha stated that: 
The Land Forces Committee at their first meeting upon this subject put 
into train certain enquiries relating to the drawing up of a specification of an 




the Secretary of State for Air was to examine and report to the 
Committee on the means by which an additional 250 first line aircraft, suitable 
for the close support of the Army and acting under its orders (together with the 
necessary pilots and reserves) can be made available by the Spring of 1940.
70
 
However, he continued: 
It now appears that the Secretary of State for Air contests this 
conclusion in principle and is not wilting to place additional machines at the 
disposal of the Army to act under its orders.
71
 
Hore-Belisha’s next paragraph stated: 
I had made it clear that this spasmodic allocation of aircraft for the 
Army would never be satisfactory, and it must, I submit to my colleagues, be 
axiomatic that (to employ words once used by Lord Balfour) "A fighting 
department should as far as possible have the whole responsibility (subject to 
Treasury and Cabinet control) of the instruments it uses, the personnel it 
commands, and the operations which it undertakes".
72
 
This self-sufficiency in a time of severe resource limitations was unrealistic, even if 
later in the war it might be achievable. In the meantime, it represented as severe 
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challenge to the RAF. Hore-Belisha concluded with what he considered to be a 
reasonable request: 
Agreement to the moderate demands which I make would go far to 
remove a feeling, growing ever more prevalent in the Army, that it lacks an 
essential arm of its equipment and that it is being sorely hampered by the 
present restraint upon its natural evolution.
73
  
The SofS for Air replied on 3 November 1939 stating that the point of issue was that:  
the point at issue is this: The Secretary of State for War demands in 
effect the creation of an Army Air Arm, under the complete and permanent 
control of the Army and ultimately trained and administered by the War 
Office. This is to include a large force of special type bombers manned by 
Army Officers, amounting to a total of 250 first line aircraft, together with the 
necessary pilots and reserves, by the Spring of 1940 and ultimately to a much 
larger number, to be a "permanent part of the mechanism directly under the 
Commander-in-Chief in the Field".
74
 
The RAF, he stated: 
propose that bomber support for the Army shall be found from the 
main Air Striking Force, from which Squadrons should be allotted by the 
Chiefs of Staff to operations in support of the Army, in such proportions as 
may be necessary according to the situation or to the plans projected. The Air 
Ministry are arranging for a proportion of the bomber force to receive special 
training with the Army -just as a proportion now receive special training for 
the attack of ships at sea. But they consider it vital to retain the Bomber 
Command as a homogeneous force, of which any part, or the whole, can be 
immediately concentrated on whatever task is of greatest importance at the 
time, whether it be counter-offensive operations in connection with the 
defence of this country against air attack, operations in support of the Navy 
against enemy naval or air forces threatening our coasts and sea borne trade, or 




This lengthy extract is quoted for it illustrates the tension that many had foreseen, 
namely the inability of the nation to meet the requirements of all commanders for air 
support. This problem was exacerbated in the case of the Army by their desire to 
exclusively control their own air assets. The SofS went on to summarise this position: 
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I must emphasise at once that, quite apart from the principle involved, 
it is impossible to provide, complete with the necessary reserves and trained 
personnel, both ground and air, 250 aircraft by the Spring of 1940, save by 




He then reminded his colleagues that: 
The Secretary of State for War acknowledges that the problem of air 
support to the Army only assumed importance consequent upon the decision, 
reached just before the war, to recruit a Continental Army. The Air Ministry, 
of course, do not question that decision, and fully accept its implications. It 
represents a fundamental change in our general defence policy, and our air 
policy must be adapted to meet it.
77
 
The SofS then illustrated the challenge the Army’s proposal raised: 
A continental Army involves heavy demands on our resources in 
classes of aircraft other than bombers. It requires large numbers of Army Co-
operation and Reconnaissance Squadrons as well as Fighter Squadrons, and 
these must be found at the expense of Home Defence Fighter Squadrons, 
Coastal Command Squadrons, the Fleet Air Arm, or the Air Striking Force. I 
must stress the fact that until the rate of aircraft production rises and training 
of personnel has made substantial progress, even the provision of the essential 
number of Reconnaissance and Fighter Squadrons will be a matter of the 
utmost difficulty. If in addition we are to find large numbers of bombers 
"continually under Army control" then they can only be found by taking them 
away from our main Air Striking Force. An allotment of 250 first line bombers 





In particular, I wish to record my conviction that if the War Office is to 
be allowed to enter into competition with the Air Ministry in ordering or 
acquiring airframes, aero-engines and accessories of any type for any purpose, 
then the result in the sphere of aircraft production will be chaotic.
79
 
To reconcile the two departmental viewpoints Lord Chatfield, the Minister for 
Co-Ordination of Defence, was asked by the War Cabinet to investigate the situation. 
He reported to the War Cabinet on 2 December 1939.
80
 He held two meetings with 
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Deputy CIGS, COS to C-in-C BEF, Pownall, and DCAS from which he was able to 
report that: 
As a result of the progress made at these two meetings, I requested the 
two Deputy Chiefs of Staff to continue the discussions without me and to 
endeavour to obtain an agreed solution of the problem within the limits of the 
Cabinet decision and likely to be acceptable to the two Services. I am now 
able to report that Air Marshal Peirse and Major-General Massy have prepared 
in full agreement a proposed solution which I have carefully examined with 
them, and which is appended as Annex I to this Memorandum.
81
 
Chatfield then outlined the proposals: 
The proposed scheme which is based on the analogy of the existing 
relationship between the Royal Navy and the Coastal Command, R.A.F., is 
generally as follows: 
(a) An RAF Command to be established in France to co-ordinate 
the operations of all R.A.F. units there. 
(b) The Commander to be designated the Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief, British Air Forces in France, his position being 
similar to that of the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F., except that he will 
not be under any French Commander. 
(c) The Command will include all the bomber squadrons of the 
Advanced Air Striking Force in France, which will be detached from 
the bomber command. 
(d) The Advanced Air Striking Force, or any part of it, when 
ordered to operate in conjunction with the bomber command in some 
strategic operation, other than in support of the armies in France, will 
pass temporarily under the command of the A.O.C.-in-C, Bomber 
Command, who will issue operation orders direct to the A. O.C. 
Advanced Air Striking Force. It is agreed that such an order would 
only be given by the Chiefs of Staff Committee with War Cabinet 
sanction. 
(e)  The Air Component of the B.E.F. will he absorbed into the new 
command but will remain under its own A.O.C, who will act as adviser 
to the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and under his operational control. 
(f) The A.O.C. -in-C. will be charged with the responsibility of 
seeing that the Commander-in-Chief, B.B.F- has at all times "full 
assurances regarding air support". Accordingly, he will place at the 
"disposal of the Commander-in-Chief" such bomber squadrons as the 
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latter may, in consultation with him, consider necessary from time to 
time. 
(g) The precise arrangements to give effect to give effect to this 
decision to be concerted in detail between the Commander-in-Chief, 
B.E.F., and the A.O.C.-in-C. British Air Forces in France, who will 
consult, as necessary, the French High Command.
82
 
Chatfield concluded by recommending that: 
Having discussed the proposed solution with the Secretary of State for 
War and the Secretary of State for Air and obtained their general concurrence, 
and with the assurances as to supply referred to in paragraphs 6-10, I 
recommend approval of the agreed solution.
83
 
This outcome, which had Newall’s agreement, also addressed his concern for 
establishing a known person to be the face of the air contribution, a ‘generalissimo’ 
who would reassure the various stakeholders that air was under control. The Hankey 
System’s reliance on bureaucratic process singularly failed to provide this human 
reassurance. Thus the appointment of a commander of all RAF units in France would 
improve the situation and by the incorporation of wider responsibilities to support the 
BEF ‘abate the more unrealistic’ Army demands.
 84
 
Barratt was informed he would become the C-in-C on 31 December 1939.
85
 
BAFF was formed on 15 January 1940 taking command, as per the Chatfield 
agreement, of the RAF Air Component to the BEF, the AASF from Bomber 
Command, and all the sundry units and establishments that had, overtime, emerged in 
France.
86
 Barratt’s status was confirmed as the equivalent of Gort’s but his 
responsibilities, based on the air assets he controlled, extended well beyond the BEF 
zone of operations. Barratt was also not under the control of any French officer as 
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Gort was, but under the direct authority of the CAS and Air Ministry
87
. In effect, 
BAFF was a new multi-functional MAF command that happened to be located in 
France. As such it represented the first true multi-functional organisation established 
by the RAF in North West Europe in the Second World War and many of the lessons 
it learned in its very short existence were to be invaluable in the years to come.
88
 
The flexibility of approach embedded in BAFF was also noteworthy. Barratt 
was charged to ensure that at all times Gort had ‘full assurances’ the air support needs 
of the BEF would be met.
 89
 Whilst the Air Component was under BAFF’s command, 
it was under the BEF’s operational control, overseen by Barratt who could, in 
extremis, intervene. But unlike the situation Barratt had faced with intervening 
between Bomber Command and the AASF, in this case it would be based on the daily 
growing relationship of close trust he was building with Gort. In this Barratt was 
supported by his Directive from the Air Ministry which specifically highlighted the 
fact that since the BEF was holding a small part of the Allied line, the British bombers 
in France should be called on  to operate ‘in accordance with the day-to-day needs of 
the Allied situation on the western front as a whole’. 
On 17 January 1940 Barratt secured agreement with his colleagues that he 
should order and control reconnaissance missions and in consultation with Fighter 
Command the allocation of fighters within the BAFF structure. Developments with 
the French provided better co-ordination and enhanced operational control.
90
 
Incrementally over the coming months Barratt developed the new command with the 
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AASF remaining in the area around Reims, the Air Component located to the north in 
the rear of the BEF zone and the Blenheims of No 2 Group Bomber Command, who 
were originally intended to move to France as part of the AASF but withheld due to 
the lack of airfield facilities, at readiness in Norfolk.
91
 On 9 May 1940 Gort wrote to 
the War Cabinet setting out his assessment of the situation in France, in his 
penultimate paragraph, he restated his view concerning the priority in air support that 
his operations should be given: 
As land forces cannot operate successfully in modern war without air 
support, the availability of air forces must also be included in these 
assessments. Whilst the Allied High Command can count on the willing and 
effective co-operation of all the air units now in France, this will not be 
enough and the whole weight of our Metropolitan Air Forces will be needed to 
help in the formidable task of repelling the German onslaught when it begins. 
Germany to-day has the initiative and the power to surprise; she can 
concentrate her superior air forces wherever she decides. At present the Allies 




Gort’s timing could not have been more apposite, for on the morning of 10 
May 1940 the Germans struck and within days BAFF was split in two. The Air 
Component to the north of the German advance retreated with the BEF and its ground 
units left via Dunkirk. The AASF and its associated fighter squadrons fought on to the 
south of the Germans and eventually retired through the ports of western France along 
with the BAFF and AASF HQs. Events were to be so chaotic that it is impossible to 
assess whether the creation of a multi-functional BAFF with its own SAC materially 
affected the performance of the campaign. It most certainly did not hinder it and the 
function of command continued to be undertaken by Barratt, Playfair and Blount 
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throughout the hectic days of retreat.
93
 Throughout the short campaign the MAF was 
actively engaged, as Gort had desired, but the efforts of the modestly sized force that 
the MAF was in 1940 was never going to be the decisive factor.
94
  
The most telling aspect of the background to the establishment of BAFF is that 
it occurred to address the very obvious inadequacies of command that had been 
created on the precepts of Hankey System. The need for BAFF showed that 
management of operations only achieved so much, what was also needed was the 
human leadership element of confidence building , trust and shared endeavour to 
ensure that all participants in what had to be a complex matrix of structures believed 
that their needs would be taken into account and addressed when the moment 
demanded. The creation of BAFF was the outcome of War Cabinet level discussions. 
To reconcile the conflicting positions of the Secretaries of State for War and Air 
required the Minister of Defence Co-Ordination to bring the two sides together and 
reach a compromise. BAFF was that compromise but it also addressed the concern 
that both Newall and Barratt had concerning the need for a clearer command chain 
and a means of preventing the potential wastage of valuable assets on less than high 
priority missions. In this sense the issues of limited resource and tactical self-
sufficiency demanded by the Army were finessed into a command structure that 
created a de facto SAC, Barratt, and an embryonic multi-functional command, BAFF. 
This first step towards multi-functionality would not be that last and the collapse of 
the Allied Forces in the west would bring about another crisis of command. 
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Dunkirk – Crisis Adaptation 
At 2.45pm on 13 May 1940 Mr Churchill, the newly appointed PM, addressed 
the House of Commons.
95
 He began by stating: 
I beg to move, that this House welcomes the formation of a 
Government representing the united and inflexible resolve of the nation to 
prosecute the war with Germany to a victorious conclusion.
96
 
He then moved on to announce the formation of his new all party administration: 
A War Cabinet has been formed of five Members, representing, with 
the Opposition Liberals, the unity of the nation. The three party Leaders have 
agreed to serve, either in the War Cabinet or in high executive office. The 
three Fighting Services have been filled. It was necessary that this should be 




Before clarifying in the clearest terms the intention of the Government in the face of 
the developing crisis: 
We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have 
before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering. You ask, what 
is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our 
might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a 
monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of 
human crime. That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in 
one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, 




It was clear the British Government intended to make its stand against 
Germany and Churchill’s defiant rhetoric epitomised the ‘survive at all costs’ 
mentality that would develop over the coming months. Indeed, the situation was such 
that on 21 May 1940 the PM urged Parliament to pass with the utmost haste the 
Treachery Bill.
99
 However, the collapse of the French military position and the 
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attendant political crisis added further to the immense complexity facing the 
Government and UK high command. On 23 May 1940, the PM stated that:  
The German armoured forces which made their way through the 
breach in the French Army have penetrated into the rear of the Allied Armies 
in Belgium and are now attempting to derange their communications. 
Abbeville is in enemy hands and heavy fighting is proceeding around and in 
Boulogne. It is too early yet to say what the result of this coastal fighting may 
be; but it evidently carries with it implications of a serious character.
100
 
Despite desperate Allied resistance, in which the RAF attempted to fight a co-
ordinated campaign employing much of Bomber, Fighter, and Coastal Commands in 
support of the military operations in France, the German onslaught drove on and the 
situation continued to deteriorate. The PM updated the House of Commons on 28 
May 1940, stating that: 
The House will be aware that the King of the Belgians yesterday sent a 
plenipotentiary to the German Command asking for a suspension of arms on 
the Belgian front. The British and French Governments instructed their 
generals immediately to dissociate themselves from this procedure and to 
persevere in the operations in which they are now engaged.
101
 
However the situation was grave as the PM subsequently stated: 
The situation of the British and French Armies now engaged in a most 
severe battle and beset on three sides and from the air, is evidently extremely 
grave. The surrender of the Belgian Army in this manner adds appreciably to 
their grievous peril. But the troops are in good heart, and are fighting with the 
utmost discipline and tenacity, and I shall, of course, abstain from giving any 
particulars of what, with the powerful assistance of the Royal Navy and the 
Royal Air Force, they are doing or hope to do. I expect to make a statement to 
the House on the general position when the result of the intense struggle now 
going on can be known and measured.
102
 
His next statement neatly hid the true nature of the operation now underway at 
Dunkirk: 
the House should prepare itself for hard and heavy tidings. I have only 
to add that nothing which may happen in this battle can in any way relieve us 
of our duty to defend the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves; nor 
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should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way, as on former 
occasions in our history, through disaster and through grief to the ultimate 
defeat of our enemies.
103
 
What Churchill was concealing from the House of Commons was Operation 
DYNAMO, the evacuation of the BEF and French forces from Dunkirk, in which the 
RAF would play a significant but ultimately controversial role.
104
 
On the 19 May 1940, VAdm Ramsey began the planning for Operation 
DYNAMO at his Headquarters in Dover and on 20 May 1940 the PM directed that as: 
a precautionary measure the Admiralty should assemble a large 




However, on 25 May 1940 the War Cabinet was discussing a response to General 
Weygand who had asserted that the BEF was withdrawing, which was not the position 
as understood by the War Cabinet.
106
 The confused nature of the time is well 
illustrated by the following: 
The Prime Minister thought that we should await further news from 
Lord Gort before taking a decision on this matter. The War Cabinet agreed 
that, pending further news of the situation of the British Expeditionary Force, 
steps should not be taken to withdraw reserves of ammunition from the bases 




On the 26 May 1940 Ramsey was ordered to execute DYNAMO and begin the 
evacuation of the Allied armies concentrating in the defensive perimeter of Dunkirk. 
However the fighting was still some way from the beaches and the surrender of the 
Belgium forces was adding to the danger facing the BEF, the PM summarised the key 
priority to the War Cabinet: 
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Our chief preoccupation now was to get off as much of the British 
Expeditionary Force as possible. There would be very confused fighting in the 
area of operations. The bombers on both sides would be able to do little, as the 
opposing troops would be very much intermingled. The German bombers, 
however, would get their opportunity when our men reached the coast.
108
 
To this the CAS highlighted the situation that day: 
large numbers of fighters had been operating that day over the French 
coast. We had lost 9 aircraft, but 23 Germans had been shot down for certain 
and several more unconfirmed. The German Air Force had been very active 
indeed during the day. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter 
Command, was proposing to use formations of 3 squadrons the following day 




Whilst Ramsey was beginning his planning on the 19 May 1940, the Air 
Ministry had agreed with Gort and Blount that the Air Component needed to be 
evacuated back to the UK and continue as best it could to support the BEF from a 
forward base area in the SE of England.
110
 Accordingly, Blount established his Back 
HQ at RAF Hawkinge in Kent near to Ramsey’s HQ in Dover.
111
 
This background to the evacuation has been highlighted in some detail to 
illustrate the close link between the War Cabinet, the COS, and their respective 
frontline commands. Events on the frontline were of immediate importance to the 
War Cabinet and stimulated responses that required immediate actions from the three 
services. Here the COS played their key role in the co-ordination of defence and their 
respective staffs acted as their executives to ensure the frontline acted as the War 
Cabinet desired. This was the principle at the heart of the Hankey System and at the 
highest level it worked well. The difficulties emerged closer to the frontline where the 
completeness of higher co-ordination would have the most telling effect. Newall 
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dispatched Joubert to act as the forward co-ordinator, a natural development of 
Joubert’s combined operations advisor role.
112
 The task facing the RAF was to focus 
the efforts of all frontline commands in support of the evacuation. This was exactly 
the role that had been envisaged for the SAC. 
Joubert arrived at Back HQ at 0630 hrs on 26 May 1940 to take over the HQ 
and ensure the ‘co-ordination of reconnaissance, fighter and bombing operations’ in 
support of the evacuation. However, Joubert quickly found that Blount, who arrived 
on 27 May 1940, had established a sound HQ and he returned to London in the 
afternoon leaving Blount in command. Blount was further assisted by the arrival in 
the evening of Lt Col Festing of the War Office whose role was to help in the co-
ordination of the RN, RAF and evacuating BEF. By the end of 27 May 1940 Blount 
and the Back HQ were, by virtue of CAS’ representative Joubert’s endorsement of 
Blount’s HQ, effectively charged with the SAC role for the Dunkirk evacuation. 
Although Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands would act at times independently, 
their directing co-ordination would come from Blount through the Air Ministry. 
Blount’s HQ was naturally very rudimentary and poorly staffed. Furthermore, 
his understanding of what was happening in the Dunkirk perimeter was patchy at best 
and he had to piece together whatever information he could get to gain a basic insight 
with which to plan and task his forces.
113
 His forces, of course, were not his, but as 
Richards comments: 
he was dependent for all his tasks other than reconnaissance, upon 
“requests” to the chiefs of the operational commands. Fortunately, Portal, 
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Dowding and Bowhill were all men who recognized a crisis when they met one, 
and the organization, though cumbersome, somehow worked.
114
  
The role of Blount as the very specific SAC for the operations in support of 
DYNAMO marks a waypoint in the changes that had taken place since 1939. In 
Blount the RAF created an SAC to undertake exactly the task it said in 1937 would be 
required in wartime, namely the active co-ordination of the mono-functional 
commands to deliver multi-functional effect. But Blount’s appointment was not on the 
same level as the creation of BAFF and the elevation of Barratt to C-in-C. Blount was 
empowered to task and co-ordinate the air assets committed to a very specific and 
vitally important military operation in a confined operating area. He did not 
simultaneously have authority over Bomber, Fighter or Coastal Commands’ wider 
operations and the time period envisaged for his authority to last was obviously very 
limited. In retrospect, the example of Blount highlighted the benefits that could come 
from empowered co-ordination and control, and as such provided a pointer for what 
might be required once operations moved beyond the fight for survival towards the 
beginning of co-ordinated offensive action. Blount became an SAC by circumstance 
rather than considered deliberation as in the case of Barratt. His performance in that 
role should have highlighted that the objections within the RAF to one individual 
being given authority over operations not in their immediate area of expertise, were 
flawed. But that lesson would not be learned at that time. 
Higher Air Command - The Reality of War 
The introduction of Joubert and the elevation of Barratt to C-in-C status 
highlighted early indications that the Hankey System contained difficulties for the 
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RAF. That the system should have evolved from the experience of the First World 
War was both a blessing and a curse. On the positive side its process and procedures 
ensured a systematic approach to war governance was established and maintained. It 
allowed all parties to make their case and have it properly considered before decisions 
were reached.
115
 It avoided, at least until the change of PM, the domination of war 
policy by personality which was to have such an adverse effect on the conduct of the 
war by the Germans, Italians and Soviet Union. It also professionalised the 
management of operations and allowed for decision making to be undertaken amid the 
growing complexity of information and strategic demand. On the other hand, it 
reflected a way of working that technology was rapidly overtaking. 
The flexibility and adaptability of emerging military capability was out 
stripping the capacity of the Cabinet decision making process. Events would move at 
such pace that yesterday’s decision could easily be overtaken by today’s events. The 
argument made by James that command decisions moved at the pace of humans rather 
than machines, was increasingly coming under question. This had been a central tenet 
of James’ argument during the SAC Debate but the reality of combat operations was 
increasingly showing that the ability of air weapons to act, recover, and act again 
meant that the traditional concepts surrounding the command and control of military 
operations were coming under question.
116
 Even in the early months of the Second 
World War the multi-role capability of the RAF’s frontline meant that demands for 
different types of air support from the same platform were going to become a central 
feature of air command. For the RAF this was particularly critical as its capability 
offered the War Cabinet, and the other Services, the fastest reacting means with which 
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to deal with the unexpected. Thus to harness it to a process which relied on the 
directives and central co-ordination when flexibility and adaptability were essential 
was a significant weakness. By resisting the RAF’s request to establish a SAC the 
DCOS Committee significantly weakened the RAF’s ability to respond to wartime 
requirements. Whilst James was correct in asserting that war was often a period of 
protracted inaction, he was wrong in applying this precept to the air environment 
where the demands for support and assistance continually outstripped availability, just 
as Harris had warned they would.
117
  
Another challenge was this limit of authority that could or should be exercised 
by the CAS and the Air Ministry. CAS held overriding authority and it is difficult to 
argue that he lacked the command authority necessary to pull together the various 
components of the RAF into a cohesive whole. Moreover, he was responsible for all 
senior appointments and in his hands rested the gift of advancement or retirement. So 
how could it be possible that he did not have the authority necessary to act as the SAC 
in the Hankey Model? 
The simple answer is that the characterization above of his singular authority 
is overly simplistic and ignores the reality of higher command.
118
 High command was 
not analogous to dictatorship. The CAS may have theoretically possessed the 
authority described but that did not mean that it would have been right for him to use 
it in an unthinking or unsympathetic way. As CAS he had constitutional seniority over 
his Service colleagues, but he was still subject to the direction of the Air Council and 
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had at all times to consider the morale and sustainability of his high command 
colleagues and the well being of the RAF and its morale. That does not imply that he 
was honour bound to defer to their wishes or perspectives, but the collegiate nature of 
British military command demanded that their views must be considered and that their 
position and personal authority must be acknowledged. So it was not the case that the 
CAS could simply direct and order, it was much more complex than that and one of 
the reasons why the role of SAC was not something that could simply be added to the 
duties of the CAS as required by the Hankey System. 
Another factor was the command responsibilities of the Cs-in-C. They were 
responsible for the fighting efficiency of their frontline units and the successful 
delivery of the requirements set out in the operational directives they received from 
the CAS via the Air Staff. This responsibility was jealously guarded by the three 
operational Cs-in-C as it defined the unique role they held in the command structure 
of the Service. Indeed, when the subject of establishing a SAC was first broached it 
drew significant opposition from the Cs-in-C who argued that a SAC would 
undermine their role and weaken their link with, and authority of, the CAS. It is 
highly likely that that would have been true as the SAC would, in effect, have been a 
Supreme C-in-C sitting above the Cs-in-C with overall operational responsibility.  
The Cs-in-C saw themselves as the final arbiters of the actions of their 
Commands and they possessed firm views on how their organizations should be used 
to contribute to the war. At a time when air power theory was based on flimsy and 
equivocal evidence is was possible and intellectually defensible to hold very 
diverging opinions on the ‘way’ in which air capability should be used. The effect of 
this was to enable the Cs-in-C to hold firm views of how their capability should be 
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used that were difficult, if not impossible to gainsay. That understandable lack of 
certainty limited the ‘authority’ that a wise CAS could or would apply.
 119
 
If the RAF had found the CAS acting as the SAC a difficult transition, the 
Hankey System found its responsiveness to unfolding events a severe challenge. In 
retrospect it is clear that in the early days of the war under the premiership of 
Chamberlain the War Cabinet had not yet fully transitioned to a war footing.
120
 In 
particular, the responsiveness necessary in the higher command procedures was 
lacking in the early months. Air forces may be highly flexible and adaptable but this 
attribute also makes them highly attractive to close political control. That the RAF 
should still in 1939 have shown all the signs of bridling at this truth is strange given 
that the RAF was in part born of a political desire to exercise control over the growing 
military power represented by the air service in 1917 and 1918.
121
 Nonetheless, the 
RAF, and the C-in-Cs in particular, often became exasperated at the continually 
changing directives they were expected to address.
122
 Whilst one can be sympathetic, 
such sympathy must have limits for the very attributes which airmen heralded as their 
unique capability were the ones which demanded that they establish a command and 
control structure able to address the consequences of their ownership. The situation 
exposed in 1939 would continue throughout the war, as often the only asset capable of 
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offering a response was the air force.
123
 The airman was becoming the victim of his 
own capability and success. 
The Hankey System was designed to ease the management of war and to 
replicate the efficient machinery of government that emerged in the final months of 
the First World War. But the First World War was not to be a rehearsal for the Second 
World War; the retreat from Mons and the Miracle on the Marne were not to be 
repeated after the German breakthrough at Sedan. The Hankey System was ideally 
suited to the management of a stabilized front and the gradual shift to the offensive 
enabled by the inevitable dominance of industrial output and capacity. In this they 
were supported by the JPC assessment on the expected conduct of a future war against 
Germany which foresaw a defensive battle preceding stalemate after which the allies 
would build strength before committing to the offensive.
124
 But in 1939 and 1940 the 
situation was far from a repeat of the last two years of the First World War and 
significantly different from the JPC re-assessment of 1936.
125
The pace of events and 
the strategic implications that developed created a situation more akin to fire fighting 
than crisis management. 
The decision process once the attack in the west began was simply too slow to 
cope with the needs of the moment. But in truth the limitations of the Hankey system 
had existed for a long time for they were embedded in the management concept that 
underpinned the system. Management of the experienced and familiar was feasible, 
management of the unknown and dramatic change and chaos was almost 
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 In 1939 neither the Government nor the RAF higher commanders were 
really prepared in either mind or process to deal with the chaos that would attend to 
the outbreak of German operations in the west. The Phoney War masked the 
symptoms but they were there nonetheless. The fact that Newall had twice established 
a SAC in the first four months of the war is ample evidence that the RAF’s command 
structure was not correct and that the decision taken for good reason in 1937 was at 
the heart of this problem. 
In both these cases, Joubert as CAS’ Combined Operations advisor and Barratt 
as the C-in-C BAFF the root cause was the same, inadequate resource in the face of 
exponentially growing demand. The pressure to achieve more success in the North 
Sea demanded better internal co-ordination within the RAF and with the RN. The 
need to address the Army’s requirements in France led to War Cabinet decisions that 
effectively directed the RAF to form BAFF to overcome the intractable dispute 
between the War office and the Air Ministry. Either way, capability shortfalls coupled 
with resource shortage and the attendant need for centralised control of scarce assets 
were the driving factors. 
As the fighting in France drew to a close the limitations of the War Cabinet 
and RAF higher command structure, in terms of command authority, responsiveness, 
and organization had been exposed. For the RAF their SAC proposal that had been 
defeated in 1937 returned to haunt them in 1939. It would be simplistic to conclude 
that the RAF should have imposed a SAC and vested their higher command in that 
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individual. In the first place the other two services would have been unlikely to have 
co-operated, especially the RN, and in the second place the RAF would have 
publically gone against agreed CID process as encapsulated in CID 1425-B. 
Newall’s response was to insinuate a SAC equivalent into the various 
operational structures without challenging the agreed wider system of higher 
command. The successful elevation of Blount to oversee the air operations over 
Dunkirk typified this approach, but this typically British compromise met with limited 
success. In 1939-40 the outcome of the war’s events were not determined by the 
arrangements for the RAF’s contribution, other grander strategic factors would 
dominate. However, as the surviving war leaders took stock in the aftermath of the 
French surrender, air command was to come into extremely sharp focus and for a 






The previous chapter reviewed the challenges the RAF faced in commanding 
its forces when operating in allied coalition with France and in a combined operation 
with their Army and RN colleagues. Adaptations were made to address inter-service 
demands for greater use of RAF assets, a problem exacerbated by the limited size and 
mono-capability of the RAF frontline in 1939-40. In the case of North Sea operations, 
the campaign in France, and the evacuation from Dunkirk, the RAF needed to address 
joint requirements for maritime and land support, both of which had not figured 
greatly in the 1936 debates concerning the structure of the frontline. However, by late 
June the isolated position of Britain was clear. Although the immediate task was to 
survive whatever threats the coming weeks might produce, underlying this survival 
was a long standing dispute within the RAF over the balance between offensive and 
defensive strategies. This debate would reach a climax in the autumn with the 
wholesale re-organisation of the RAF’s higher command. This change of personalities 
would be central to the leadership and command of the RAF for the remainder of the 
Second World War. Therefore, whereas the previous chapter addressed the need for 
high commanders to adapt their command structures and practices to the operational 
demands of the time, this chapter will investigate the equally important challenge of 
ensuring that the right personnel occupy the high command positions so that the 
practices and processes of command can function effectively. During both the day and 
night air battles over the UK between  July 1940 and May 1941 the practice of 
179 
 
command conformed more or less to the precepts set out in CID 1425-B – the Hankey 
System. During the Battle of Britain the personnel were those who had begun the war 
and had significant pre-war staff and command experience. During the Blitz virtually 
all high commanders were new having been appointed in the last three months of 
1940. That they should both execute the Hankey System with success says much for 
its inherent strengths, regardless of the shortcomings highlighted in the previous 
chapter. 
The Battle of Britain  
Following the fall of France, the strategic situation simplified, Britain’s only 
policy could be one of survival and therefore all must be done, regardless of 
perspective, ambition or mindset, to ensure that Britain survived until the autumn 
storms made a cross-Channel invasion too risky an enterprise for the Germans to 
consider.
1
 This meant that from mid-June, the Home Defence Forces had to counter 
the threat of invasion until mid to late September, some four months in which to 
survive and in which the operational goal was not victory but the avoidance of 
defeat.
2
 Among the Home Defence Forces the RN and the RAF held the key to 
success.
3
 The Germans could not mount a realistic assault until they had achieved 
some measure of air superiority and even if that were to be gained they would still 
face the prospect of a climatic sea engagement with an as yet undiminished RN.
4
 Thus 
the Germans had two immediate operational goals. First, the RAF must be defeated to 
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such an extent to grant freedom in the air, and secondly, the RN must be reduced in 
capability so that it could no longer deny freedom of movement in the Channel to the 
invasion forces.
5
 With the great benefit of hindsight, these two pre-conditions make it 
clear that an invasion of southern Britain in 1940 was an unlikely undertaking, but 
that ignores the contemporary evidence to the contrary. The Germans had already 
defeated Poland, Denmark and Norway in a matter of weeks, and tellingly had 
defeated the French Army and evicted the BEF from the Continent. The threat of 
invasion, whatever calm reflection may suggest, was perceived at the time as both real 
and imminent and the RAF found itself very much in the frontline. 
The emerging situation was the one for which Dowding and Fighter Command 
had been planning since 1936, based on previous preparation stretching back to the 
First World War but with the added complication that the enemy now occupied the 
entire Channel and North Sea shore from the Brest Peninsula to the northern tip of 
Norway.
 6
 This extension of the threat sector that Dowding must consider greatly 
increased the pressure on his already thinly dispersed forces. That the enemy could 
now strike from the Shetlands to Land’s End meant that Fighter Command’s focus 
could not be exclusive to any one sector. On the other hand, the bulk of the German 
forces and all their single engine escort fighters were concentrated on the airfields of 
northern France where the bulk of the GAF’s offensive capability was also 
concentrated.
7
 So while in theory Dowding faced an enemy frontline extending over 
many hundreds of miles, in reality his main threat would originate from northern 
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France and the Low Countries and be targeted against the south east of England and 
the London area in particular. This was only to be expected as the purpose of the 
aerial battle was to gain air superiority over the Channel and planned landing areas in 
order to enable the invasion planned under the German operational plan SEALION.
8
 
This particular issue would prove to be central to the command changes that would 
unfold in late 1940. 
The course of the Battle of Britain is well known and need not be repeated in 
this study.
9
 The important consideration for this study relates to the manner in which 
higher operational co-ordination was achieved. Judging from the period covered in the 
previous chapter, the creation of bespoke co-ordinators would have been 
understandable. However, from mid-1940 onwards RAF high command conformed 
increasingly to the pattern laid out in CID 1425-B. In the Air Ministry, the DCAS 
acted as CAS’ operations director through his D Ops(H) whose close staff co-
ordinated the operations of Fighter Command with the actions of Bomber Command 
and Coastal Command and with the RN and British Army.
 10
 To create this co-
ordination their colleagues in the other Air Ministry Directorates responsible for 
Bomber Command and Coastal Command directed their commands to undertake the 
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operations aimed at defeating the prospect of invasion and securing Britain’s survival 
into 1941.  
Ray succinctly summarised the task facing the German High Command in 
July 1940.
11
 The poor state of the German Navy in the aftermath of the Norwegian 
campaign, severely constrained the options or, indeed, feasibility of landing the 
German Army on British shores. Whatever invasion plan was to be developed for the 
surface forces, the essential pre-requisite was for the Luftwaffe to achieve air 
superiority over the RAF. For the RAF the task was to not cede control of the air by 
remaining a viable and effective defence, to protect the valuable targets that were 
based within range of the GAF offensive forces, and to inflict on the enemy as much 
damage as possible to reduce its capability to mount and sustain an invasion by 
attacking its shipping, invasion barges, and offensive air capability.
12
 In addition to 
this Bomber Command was also under orders to take the fight to the German 
homeland through the early phases of its bombing campaign and to assist Coastal 
Command in its fight against the German Navy. Finally, by reforming the units which 
had so recently fought in France under the AASF, Bomber Command was to also 
contribute to the anti-invasion capability by developing the means of attacking the 
German Army when and if it landed. Thus the task of co-ordination facing the Air 
Ministry was considerable.  
Throughout the summer, Bomber and Coastal Command conducted parallel 
but complementary operations directed against the invasion forces and the Luftwaffe 
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 Additionally, Bomber Command began tentative early operations against the 
German homeland, and in a PM directed mission responded to the bombing of 
London on the 24 August 1940 by bombing Berlin the following night.
14
 This 
combination of offensive defence against the means of the German invasion potential 
and offense against the German industrial and political infrastructure typified the 
growing flexibility with which the Air Ministry and the frontline commands were 
beginning to operate. Coastal Command also attacked the coastal shipping and 
invasion ports that were essential to mount the invasion and continued its North Sea 
duties against the German High Sea Fleet.
15
 However, what was notable about these 
operations was that although the separate commands were very responsive they were, 
in the main, conducted as separate operations confined within the mono-functional 
structures. The multi-functional perspective was held by the CAS and Air Ministry, 
especially the DCAS, Douglas.
16
 He was responsible for all the elements of the Air 
Staff responsible for directing the actions of the commands. He was also responsible 
with his Army and RN DCOS colleagues for ensuring co-ordination across the 
Services. It was a pivotal position and in effect the SAC sought by the RAF but 
without the public authority and profile. 
The net result of the centrally co-ordinated action of the commands was a 
tactical position that by 14 September 1940, following a particularly successful raid 
against Ostend which had led to the sinking of 80 invasion barges, led to Adm Raeder 
advising Hitler in a Conference he had called to consider the state of invasion 
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preparations that ‘The present air situation does not provide the conditions for 
carrying out the operation, as the risk is still too great.’
17
 Three days later Operation 
SEALION was delayed indefinitely following the evidence of Fighter Command’s 
continuing strength revealed during the operations of 15 September 1940.
18
 
The Battle of Britain is nearly always portrayed as a battle fought by Fighter 
Command. But that is a partial view for the overall damage to the German invasion 
forces came about through the co-ordinated actions of all three frontline RAF 
commands centrally directed and controlled by the CAS through his DCAS and 
supporting Air Staff. The command of the Battle of Britain represented a significant 
success and validation of the Hankey system. The way in which central co-ordination 
was achieved, despite the inevitable frictions along the way, was an excellent 
demonstration of the effectiveness that could be achieved in the central co-ordination 
of a complex defence structure. However, the success achieved during the battle 
disguised an increasing unease at the highest levels within the RAF and Government 
that the high command, though successful, had been found wanting.
19
 This, some 
argued, had led to the retirements of Newall and Dowding, and the replacement of 
Park, by underhand conspiracy and shabby treatment.
20
 However, more sober 
reflection by Ritchie delivered a more balanced and insightful assessment.
21
 Ritchie’s 
work is complemented by Ray’s study of the Battle of Britain which highlighted the 
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The view that Newall and Dowding were the victims of underhand treatment 
ignores the supreme danger of the time. Both served at the behest of the Prime 
Minister who had to have the utmost confidence in his appointed commanders. 
Likewise, Dowding commanded Fighter Command but as the agent of the CAS, who 
was responsible to the War Cabinet for the performance of the RAF. As the day and 
night battles developed it was entirely reasonable, indeed, entirely proper for the Air 
Staff to take a close overseeing role monitoring the  one element of the RAF frontline 
that circumstances had brought to the very forefront of the defence of the nation. 
Whilst authors such as Wright have accused Douglas of underhand and personally 
motivated tactics, this completely ignores the central role that Douglas had in the 
operational direction of the RAF and the ensuring of its effectiveness and readiness 
for combat.
23




Douglas, as DCAS, was effectively responsible for the day to day operational 
performance of the RAF. Whilst Dowding held sway over Fighter Command, Portal 
Bomber Command and Bowhill Coastal Command, the point of higher co-ordination 
was Douglas on behalf of Newall. As such it was imperative that he took a close 
interest in all operational matters of which the increasing Fighter Command losses 
and damage to No 11 Group airfields during August and early September, along with 
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the growing night attacks after 7 September 1940, were the two most pressing issues 
of the time. He was also responsible for ensuring the harmonisation of Air Staff Plans 
with operational reality in terms of bomber, fighter and coastal operational policy. 
On 24 September 1940 Douglas replied to Saundby, the ACAS (Training) 
that: 
I have received a number of criticisms recently from several sources 
about the combined tactics employed by Fighter Command squadrons, 
(particularly by those on No 11 Group), to deal with the large enemy 
formations that come over by day.
25
 
After noting that although tactical memoranda had been issued he observed 
that they were ‘not actually translated into effect by units’.  He continued: 
What we want is some plan by which, when a large number of 
squadrons are sent up to tackle a very large enemy formation, there is some 
sort of broad co-ordinated plan of action between them.
26
 
Next he offered a contrary view to the established procedure of allocating each 
squadron a separate radio frequency for its ground control and airborne 
communications: 
It has been suggested to me that it is a mistake for all fighter squadrons 
to be on different wavelengths. It might well be advisable that, say, three or 
four squadrons should work on the same wavelength, so they could 
communicate with each other and arrange a co-ordinated plan of attack.
27
 
Collectively these views represented a severe critique of Fighter Command 
and No 11 Group’s operations. That they should be stated just after the subsequently 
identified culmination of the battle illustrates the uncertainty of the time and the on-
going concern that larger scale attacks would continue. This particular issue would be 
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addressed at a conference chaired by Douglas on behalf of CAS, on 17 October 1940, 
but before that the issues facing Dowding would grow in scale and complexity.
28
 
On 14 September 1940 Dowding had received a letter from the Air Council 
informing him that: 
The minister for Aircraft Production has invited Marshal of the Royal 
Air Force Sir John Salmond, GCB, to undertake a thorough enquiry into the 
equipment and preparation of night fighters. The Air Council, in promising 
their fullest co-operation in this enquiry, have proposed that its scope should 
be extended to cover all matters in connection with air fighting at night which 
are of common concern to the two Ministries.
29
 
The letter concluded by asking Dowding to nominate a representative whom the Air 
Council thought should be Brand, AOC No 10 Group. With remarkable speed 
Salmond’s Committee reported its findings on 17 September 1940 and the Air 
Council wrote to Dowding enclosing their conclusions on 25 September 1940.
30
 
Thus at the culminating point of the day battle the C-in-C’s operational 
methods by both day and night were under external review. This can hardly have been 
a comfortable situation for Dowding, especially given the uncertainty surrounding his 
tenure in command that had been on-going since the late spring. This correspondence 
has been well covered in the literature with Newall writing to Dowding on 5 July 
1940 to ask him to extend to October.
31
 Dowding replied on 7 July 1940 with a letter 
to Newall stating his perspective on the handling of his appointment and career from a 
letter received from Ellington in 1937 and the nine subsequent letters he received until 
Newall’s letter of 5 July 1940.
 32
 Dowding stated: 
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Before the war, as I told the S of S, I should have been glad enough to 
retire; now I am anxious to stay, because I feel that there is no one else who 
will fight as I do when proposals are made which would reduce the Defence 
Forces of the Country below the extreme danger point. 
I would therefore suggest that I should not be called upon to retire 
otherwise than at my own request before the first retiring date given to me, 
viz. April 24
th
 1942 or the end of the war, whichever is the earlier.
33
 
This was an extraordinary ultimatum to the CAS. First, Dowding claimed only 
he would defend the frontline and second he effectively demanded to be left alone in 
charge of Fighter Command for the foreseeable future. Ignoring the fact that Newall 
had been the main protagonist in opposing the PM’s demands for more fighter aircraft 
to be sent to France, Dowding was suggesting that the CAS was incapable of 
maintaining the RAF frontline in a fit state to defend the home base. Also by 
demanding to be left in post until early 1942 or the end of the war, Dowding was 
demanding effective autonomy from Air Ministry and CAS oversight and displaying a 
very inflated sense of self-importance. 
On 10 July 1940 Churchill entered the debate with a note to Sinclair 
expressing his surprise and displeasure that Sinclair was considering removing 
Dowding. Churchill then stated that he: 
greatly admired the whole of his work in the Fighter Command, and 
especially in resisting the clamour for numerous air raid warnings, and the 




Churchill concluded by hoping that Dowding’s appointment ‘should be indefinitely 
prolonged while the war lasts’.
35
 Sinclair noted on the PM’s letter in pencil that he 









had discussed the matter with him on 12 July 1940 and that the PM had agreed to let 
the matter rest for further review in a month.
36
 
Newall replied to Dowding on 13 July 1940 in a conciliatory tone: 
No one is more fully aware than I of the inconvenience to which you 




After offering his ‘sincere apologies’, Newall set out his reasoning for asking 
Dowding to extend until October: 
I have to consider the retirement of the more senior officers in order to 
maintain an adequate flow of promotions into the higher positions in the 
Service, and it is always my desire to give the officers concerned as long 
notice as possible; but particularly in the case of the highest Commands in the 
Royal Air Force the rapidly changing events of the last two years have forced 
new decisions upon us at short notice. You will recall that on two earlier 
occasions when you were asked to defer your retirement, in March, 1939 and 
March, 1940 the country was, as it is now today, faced with a critical threat. 
The reasons which applied then do so now and compel me to try to avoid a 
change at Fighter Command.
38
 
Newall then addressed Dowding’s implicit criticism of him and the Air Staff and his 
demand to be extended in post until 1942 or the war’s end: 
With regard to your reason for suggesting that you should not be called 
upon to retire before April 24
th
, 1942, or at the end of the war, whichever is 
the earlier, I am afraid that I am unable to agree that there is no one else who 
could resist as you do proposals to reduce the Defence Forces of this country 
below the extreme danger point. From time to time, as we both well know, 
there has been pressure on the political and other sides to divert A.D.G.B. in 
one way or another. While, only last month, I was glad to have your support at 
the Cabinet when the question of sending fighter squadrons to France was 
under consideration, I must point out that the policy of the Air Staff has 
consistently been directed towards conserving our Air Defence Forces in the 
face of the various conflicting claims that have rightly or wrongly been made 
upon them. Nevertheless, it is the duty of the Air Staff, no less than of the 
Command, to give effect to the decisions the Government has taken, whatever 
our personal views may be.
39
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Newall concluded by re-iterating that: 
I can only repeat that so far as can be seen at present I must ask you to 
make it convenient to defer your retirement until the end of October.
 40
 
Dowding replied on 14 July 1940 accepting Newall’s apology, commenting that he 
was thinking as much about other events where he had stood for no fighter diversion, 
and concluding by stating that: 
I realise, however, that this is a matter upon which we cannot be 
expected to see eye to eye, and further discussion would be unprofitable.
41
 
Dowding had also replied to Sinclair, to whom he had copied his original letter to 
Newall of 7 July 1940, with a short note stating that he now understood that he would 
be ‘placed on the Retired List at the end of October 1940’.
42
 
But matters were not to rest there for on 10 August 1940 Sinclair received a 
sharp note from the PM stating: 
I certainly understood from our conversation a month ago that you 
were going to give Dowding an indefinite war-time extension, and were going 
to do it at once. I cannot understand how any contrary impression could have 
arisen in your mind about my wishes. Let me however remove it at once, and 
urge you to take the step I have so long desired.
43
 
On 12 August 1940, Newall wrote to Dowding: 
When I wrote to you on July 13
th
 I could not see any alternative to 
indicating the end of October as the time for your retirement. In the present 
circumstances, however, I fully realise the disadvantages involved in this 
decision and I am now glad to be able to say that it has been decided to cancel 
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The same day Sinclair wrote to Churchill informing him of the removal of the time 
limit on Dowding’s appointment.
45
 
A week after Churchill had urged Sinclair to extend Dowding, he received a 
letter from Irene Ward MP offering another perspective on the leadership of the 
RAF.
46
 Miss Ward stated that: 
I’m one of the members who have been kept informed about the views 
of many people in the Air Force who want a change in the Air Chief Marshall 
(sic) and have seen the confidential memorandum. 
I am told a change may take place and I write to say that on all sides 
there appears to be among the service people an overwhelming desire that the 
Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command Air Marshal Portal should be 
appointed to succeed. 
My information is that the RAF would consider it a disaster if the 
Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command were given the supreme office.
47
 
Given that Churchill had previously suggested that Dowding should be retained at 
Fighter Command unless a more senior appointment became available, this view must 




On 7 September 1940, Miss Ward passed a copy of the memorandum entitled 
‘A Weak Link in the Nation’s Defences’ to Brendan Bracken who passed it on to the 
Churchill and ultimately to Sinclair.
49
 It was a personal attack on the calibre and 
conduct of Newall as CAS and some of the comments were very relevant to the 
subsequent fate of both Newall and Dowding. The author of the memorandum, whom 
Richie believes was Wg Cdr Kingston-McCloughry, stated that: 
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Indeed, HQ Fighter Command is substantially a one man show and is 
ruled by Air Chief Marshal Dowding who is a definite personality, but 
unfortunately he has inadequate mental ability and a very slow brain. He is 
also a classic example of a complete non-co-operator either with the Air 
Ministry or any other authority. His treatment of his staff is deplorable and he 
tolerates only ‘yes’ men. 
Air Chief Marshal Newall has not the strength of character to deal with 
Air Chief Marshal Dowding or to insist on having a strong and balanced staff 
at HQ Fighter Command.
50
 
On 6 November 1940, the Chairman of the Conservative 1922 Committee, Sir 
Reginald Clarry MP, wrote to Churchill to inform him that following a meeting of its 
members to hear ‘certain criticisms of the Fighter Command’ that he wished to 
‘represent to you the lack of confidence in which Sir Hugh Dowding is held in certain 
quarters of the personnel of the Force’.
51
 Churchill’s reply on 8 November 1940 was 
to the point: 
I do not think it would be at all a good thing for the 1922 Committee to 
become a kind of collecting house for complaints against serving 
Commanders-in-Chief or other important officials.
52
 
But 6 days later on 14 November 1940 Churchill was writing to Sinclair informing 
him that during a meeting with Dowding that morning he had insisted that Dowding 
leave Fighter Command and undertake the role of representing the UK in the US to 
get ‘American war aviation developed on right lines, and lines parallel to ours’.
53
 
Ray covers the complex reasons for the removal of Dowding, and 
subsequently Park, well, highlighting the complex interplay of disputes over day 
tactics, reinforcement policy, inter-group co-ordination, and importantly night air 
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 He concludes that Dowding’s decline after the conference of 17 October 
1940 was both steady and certain stating that: 
Through pressure from Sinclair, Balfour, Macdonald and Clarry, 
combined with the influential opinions of Trenchard and Salmond, both 
Beaverbrook and Churchill came to recognize the need for change. This they 
accepted reluctantly, but the measure became part of the RAF’s new policies, 
which also involved the replacement of Newall by Portal.
55
 
From the perspective of high command it illustrated the fundamental responsibility 
placed on a Service Chief, S of S or PM to ensure that those charged with carrying out 
operations are aligned, capable and committed to achieving a successful outcome 
sought by the War Cabinet, whatever, as Newall pointed out in his letter to Dowding, 
may be their personal view. As the day Battle of Britain subsided and the mass 
formations of enemy bombers that had generated so much discussion faded from the 
operational scene, there arose the need to shift from pure defence to whatever 
offensive action could be undertaken. That required a different approach and fresh 
minds. But, in the meantime, the night time assault that began on 7 September 1940, 
and was fundamental in the decision to replace Dowding, was growing evermore 
destructive and demanding a significant response. 
The Blitz – The Command Challenge for the New Command Team  
On 25 October 1940 Portal became CAS in succession to Newall.
56
 Portal was 
replaced at Bomber Command by Pierse, the VCAS, who in turn was replaced by 
Freeman at Portal’s insistence. The relationship between Portal and Freeman was 
close and complex. Freeman had tutored Portal at the RAF Staff College and they 
remained close and supportive colleagues throughout their careers. An interesting 
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insight into their relationship is given by Furse who records the evidence of 
Freeman’s chauffeur, Davies, that Freeman and Portal drove around Hyde Park while 
Portal agonised over accepting the post of CAS, which ‘horrified him’ as he 
considered himself to ‘not have enough experience on the Air Council’ and 
insufficiently familiar with the ‘top people in the RAF to be able to choose the right 
men for the top appointments’.
57
 It needs to be borne in mind that Furse’s work is 
favourable to Freeman and that Furse is a distant relative of Freeman, however, 
Furse’s subsequent comment that Portal then persuaded him to join him as his VCAS 
is supported by Portal’s biographer Richards. On 25 November 1940 Douglas, 
replaced Dowding at Fighter Command who departed the UK to lead a procurement 
mission to the US.
58
 And at No 11 Group, Park was replaced by Leigh-Mallory on 18 
December 1940.
59
 Thus in the space of two months almost the entire senior command 
structure of the RAF was reshuffled and at a time when the German air assault was 




The answer the RAF sought to develop was to shift their operations from the 
defensive to the offensive.
61
 This reflected in part the considerable influence 
Trenchard continue to have over the current high commanders, especially Portal, who 
enthusiastically supported Douglas’ policy of ‘leaning forward into France’, a 
euphemism for taking the offensive against the German fighter force.
 62
 This was a 
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policy Trenchard and Salmond had strongly advocated and had echoes of fighter 
operations in the First World War when Trenchard and Salmond were commanders 
and Douglas and Portal were senior pilots. However, in early June Dr R V Jones had 
discovered that the Germans were using a form of blind landing equipment to guide 
their bombers with great accuracy to their targets.
63
 During the summer much 
progress had been made in electronically countering these methods but still they 
represented a considerable threat. In parallel, great effort was applied to the task of 
fielding an effective airborne radar equipped fighter that could take the fight to the 
bombers by night as the Spitfires and Hurricanes had done by day.
64
 But by the time 
of the command changes the fruits of this work were still some months away. In this 
circumstance alternative methods were necessary. The Air Staff’s response when 
prisoner of war interrogations and ULTRA decrypts revealed in November 1940 that 
the Germans intended to mount a significant air attack illustrates the difficulty the 
new high commanders faced in shifting from a defensive posture to one in which the 
enemy would be held at risk through co-ordinated offensive action.
65
 
On 14 November 1940 Stevenson issued at 0300 hrs ‘Operation Instructions 
for Air Operation (COLD WATER)’ to Fighter, Bomber, Coastal Commands and 
other key organisations.
66
 He began by alluding to the source of the information: 
Reliable information has been received that the enemy have planned a 
major air night bombing operation against this country. This will probably 
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Four potential areas were given all in and around London and the Harwich-Ipswich 
area and the staff assessed that the operations would be carried out either in three 
phases on a particular night or on three consecutive nights. Stevenson then described 
how the enemy operation was expected to be executed: 
The plan is for K.G. 100 led personally by the Commanding Officer of 
this Geschwader - using the KNICKEBIEN type beam – who may carry out 
the first attacks and undertake beam calibration and weather reports over 
England as required. The aerodromes from which it is anticipated the enemy 
bombers will be operating are tabulated in Appendix A. 
Any further information acquired regarding this operation will be 
signalled to Commands concerned referring to this operation order. It is 
anticipated that information will be available in the Air Ministry shortly after 




Under the heading ‘Intention’ it was stated that: 
It is intended that the Metropolitan Air Force shall carry out an 
operation to counter the German attack.
69
 
The plan which had been developed required many elements of the MAF to 
work in unison under the central direction of the Air Staff. This was not the issuing of 
a new bombing directive that called for C-in-C Bomber Command to attack a new 
range of targets over the coming weeks and months; this was a very specific and 
closely co-ordinated attack under detailed Air Staff direction to be undertaken by the 
various mono-functional components of the MAF acting in concert to produce multi-
functional effect. Stevenson outlined the plan in the ‘Execution’ part of the operation 
order: 
All measures to interfere with the enemy W/T navigation aids are to be 
brought into effect. All measures for night interception and destruction of 
enemy bombers, including A.A defences, are to be undertaken by Fighter 
Command. 
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Security patrols by aircraft of Bomber and Coastal Commands will be 
carried out against enemy night bombing aerodromes in use. The heavy 
bomber force will carry out an attack on a City in Germany.
70
 
He went on to detail specific tactical actions that needed to take place and be 
cross co-ordinated between the Commands. Coastal Command was to assist Bomber 
Command with security patrols over enemy airfields and specifically mount an attack 
against Vannes airfield in France where K.G. 100 was based. The heavy bomber force 
of Bomber Command was to mount a concentrated attack ‘on military objectives in a 
selected German city’.
71
 And Fighter Command were to mount the most effective 
night air defence they could but also act as the eyes for Bomber Command and 
Coastal Command by maintaining reconnaissance over the French airbases and usual 
bomber assembly points. Finally, No 80 Wing, the recently formed organisation 
undertaking early electronic warfare against the German beams and navigation 
facilities was to ‘establish the position and identity of the enemy beams’.
72
 
Stevenson concluded the operations instruction by stating that every 
‘endeavour will be made’ to issue the executive order for the execution of COLD 
WATER by 1500 on the day, but cautioned that ‘it may be issued later depending on 
the receipt of information regarding the enemy intention’.
73
 
Early on 14 November 1940, Portal initialled a note to the PM entitled ‘Note 
for the Prime Minister on Projected Operation by G.A.F – ‘MOONLIGHT SONATA’ 
and the Counter Operation by the Metropolitan Air Force – ‘COLD WATER’.
74
 
Portal’s note was revealing in both its subsequent accuracy and error. In the first 
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paragraph he asserted that London and the south east were the expected targets. He 
identified the role of the GAF unit and the time period for the attack, namely 15-20 
November 1940.
75
 However, he then related that the ‘very good source’ that had 
highlighted the potential attack was corroborated by a GAF prisoner interrogation of 9 
November 1940 who stated that: 
Goering is convinced that the people in London are on the point of 
revolution and that Buckingham Palace has been stormed. He has therefore 
arranged a great raid to take place on Coventry and Birmingham with the 
object of destroying workers dwellings in order to undermine the morale of the 
working classes. 
We believe that the target will be those noted in paragraph 1 above, 
probably in the vicinity of London, but if further information indicates 
Coventry, Birmingham or elsewhere, we hope to get instructions out in time.
76
 
Portal then outlined the plan in considerable detail for the PM, highlighting the 
co-ordinated roles of No 80 Wing against the GAF beam system, Fighter Command 
including the AAA forces against the enemy over the UK and northern France, and 




At 1621 on 14 November 1940 the Air Ministry signalled Bomber, Coastal, 
and Fighter Commands, and No 80 Wing, a short message stating ‘Executive Cold 
Water’ – the order to execute the plans laid down in the operation instruction issued 
earlier that day.
78
 This order was repeated at 1055 on 15 November 1940 and 1047 on 
16 November 1940 covering the nights of 15/16 and 16/17 November 1940 
respectively.
 
 During this period the Commands fought hard but the GAF attacks 
continued and were at times serious. In response to a question by the CAS concerning 
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the performance of the night fighters, Stevenson wrote on 15 November 1940 stating 
that Fighter Command would submit a full report but he had discovered verbally that 
Fighter Command had achieved six airborne radar and seven visual sightings but only 
two visual interceptions had been achieved which resulted in a ‘brief exchange of 
shots’.
79
 CAS received a fuller report later in the day which stated: 
Up to midnight a total of 54 fighter sorties had been sent up. 4 
interceptions have been reported of which two resulted in combats which 
were, however, indecisive. Fighter patrols were maintained over Coventry by 
Blenheims fighters during the following periods: 
1857 hours to 2114 hours. 
0136 hours to 0336 hours. 
0140 hours to 0340 hours. 
0440 hours until enemy clear of Coventry. 
Bomber Command’s effort during the night amounted to 122 aircraft 
of which 49 were directed on Berlin, 53 on enemy aerodromes, 17 on the 
Homburg oil refineries, and 3 on mine laying. Security patrols on aerodromes 
report good success with fires and explosions. First reports of the Berlin 
operation state that large fires were started which could be seen from a 
considerable distance. 
Coastal Command detailed a total of 29 sorties (Hudsons and 
Blenheims) to attack the important aerodromes at Vannes and St Leger. No 
reports yet received as to results. 
A special bombing operation carried out against enemy beam 
transmitters in the Cherbourg peninsula was followed by one transmitter 
becoming silent and a second reported as unserviceable.
80
 
A more comprehensive report was issued on 17 November 1940 which gave 
greater detail on the intelligence background and the assessed results. The attack on 
the Cherbourg beam transmitters by two specially modified Whitley bombers was 
confirmed by intercepted intelligence as being particularly effective. But the final 
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paragraph which summarised ‘Enemy Action and Tactics’ revealed why the beam 
attack did not have the effect hoped for, it stated: 
It is estimated that some 330 enemy aircraft were engaged in the attack 
on Coventry, which was opened by some 10 aeroplanes from KG-100, which 
flew up the beams and stared fires in the target area. The remaining aircraft 
then bombed the fires. While earlier raids followed the beams they were soon 
abandoned by subsequent sorties, which took full advantage of the bright 
moonlight and approached the objective over a wide front.
81
 
The damaging outcome of the GAF raid on Coventry on the night of 14/15 
November 1940 is well known and represents a very dark moment in the Blitz and the 
early years of the war. The failure of the RAF to prevent the attack, despite the very 
comprehensive and timely planning illustrated above, demonstrated the continuing 
gap between operational plans and operational capability. Nonetheless, in terms of 
higher command, Operation ‘COLD WATER’ encapsulated the exact role envisaged 
for the Air Ministry and Air Staff set out in CID 1425-B. 
The reference in the ‘Intention’ paragraph to the MAF illustrated the 
importance of the Air Staff in bringing together in co-ordinated action the component 
parts of the UK-based RAF to deliver multi-function effect against a specific enemy 
threat. As had been argued in 1937, only the Air Staff had the immediate access to the 
national sources of intelligence, the proximity to the political decision-making 
apparatus and the authority over the RAF commands to bring about rapid co-ordinated 
action. That the co-ordinated action should not prevent the damage visited on 
Coventry and many other towns and cities during this period was due to the 
operational limitations of the frontline at the time, not the command structures and 
arrangements. The limitations of contemporary airborne radar, which was undergoing 
rapid development, was a serious shortcoming in Fighter Command’s arsenal, as was 
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the very limited number of available airborne intercept (AI) equipped aircraft. This 
combination of capability and capacity would improve out of all recognition over the 
coming months, but in late 1940 it was the unfortunate reality of war. 
Personnel Changes in Retrospect 
At Dunkirk the final vestiges of the BAFF structure represented by Blount’s 
Back Violet HQ acted as a SAC command node that co-ordinated the various 
contributions of the frontline. On the other hand, during the Battle of Britain and the 
Blitz, the Air Staff played the role intended for it in the policy encapsulated in CID 
1425-B. In the case of the Blitz, RAF command was led by an almost completely new 
group of senior commanders. 
Newall’s departure removed a man who had been at the heart of the RAF’s 
war preparations and had seen it evolve as the reality of war bit during 1939 and early 
1940. Portal, by contrast, was uncertain of his suitability for the appointment.
 82
 His 
conversations with Freeman illustrated the concern he felt and the fact he insisted on 
Freeman becoming his VCAS reinforces the view that Portal began his time as CAS 
uncertain as to his suitability and preparedness.
83
 The removal of Dowding is often 
portrayed, with some justification, as the replacement of a difficult man with 
someone, Douglas, more attuned to the needs of the time. When considered in the 
round it is clear that the changes created a situation in which stability was weakened 
in the pursuit of re-energising the command structure with younger men of new ideas 
and greater vitality. That they would grow into a successful generation of 
commanders was to be proven by later events, but in late 1940 they were 
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inexperienced and finding their way. Although a common motivation in the changes 
was the shifting of attitude to a more offensive spirit, technology and operational 
necessity would restrain offensive ambition during the winter of 1940 and the early 
months of 1941. However, by making needed changes to the RAF high command in 
late 1940, the PM, SofS and CAS ensured that energy and momentum would be 
maintained. That the method of command remained resolutely the Hankey System can 
be seen as the rational response to the situation of the time. 
The higher command of Operation COLD WATER clearly illustrated that the 
Hankey System was broadly fit for purpose and capable of operation with a new 
cohort of high commanders. Indeed, the speed of co-ordination and execution of 
Operation COLD WATER is compelling evidence that the new command team were 
more than up to the task. That the raid on Coventry and subsequent attacks across the 
UK should continue to devastate the country was not due to shortcomings in the 
command system, rather it was due to the simple fact that the enemy held the tactical 





ADAPTATION OF THOUGHT 
Introduction 
The change in personnel in late 1940 brought together a group of senior 
officers who were broadly of a similar outlook, in tune with the two key RAF 
personalities, Trenchard and Salmond, and importantly at one with the spirit of the 
PM. Between 1941 and the end of 1942 doctrine would develop in tune with 
improving capability and the growth of the RAF frontline to that critical point when 
there began to be almost enough air resource to meet the wartime demands. In early 
1941, this was in the future and the pressing challenge was to shift the balance of 
activity towards the offensive so the enemy could no longer dictate the terms upon 
which the war would be fought. The debates over day fighter tactics that had 
culminated in the Air Ministry meeting of 17 October 1940 and the review of night 
tactics undertaken by Salmond were important markers in the transition of tactics 
from the defensive to the offensive. This chapter will explore some of those 
developments in operational thinking and the command processes that emerged to 
oversee them. It will focus on fighter and bomber operations by day and night and the 
mechanisms by which they were co-ordinated and controlled. 
The main operational experience of the RAF’s high commanders of the 
Second World War was gained over the battlefields of the Western Front, and 
importantly under the influence of Trenchard and Salmond in the period 1916-1918.
1
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The constant theme driving Trenchard’s application of air power was the primacy of 
the offensive.
2
 By taking offensive action the enemy had to respond and was thereby 
denied the freedom to initiate action. Trenchard often commented that air defence was 
almost impossible due to the vastness of the sky and the freedom the attacker had in 
choosing his moment and place of attack.
3
 Thus the defender would always be on the 
back foot and only really capable of mounting inefficient defence of those locations 
and targets that he could not afford to be attacked. Detection systems in the First 
World War gave little if any warning of attack so the only possible effective defence 
was the hugely inefficient standing patrol which created casualties of its own through 
aircraft wear and tear and routine flying accidents. By contrast, it was argued, the 
offensive mission was mounted to achieve a rational purpose and was, therefore, an 
efficient use of assets.
4
 If the enemy could also be engaged in aerial combat then the 
opportunity for more damage to be inflicted on them could be taken. But the main 
purpose behind Trenchard’s preference for the offensive was to impose his will on the 
enemy and thereby undermine their morale.
5
 In the period 1916-1918 there was much 
to be said in favour of this approach. However, for commanders raised under the 
guidance of Trenchard and Salmond, the situation in 1941 was significantly different. 
The two key differences were the presence of RDF which the RAF had 
utilized to such great effect during the previous summer, and the performance of the 
monoplane fighter.
6
 This coupled with the fact that the Germans were free to deploy 
their forces wherever they saw fit across a territory that stretched from the new Soviet 
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border in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west and the Arctic Sea in the north 
created a difficult challenge for the advocates of the offensive air strategy. Faced with 
such a vast area the RAF threat from its isolated island base with aircraft of limited 
range and capability meant that the Germans knew exactly from where the RAF could 
mount their attacks and could, if it so desired, refuse combat if the threat posed 
represented no significant loss.
7
 Given that the RAF could only operate in daylight 
with fighter escort and that that escort could only reach the Pas de Calais and coastal 
regions of Belgium and the western Netherlands, the GAF could take a much more 
relaxed approach than the one that was forced on the RAF in the Battle of Britain. In 




What both the experience of the First World War and the reality of the Second 
World War created in the minds of the commanders was a view of air superiority that 
was rooted in the near-term, both in terms of time span and geography.
9
 Air 
superiority was something to be gained for the purpose of more important offensive 
action.
10
 It was a means to an end, not an end in itself. As such air superiority was a 
constant struggle that was an inevitable part of all air operations rather than a 
campaign in itself designed to be won to set the conditions for the follow-on 
campaign to unfold and succeed. This perspective of air superiority created a 
viewpoint that saw the creation of offensive air superiority as being primarily a battle 
of fighters. Mets records that over time this was to be a fundamental difference of 
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opinion between the RAF and USAAF.
11
 The USAAF held the view that air 
superiority could be achieved through a planned and relentless battle of attrition 
against the production means of the GAF and the GAF deployed at the front. Many in 
the RAF held a narrower view of air superiority as being a state that was gained 
temporarily over the battle by simultaneous air action. This short term view 
underpinned the concept behind the air plan for the Dieppe Raid on 19 July 1942 and 
was the view held by Leigh-Mallory concerning D-Day and opposed strongly by the 
USAAF Commander Spaatz.
12
 Consequently, in the view of the Air Staff, the WAPs 
of Bomber Command against the German aircraft industry were part of a much longer 
campaign of industrial destruction and denial, an active blockade that would in time 
make it impossible for Germany to continue, but would not affect the situation at the 
Front where the aircraft and reserves already existed.
13
  
Multi-Command Operations - Leaning Forward into France  
An essential element of multi-command operations was the provision of 
fighter escort both to protect the attacking assets and to attack, and hopefully destroy, 
the enemy fighters that gave battle. On 9 October 1940 Fighter Command issued 
Operational Instruction No 40 ‘Provision of Fighter Escorts for Bomber and Coastal 
Commands’ Operations’.
14
 The Instruction began by summarising the existing 
situation: 
Consideration has recently been given to the question of co-ordinating 
action when fighter escorts are provided for aircraft of Bomber and Coastal 
Commands. In the past difficulties have arisen because fighter escorts have 
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been required at short notice, and little time has been available in which to 
make detailed arrangements. In particular arrangements for the assembly of 
the bombers and fighter escort have to be carefully made.
15
 
The instruction went on to outline these initial steps which involved the 
aircraft of Bomber or Coastal Command circling the airfield from which the fighters 
were due to take-off to allow for them to join in formation or for the Bomber or 
Coastal Command aircraft to be signalled that escort was not available. The 
inadequacy of the communications, co-ordination and control for such a complex 
mission was plain, and the comment in the instruction that ‘the leader of the bomber 
formation must decide whether to cancel the operations or proceed to carry out their 
attack without fighter protection’ illustrates the inherent difficulty that was created by 
the mono-functional command re-organisation and the challenge that the Air Staff 
faced in exercising the SAC role under the Hankey System.
16
 
On 9 February 1941 CAS wrote to the PM in response to the loss of eight 
Fighter Command fighters on a fighter sweep undertaken on 5 February 1941 in 
which the GAF had only lost two aircraft.
17
 Portal recorded that: 
The orders did not fully cover the weather conditions actually 
encountered. The weather conditions on forecast were expected to be clear 
but in fact there was considerable cloud over Kent. This interfered with the 
arrangements for the rendezvous and caused some straggling and bad timing. 
The fighters conformed to the action of the bombers instead of vice 
versa. Bombers are only needed to make the enemy come up and fight and 
they need not always be used. When used they should bomb and get away at 
once. On this occasion they hung about taking deliberate shots at their target 
and kept the fighters too long in one area and made it difficult for them to 
manoeuvre. 
The objective chosen was unnecessarily far inland (40 miles from 
Calais). This again came from regarding the bombing too much as the raison 
d’etre of the operation. 
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I have discussed the operation fully with the A.O.C.-in-C. Fighter 
Command and we are agreed that if the above lessons are attended to there is 
every advantage in continuing these operations.
18
 
The PM replied to Portal on 17 February 1940 stating: 
I am much obliged to you for your explanation. There evidently was a 
serious breakdown between the Fighter and Bomber Commands. The Bombers 




In terms of operational command the PM’s next paragraph was particularly 
interesting: 
It would seem desirable when an Operation of this kind is to be 
undertaken, that the Officer Commanding by far the larger number of aircraft 
to be used, irrespective of whether they are Fighters or Bombers, should have 
unified Command. 
I am very glad to know you will continue these operations.
 20
 
This exchange of notes between the PM and CAS encapsulated the challenge 
facing the RAF in early 1941. How could the offensive be achieved and how best to 
execute the detailed plans that would emerge? That the PM identified the need for 
unified command of the allocated task assets was telling as it chimed with the reasons 
that Ellington used when forming the concept of a SAC in 1937. CAS’ reply to the 
PM outlined his thinking on how best the tactical command and co-ordination should 
be undertaken. On 18 February 1941 CAS wrote to the PM thanking him for his 
Minute and explaining that: 
We always employ many more fighters than bombers for it is primarily 
a fighter operation, the bombers only being used to make the enemy come up 
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Whilst the correspondence between the PM and CAS would appear to be clear 
cut, the process of reaching this accord required more complex co-ordination. On 9 
February 1941 CAS had written to Peirse at Bomber Command enclosing a copy of 
the note he had sent to the PM in which he criticised the performance of the No 2 
Group’s Blenhiem bombers.
22
 He concluded by stating that he enclosed to copy of the 
note ‘for your information and future guidance’. Peirse replied on 12 February 1941 
stating in his fourth paragraph: 
If we do (and we do) want engagements then they must be profitable to 
us because we shoot down more fighters than we ourselves lose, or because 
we inflict material damage on the enemy.
23
 
To this CAS replied on 13 February 1941 with a passage that reveals much of 
his thinking at the time: 
Before coming to the main point I would like to say that I cannot agree 
with the reflection in your paragraph 4, namely that these operations are 
desirable only if we shoot down more of the enemy than we ourselves lose, or 
else inflict material damage by our bombing. I regard the exercise of the 
initiative as in itself an extremely important factor in morale, and I would 
willingly accept equal loss or even more in order to throw the enemy on to the 
defensive, and give our own units the moral superiority gained from doing 
most of the fighting on the other side.
24
 
From this doctrinal viewpoint, with its echoes of Trenchard and Salmond, Portal 
moved on to address more practical matters: 
I really do not see that we need to incur losses as heavy as we inflict on 
the enemy unless we spoil the chances of the fighters by tying them too much 
to the bomber operations. We want to translate the initiative into practical 
terms of numbers, height, and a tactical plan, and above all we must avoid 
falling between the two stools of fighting and bombing.
25
 
To address a concern about the use of the word ‘bait’ in relation to the Blenheim 
operations that Peirse had raised, Portal commented: 
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I do not like the word ‘bait’ and it need not be mentioned to the 
Blenhiems. They are doing a useful job in harassing the invasion ports and at 
the same time they are playing an important part in our efforts to get the 
initiative back from the enemy.
26
 
To resolve the co-ordination aspects of the planned operations the CAS 
suggested that the C-in-Cs should consult and if necessary meet with him.
27
 However, 
on 15 February 1941 C-in-C Fighter Command wrote to CAS to say that he had met 
with Peirse and other senior commanders, including Leigh-Mallory AOC No 11 
Group, and that they had agreed on a new definition of the planned attacks, namely: 
The object of these attacks is to force the enemy to give battle under 
conditions tactically favourable to our fighters. In order to compel him to do so 
the bombers must cause sufficient damage to make it impossible for him to 
ignore them and refuse to fight on our terms.
28
 
It was also agreed that Leigh-Mallory would co-ordinate and control the operations 
thus adding further clarity to the suggestion made by the PM. That matters had not 
been entirely straightforward is illustrated by a comment Douglas made in a letter to 
Bowhill relaying the outcome of his discussions with Peirse: 
There has been a certain amount of argument with Bomber Command 
(sic) but Peirse has finally agreed to come into line.
29
 
This exchange of correspondence illustrated a number of important features of 
RAF operational command at that time. As highlighted with the control of Operation 
COLD WATER, MAF operations came under the very close scrutiny of the War 
Cabinet, and especially the PM. This required the close attention of the CAS and the 
Air Staff, especially the DCAS, both upwards to the PM and down to the frontline. 
Portal was not afraid, despite his relatively short time in post, to assert his view and 
authority. The issue over the role of the Blenheims which could be argued led to their 
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poor performance on the 5 February 1941 raid, was quickly and decisively resolved 
with the CAS leaving no one in any doubt as to what his desires were. That he should 
also offer his Cs-in-C a personal meeting to settle any remaining difficulties 
illustrated that he was open to discussion and actively involved and attentive to 
unfolding MAF operations. Equally, that the Cs-in-C should eventually resolve the 
matter at their level illustrated their recognition of their responsibility and the broadly 
harmonious and increasingly co-operative relations that were becoming established 
among the new RAF command team.  
On 30 January 1941 Douglas had written to Bowhill asking if Coastal 
Command would be prepared to: 
assist in these fighter-bomber operations by providing a force of 
Coastal Command aircraft to carry out the bombing attacks when Bomber 
Command Squadrons are not available to take part.
30
 
Bowhill’s response on 8 February 1941 was unequivocal: 




On the same day, Leigh-Mallory issued Operation Instruction No 6 entitled ‘CIRCUS 
OPERATIONS’, the object of which was: 
To lay down principles which are to govern the carrying out of all air 
operations in which No 11 Group Fighter Squadrons are taking part in 
company with, or in support of, Bomber aircraft supplied by either No 2 
Group, Bomber Command, or No 16 Group, Coastal Command, or both.
32
 
Following the discussions and clarification given by Portal concerning the operations 
of 5 February 1941, Douglas reinforced to Leigh-Mallory that: 
It has been clearly agreed by the Air Staff that the purpose of these 
operations is to destroy enemy fighters under circumstances favourable to our 
squadrons. Our bombers are present only for the purpose of forcing the enemy 
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to come up and fight and they must therefore conform to the requirements of 
our fighters in pursuit of the main aim of the operation.
33
 
In parallel with the shift to multi-command offensive operations epitomised by the 
development of CIRCUS Operations outlined above, Fighter Command, and 
especially Leigh-Mallory at No 11 Group, were also developing ideas on the 
offensive use of his assets on their own. 
The Emergence of Multi-Functional Groups - Intruder Operations 
On 21 December 1940, Leigh-Mallory issued an outline instruction to the 
stations of his Group entitled ‘OFFENSIVE ACTION – MOSQUITO 
OPERATIONS’.
34
 His first two paragraphs summarised the shift in mindset the 
command changes had brought about over the previous months: 
It would appear that the life of the Germans on the FRENCH and 
BELGIUM coasts is at present by day a comparatively easy one. They are 
seldom molested by offensive action on our part, and their aircraft are free to 
fly at will. 
It is considered desirable to harass the GERMANS by daily ‘tip and 
run’ operations, to make them feel that flying over NORTHERN FRANCE 
and BELGIUM is unsafe and so force them to some system of Readiness in 
order to protect themselves. If this is achieved, it will materially affect the 
morale of the German Air Force.
35
 
Leigh-Mallory envisaged nuisance raids under cover of cloud by flights or squadrons 
on a rotational basis within his Group. He emphasised that commanders were not to 
take undue risks, that only experienced pilots were to be used and that the purpose of 
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The early operations under this plan were not particularly effective with the 
GAF rarely responding to the presence of such a small force of RAF fighters. Equally, 
despite Leigh-Mallory’s desire to inflict damage on the enemy without loss ‘to 
ourselves’ this rarely occurred and RAF losses began to mount.
37
 On 2 March 1941, 
Leigh-Mallory wrote to Douglas at Fighter Command proposing the ‘Use of 
Incendiary Bombs by Single Seat Fighters’.
38
 His proposal to carry seven 4lbs 
incendiary bombs in the flare tube of Hurricanes and Spitfires to add to the offensive 
capability was not accepted by Douglas who, replying on 16 March 1941 noted that: 
The primary object of the ‘Rhubarb’ operations is to shoot down 




Douglas felt that the possession of ‘these bombs would encourage pilots to take 
unnecessary risks for very inadequate return’. On a more positive note he reported 
that trials to fit the Hurricane with two 500lbs bombs were underway. Douglas would 
have felt reinforced in his assessment when on 29 March 1941 two Hurricanes of 601 
Sqn had to break off an attack on three enemy aircraft taking off because one of the 
Hurricane pilots had expended most of his ammunition against a goods train. He 
curtly commented to his SASO: 
It is a pity F/O Seddon did not save his ammunition for the E/A taking 




Undeterred Leigh-Mallory wrote again to Douglas on 7 April 1941 on another 
important aspect of offensive fighter operation, namely range extension, which he had 
                                                          
37
 J Foreman, Fighter Command War Diaries Vol 2, (Walton-on-Thames: Air Research Publications, 
1998), pp. 127-152. 
38
 TNA AIR 16/366, E 22A, dated 2 March 1941. 
39
 Ibid., E 30A, dated 16 March 1941. Note that the MOSQUITO codeword had been previously 
changed by Air Ministry Instruction at E 11A dated 24 January 1941, to avoid confusion with the 
Mosquito aircraft then under development. 
40
 Ibid., Minute dated 3 April 1941 
214 
 
touched upon in his letter of 2 March 1941.
41
 He stated that he thought auxiliary fuel 
tanks would be particularly useful for escorting ‘bombing attacks on targets just 
beyond the present effective range of single seat fighters, e.g. Brest and Lorient. It 
was relevant that Bomber Command were heavily engaged at that time in operations 
to support the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking German naval facilities in France. He 
also thought extra fuel tanks would permit ‘offensive patrols of deep penetration by 
small numbers of single-seater fighters in suitable cloud conditions. This last point 
was directly related to expanding the reach of his RHUBARB missions. He concluded 
by highlighting that jettisonable tanks would allow his fighters to enter combat 
without their performance being impaired and that tanks containing 50 gallons would 
offer an additional one hours endurance. Douglas replied to Leigh-Mallory on 15 
April 1941 to inform him that jettisonable tanks were under development and that 
information would be available in the near future.
42
 On the other hand, on the 
previous day Douglas had told Leigh-Mallory that the Air Ministry would not grant 
permission ‘to attack moving trains in Occupied France’.
43
  
This tentative approach was typical of the time with the MAF feeling its way 
from the defensive to the offensive. The drive from Leigh-Mallory and No 11 Group 
to develop new operational procedures, fit single seat fighters with bombs and extend 
their range with the use of external fuel tanks was notable and commendable. But it 
was also matched by the initiative of the Air Staff who away from the frontline 
through the relevant directorates of the Air Ministry had in parallel initiated action to 
develop the tanks, bomb fittings, cannon armament, and new aircraft that would allow 
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Leigh-Mallory to unleash the drive and aggression that his command clearly 
possessed. These initial small steps toward multi-functionality would grow over the 
coming months but in the meantime the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 
June 1941 led to a significant debate on the best use of the MAF. 
BARBAROSSA – The Responsibility of Coalition Warfare 
After the German invasion of the Soviet Union the UK and Empire forces 
were no longer alone in the war, but that welcome improvement came with collective 
responsibility. However, there was precious little the UK and Empire air forces could 
do to directly assist the Soviet Union. Bomber Command in the early stages of the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union was conducting the operations from which 
strike photographs would prove that it was incapable of hitting anything but the most 
obvious target and that 80% of its attacks were outside of 5 miles from the intended 
aim point.
44
 The Butt Report, which delivered this damming conclusion in August, 
would severely dent confidence in the capability of Bomber Command.
45
 Thus, a 
strategy that was based on precision attack was clearly a forlorn hope. An alternative 
was to increase the threat posed in the west to a point whereby the Germans were 
forced to re-deploy aircraft from the east to meet the growing threat in the west.
46
 Part 
of the logic of the No 2 Group and Fighter Command operations was to create 
pressure on the Germans to keep a sizable force in the west so as to prevent its 
redeployment to the Mediterranean. Thus a logical first step would clearly be to 
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increase the scale and scope of these operations in order to assist the Soviet Union.
47
 
The key question was how best to accomplish this. 
On 19 June 1941 Douglas, Peirse, and the newly appointed Joubert, C-in-C 
Coastal Command, met at Fighter Command: 
To consider options which would prevent the enemy from withdrawing 
further forces from the West to the EAST, and to force him to return those 
forces which he might already have sent, particularly in the event of 
operations developing against Russia.
48
 
They identified four possible contributions: daylight attacks on west and north west 
Germany; daylight attacks in strength on the important industrial area of Bethune-
Lens-Lille; daylight attacks to stop all movement of enemy shipping through the 
Straits; and general invasion preparations. They agreed to propose to the CAS that 
Bomber and Fighter Command would plan and develop heavy attacks on the Bethune-
Lens industrial area; that Coastal and Fighter Command would attack all shipping 
through the Straits and Channel area during daylight; and that the RN and Army 
should be pressed to co-operate ‘in staging elaborate dummy’ preparations for a large 
scale landing aimed at north west France. In their final paragraph they commented on 
the need for range extending auxiliary fuel tanks and recommended that five Spitfire 
squadrons be so equipped and the Hurricane tanks destined for the Middle East be re-




On 22 June 1941, Freeman, the VCAS, wrote to CAS putting forward the Cs-
in-C proposals and adding comment of his own.
50
 First, he was unconvinced that the 
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GAF would give battle unless targets of significance were chosen, he recommended 
the Potez Factory at Albert as a promising choice. Secondly, he was more confident 
that a concerted attack on shipping in the Channel would bring results and he went so 
far as to advise that if Bomber Command continued to fail to provoke the GAF 
through attacks on their airfields they should be directed against shipping targets in 
tune with Coastal and Fighter Command. He advised CAS that he had already taken 
action on the tanks for Spitfires and Hurricanes and mentioned that Peirse had a 
‘hush-hush operation’ that he would explain to CAS in the coming days.
51
 This secret 
mission was also mentioned by Douglas in his covering note to the Minutes of the Cs-
in-C meeting and it was clear that the final paragraph of the Minutes, dealing with the 
need for long range fuel tanks, was stimulated by the needs of Peirse’s mission.
52
 
On 25 June 1941 Peirse wrote to CAS outlining his secret plan which involved 
Blenheims attacking a German inland port on 28 June 1941. Anticipating success he 
planned to follow up the Blenheim attack with daylight heavy bomber attacks in the 
following days. He then specifically requested the allocation of 20 Mosquito aircraft, 
at the time planned for reconnaissance duties, for use as bombers, believing he could 
‘penetrate considerable distances with them, armed or unarmed.
53
 CAS replied the 
next day, 26 June 1941, stating that he had asked about the use of Mosquitoes but that 
they were not yet in service and although three were expected within days, they would 
require another 21 days before they could be used to drop bombs.
54
 He therefore 
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On 27 June 1941, Bottomley, the DCAS, wrote to Peirse on behalf of the Air 
Council with a revised list of targets in northern France for daylight attack supported 
by fighter cover.
56
 The list dealt with transportation and power targets which were 
seen to be of greater importance than had previously been realised. DCAS followed 
up on 3 July 1941 with a complementary list of industrial targets ‘known to be 
working for the Germans in the Pas de Calais area’.
57
 The hopes of the time are 
reflected in the second paragraph: 
there are indications that the attack of these targets is likely to result in 
serious industrial trouble, especially amongst the Communist element of the 
French workers, with consequent embarrassment to the Germans. There is 
even a suggestion that in view of the weakened German forces this unrest 
might develop into a revolt.
58
 
Also on 3 July 1941 DCAS had written to both Peirse and Douglas reversing 
the policy given by CAS on 13 February 1941 concerning the objective of the 
CIRCUS operations. He stated that: 
In light of the present strategical situation it is necessary to modify the 
aim of these operations. Their primary aim should now be the destruction of 




Saundby, SASO Bomber Command, wrote to Fighter Command and HQ No 3 Group 
on 5 July 1941 to give substance to this change of policy.
60
 He stated that henceforth 
it was the intention of Bomber Command to augment the Blenheims of No 2 Group 
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that had been operating in concert with Fighter Command, with Stirlings from No 3 
Group with up to eight sorties per day. 
The background to this change of approach was given in a memorandum titled 
‘Implications of German-Soviet Air War’ prepared by Freeman, the VCAS, and 
distributed on 8 July 1941.
61
 Freeman noted that the Soviet Air Force whilst 
numerically superior to the GAF it was suffering severe losses in the early fighting. 
However, the GAF was also under pressure and ‘in certain sections of the front 




It is, therefore, to our advantage to prolong as long as possible the 
Russian defence since this will not only weaken the GAF but will also delay 
the re-construction of her Air Forces in the West against this country, and 
provide time for reinforcing our own Air Force with new material.
63
 
Therefore, he continued, the best way to assist the Soviet Union was to force 
Germany to withdraw forces from the east by ‘attacking objectives of such value’ that 
the GAF had to respond to protect the vital targets attacked.
64
 Having set the scene, 
VCAS reviewed the current options for attacking German interests through continuing 
the fringe attacks already undertaken, by ‘heavy and effective attacks on the French 
Atlantic ports used by the Germans for the attack on the trade routes, and particularly 
the enemy capital ships at Brest’, and finally through the direct attack of objectives in 
Germany.
65
 In his paragraph 9 he summarised the contemporary thinking concerning 
attacks on Germany: 
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Whatever may be the effect of attacks against objectives in the Pas de 
Calais and Brest areas the best chance of persuading the enemy to withdraw 
appreciable fighter forces from the Russian front would be to undertake more 
demanding attacks against key objectives in north-west Germany and the 
Ruhr. Apart from the possibility of severe material damage, the effect on 
morale of the German industrial population of daylight attacks delivered 
against industrial targets would be very serious. Whatever might be their 
views on strategical grounds the German High Command might well be forced 
to accede, against their better judgement, to a popular clamour for greater 
protection in the industrial areas of Western Germany.
66
 
Freeman fully acknowledged that at the present time Bomber Command had 
very little experience of the essential skills of formation flying and fire control that 
were vital to enable successful daylight operations. However, ‘under conditions which 
afforded a reasonable measure of security by flying at a great height, or under 
conditions of cloud cover, or possibly by low flying’ he felt that daylight operations 
were feasible especially given their potential for significant and telling damage to be 
inflicted.
67
 In parallel, continued and intensified attacks in the Pas de Calais and 
coastal zones could cause dispersion of the fighters retained in north-west Germany 
thus easing the task facing Bomber Command. He concluded: 
Every effort should, therefore, be made to develop this form of attack 
at the earliest possible date. One of the main aims of our bomber attacks and 
sweeps in the Pas de Calais, Channel and Brest areas should be to compel a 
thinning of fighter defences in north-west Germany so as to facilitate day 
attacks in that area. 
The current day operations should be designed with this aim in view 
and the general strategical principles out in this memorandum should guide 
Commanders-in-Chief in the planning of such operations.
68
 
Whilst VCAS was addressing the needs of daylight attacks, DCAS was issuing 
a new Air Council Directive to Bomber Command setting out the view that ‘a 
comprehensive review of the enemy’s present political, economic and military 
                                                          
66
 Ibid., dated 8 July 1941. 
67





situation discloses that the weakest points in his armour lie in the morale of the 
civilian population and in his inland transportation system’.
69
 In relation to the 
guidance issued by VCAS the previous day, this Directive stated that: 
It is accepted as a principle in this plan that the successful attack of a 
specific target at night can only be undertaken in clear moonlight. It follows 
therefore, that for approximately ¾ of each month it is only possible to obtain 
satisfactory results by heavy, concentrated and continuous area attacks on 
large working class and industrial areas in carefully selected towns.
70
 
Nonetheless, the daylight principles that VCAS had identified were being 
practiced and on 8 July 1941, echoing VCAS’ suggestion that daylight attacks might 
be possible from high altitude, three newly arrive B-17 Flying Fortresses of No 90 
Sqn attacked Wilhelmshaven.
71
 Two aircraft bombed successfully and all returned 
safely. Until the end of the month Bomber Command would mount 17 daylight 
missions including a major raid against Brest, Cherbourg and La Pallice on 24 July 
1941 in which 151 aircraft took part. Losses were heavy in some forces; 20 
Blenheims, 10 Wellingtons and five Halifax were lost, but the Wellingtons and 




This episode showed the close involvement of the Air Staff and the leading 
role they took in the development of concepts and tactics. Daylight missions by 
Bomber Command had been abandoned in December 1939 after the heavy losses 
incurred in North Sea operations. That the MAF should shift from a firmly defensive 
posture in July 1940 to a very aggressive daylight doctrine in July 1941 was of course 
due to the pressing strategic need to support the Soviet Union, but it was also due to 
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the drive and attitude of the CAS and Air Staff, and frontline commanders who felt 
empowered by the clear direction that was being set from above. In that vein a 




The Minutes paint the picture of a reflective group striving to achieve the 
strategic goal of support to the Soviet Union in the form of the diversion of GAF 
aircraft back to the west to meet the threat posed by the MAF.
74
 Peirse outlined the 
major daylight operation that had taken place on 24 July 1941 pointing out that the 
majority of aircraft lost to enemy fighters were already lagging behind the main force 
due to flak damage. He also observed that none of the Flying Fortresses which led the 
raid at high altitude had been lost. He then stated that he felt the ‘strategical 
conception’ upon which the recent daylight operations had been based was ‘unsound’: 
When the present policy had been decided he had hoped that by 
drawing the majority of the German fighters into the Pas de Calais a backdoor 
would be opened into Germany. He was now convinced that this expectation 
was over optimistic and we could not develop heavy bombing with our present 
forces without heavy casualties.
75
 
Peirse went on to state that: 
He was himself convinced that greater effect on German dispositions 
in the East would be obtained by the activities of Fighter Command in the Pas 




In the margin Douglas wrote ‘not without heavy bombing’, and commented in the 
meeting that ‘his fighters were unable to bring the German fighters to battle unless 
bombers accompanied them’.
77
 CAS agreed stating that in ‘his opinion the best hope 
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was for the Blenheims to continue hitting away at the Pas de Calais to prevent the 
Germans withdrawing fighter defences from this area’.
78
 Therefore, it was decided 
that the development of daylight bombing operations should continue in accordance 
with the strategy laid out in VCAS memorandum of 8 July 1941, that Blenheims and 
if possible Stirlings should continue to be used and the Flying Fortresses should 
develop techniques for long range high altitude bombing.
79
 
On the matter of anti-shipping attacks AOC No 2 Group requested that he be 
allocated Hurricanes equipped to carry bombs, in effect broadening his attack 
capability but also creating a self-escorting multi-functional force. CAS declined 
saying that: 
He had decided that the Hurricanes now being produced to carry 




However, if Fighter Command found they could not obtain full value he was prepared 
to ‘consider transferring them to Bomber Command control’.
81
 In fact the reverse 
happened and on 6 October 1941 the DCAS, on behalf of the Air Council, informed 
Douglas that: 
you will assume responsibility for day operations against enemy 
shipping in the area defined in paragraph 16 of your instruction....(i.e. in the 
area Manston-Ostend-Dieppe-Beachy Head). 
He went on to agree to a proposal by Douglas sent on 14 September 1941 that 
Fighter Command could use Hurricane bombers against fringe targets on the enemy 
coast and stated that the Air Ministry Intelligence staff would shortly be providing 
suitable target details, which would be updated by the Target Committee from time to 
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 In effect this authorised the creation of a light attack force within Fighter 
Command. 
This represented a significant shift in organisational and doctrinal thinking for 
through the acquisition of the Hurricane bomber Fighter Command had gained the 
means of conducting offensive attack operations. Bomber Command had hoped that 
this aircraft with its functional role of attack would be allocated to No 2 Group, but 
CAS decided that it was better for it to remain in Fighter Command where it could be 
employed by units familiar with the type and integrated into the radar control system 
that Fighter Command ran. 
83
 It was a significant step towards multi-functional 
commands and represented a dramatic shift from the role and approach of Fighter 
Command a year earlier. 
Operations to divert German resources from the east resumed in early August, 
but by September questions were being raised about their sustainability given the 
mounting losses being incurred.
84
 Eventually events on the evening of 7/8 November 
1941 by Bomber Command and during the day on the 8 November 1941 by Fighter 
Command settled the offensive activity of both forces for the coming months. During 
the night of 7/8 November 1941, Bomber Command raided Berlin and in the process 
lost 37 aircraft from the 400 dispatched.
85
 On the following day Fighter Command 
mounted its only Circus operation for November and lost 14 pilots for the claimed 
destruction of five enemy aircraft.
86
 On 11 November 1941 the War Cabinet directed 
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that the offensive should be suspended and a policy of conservation imposed on both 
Bomber and Fighter Command to enable them to resume the offensive in the spring.
87
 
Between 14 June and 31 December 1941 Fighter Command lost 411 pilots in 
the daylight offensive whilst claiming 731 enemy fighters.
88
 This gives a good 
indication of the sense of achievement that would have been present at the time. The 
fact that the Germans had not lost 731 but only 154 illustrates just how far removed 
from reality the processes of the day could make the high command become.
89
 Clearly 
gaining air superiority was not a straightforward task and as the year came to a close it 
was obvious that the strategy of diverting German assets from the east to the west had 
failed to achieve its objective. Terraine argued, with the benefit of hindsight, that: 
Less helpful was the continuing disposition to find ways of resuming 
day bombing, when really there was only one way that could make it effective 
– the introduction of a true long-range fighter to protect the bombers.
90
 
His subsequent analysis, in tune with Webster and Frankland, stating that Portal was 
at fault has been influential in the historiography, with Terraine devoting an Appendix 
to his assessment of the matter.
91
 However, as this analysis has highlighted, methods 
of extending fighter range through the use of external jettisonable tanks had been 
discussed and squadrons were equipped during the summer of 1941. The awareness of 
the importance of fighter escort was widely held as was evidenced by the discussion 
at the CAS Meeting of 29 July 1941 in the wake of the large scale Bomber Command 
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daylight attack of French coastal bases.
92
 On 1 March 1942, in the wake of Japan’s 
entry into the war, the PM sent a short minute to the CAS: 
Let me have a note on the comparative ranges, so far as known, of 
Japanese and British fighter aircraft of all kinds. 
We are repeatedly reading about long-range Japanese fighters, but the 
Air Ministry have always led me to believe no important advance in range was 
likely to be made.
93
 
On 14 March 1942 General Wavell, C-in-C India, telegraphed his assessment 
of the recent fighting in the Far East and his conclusion that the ‘possession of 
fighters with a range up to 1500 miles’ was ‘the most outstanding’ advantage the 
Japanese enjoyed. After arguing for the bolstering of air defences in his region and the 
dire consequences of not acting, in terms of the security of India and Burma, he 
concluded with the memorable phrase; ‘You have been warned’. This was taken up by 
the PM the following day who demanded an explanation and stated: 
This is very grave. You have repeatedly assured me that ranges of this 
kind were impossible for fighters.
94
 
CAS replied the same day: 
I suggest you are mistaken in thinking that I have repeatedly assured 
you that ranges of 1500 miles are impossible for fighters. We ourselves have 
for some time possessed the Beaufighter which, as I stated in the attachment to 
my minute of 3
rd
 March, has a theoretical range still-air range of 1460 to 1870 
miles according to the armament carried. 
I agree that I have repeatedly told you that the long range fighter has 
little chance when up against the short range fighter, owing to the better 
performance of the latter. If we had had adequate short range fighter defence 
in Malaya and Java we should, in General Wavell’s words, have ‘beaten the 
Japanese air forces out of the skies’ as we did in Burma where it was possible 
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Earlier Lord Cherwell had added to the debate on 11 March 1942, writing to the PM 
stating that: 
The average speed of the Japanese machines....is some 100 miles per 
hour less than that of ours. It is true that their range is greater, using auxiliary 
tanks that can be jettisoned. When we fit these, the range of our fighters will 
be equal to that of the Japanese machine and our speed will be higher.
96
 
CAS submitted the special report the PM had asked for on 19 March 1942 
summarising the position concerning range extending tanks. He explained that both 
jettisonable and non-jettisonable tanks were available for the Hurricane and 
jettisonable tanks for the Spitfire. Performance loss when the tanks were carried 
restricted the use of the tanks by the Fighter Command Hurricanes to ‘Intruder’ 




This passage of correspondence, far from revealing a Service unprepared for 
the demands of war, shows that whilst Terraine was correct in suggesting that Portal 
had a blind spot over the potential performance of the long range fighter, as 
subsequently demonstrated by the capability of the P-51 Mustang, he was not correct 
in suggesting that Portal and his colleagues were against the use of range extending 
drop tanks. Without the pressure from both the Air Ministry and the frontline the 
procurement system would have not been as far advanced as it was in early 1942. This 
beginning of the capability to fight over longer range and penetrate the enemy’s 
defences to reach targets that were of significant importance to him, coupled with the 
deployment of more multi-functional aircraft would shape the development of 
operations and high command for the rest of the war. 
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Multi-Role Capability and Command Flexibility 
This chapter has so far addressed the ability of the RAF high command to 
adapt thinking to operational necessity. This section now focuses on the adaptation 
that was enabled through the introduction of new capability, be that in the form of 
new aircraft, modified and upgraded existing types, or electronic and scientific 
devices that offered transformational capability to the frontline. At the start of 1942 
equipment changes had already begun the process of transforming the mono-
functional commands of 1936 into increasingly multi-functional commands with 
growing levels of self-sufficiency. Coastal Command in particular, due in part to its 
specialised role and close working relationship with the RN, was already provisioned 
with attack, reconnaissance, fighter, and escort fighter capability. Fighter Command 
possessed the Hurricane bomber and recent policy changes in October 1941 had given 
it authority to attack shipping and land targets. Of the three, Bomber Command was 
the least multi-functional although the command mechanisms by which it gained 
multi-functional support were well tried and practiced. 
During 1942 the fielding of new capabilities in all three Commands would 
alter the way in which the CAS and Air Staff were able to co-ordinate air operations 
from the UK. New aircraft with greater multi-role capability created the conditions in 
which the mono-functional commands remained coherent in terms of aircraft types, 
training schools, maintenance support etc, but were increasingly blessed with the 
means to undertake roles that had previously been beyond them. In Coastal Command 
the creation by Joubert of the Coastal Strike Wings based on the various models of the 
Beaufighter allowed Coastal Command to configure strike wings from within its own 
resources which now comprised fighter, torpedo bomber, and attack versions of the 
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same aircraft thereby releasing it from the need for inter command support.
98
 
Likewise Fighter Command acquired aircraft, such as the Havoc, Boston, Mosquito, 
Hurricane bomber and Beaufighter, which were able to perform functions that 
previously had to be provided by its sister organizations.
99
 In the case of Bomber 
Command the developments were less transforming but the arrival in Fighter 
Command of the Mosquito in the night fighter role greatly improved night fighter 
escort, and the development of electronic counter-measures embedded in Bomber 
Command aircraft further broadened the functional capability of the Command.
100
 
This transition to multi-functionality created new options for command and 
control of UK based air operations and reduced the inherent need for inter-command 
co-ordination from the Air Staff. However, the growing self-sufficiency also led to 
inter command difficulties. For example, both Bomber Command and Coastal 
Command considered they held primacy in the attack on shipping, but for different 
reasons.
 101
 Coastal Command considered their environmental focus gave them 
priority while Bomber Command considered that their offensive functional lead 
meant they should hold sway. On 15 July 1941 this growing dispute reached the 
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arbitration of the CAS who allocated Bomber Command responsibility from 
Cherbourg to Texel and Coastal Command the lead in all other areas.
102
 
In October 1941 responsibility for the counter German Navy  ‘Channel Stop’ 
operation in the area Manston-Ostend-Dieppe-Beachy Head was devolved entirely to 
Fighter Command following Bomber Command’s withdrawal of its Blenheims and 
the equipping of Fighter Command with the recently fielded Hurricane bombers that 
could substitute with bombs and cannon for the offensive capability of Bomber 
Command.
103
 This arrangement, albeit only covering a small area, but one of 
significant operational importance, was possible because the deployment of a multi-
role aircraft types enabled Coastal Command and Fighter Command to undertake this 
task self-sufficiently thereby permitting the clarification of command and control 
arrangements. It was also helped by the ease with which both Coastal Command and 
Fighter Command had demonstrated they could co-operate over the previous months 
under Douglas, Bowhill, and Joubert. 
Clearly it would be stretching the point too far to suggest that as a result of the 
arrival of the Hurricane bomber that Fighter Command had become a multi-functional 
command. On the other hand, it would be entirely reasonable to highlight this as an 
example of the operational efficiency and potential created by the fielding of more 
capable and adaptable aircraft. In a similar vein the widespread use of cannon 
armament in Coastal Command and Fighter Command aircraft gave them all a 
realistic ground strafing capability that could be used to attack aircraft, shipping, 
vehicles, rail stock, unprotected buildings and general ground facilities. In earlier 
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times this would have been undertaken by the light bomber force of No 2 Group 




By night a similar transition was underway with the increasing presence of 
‘attack’ capabilities embedded in Fighter Command assets, or as in the case of the 
Coastal Command the Coastal Strike Wings, the fighter and longer range escort 
capability inherent in their new Beaufighter. The night Intruder operations developed 
during 1942 to the point where they were capable of providing increasingly effective 
fighter sweep, escort and support to the Bomber Command main force operations.
105
 
The provision of the Mosquito brought the German operational training airfields in 
range and the heavier and more comprehensive armament, comprising cannons, 
machine guns, and four 250lbs bombs enabled effective and telling attacks to be 
made. As a result of this increase in capability Douglas revamped the Intruder control 
system to integrate planning, liaison, co-operation and execution of the nightly 
intruder missions.
106
 This new facility, the Intruder Operations Room at his 
Headquarters in Stanmore, enabled the integration of the ‘Y’ Service real time 
intelligence output with the real time conduct of the airborne missions.
107
 The 
presence of liaison staff from Bomber Command and Coastal Command added to the 
ease with which co-ordinated action could be undertaken and hence enhanced 
operational effectiveness. By the end of 1942 Intruder operations were reaching 
beyond the Ruhr and providing Bomber Command with both airborne escort and 
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support and co-ordinated offensive strikes against the German night fighter bases.
108
 
Throughout 1941 and 1942 the RAF transitioned from its necessarily defensive 
posture of the first two years of the war to an increasingly offensive role. At the 
higher command level this was driven by both political and personal factors. 
The political, and naturally the determining factor, was the view of the War 
Cabinet and the desire to regain the initiative from the Germans after the Battle of 
Britain.
109
 Once a measure of survival had been achieved wider options became 
available.
110
 Securing the Atlantic was as critical in 1941 as securing the UK had been 
in 1940.
111
 This could only come about if the Germans were placed under an 
obligation to respond to the offensive actions of the RN and RAF.
112
 This was further 
emphasized when the pressing need to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union emerged 
in mid-1941.
113
 On 4 September 1940 the War Cabinet had discussed an appreciation 
by the COS on Future Strategy.
114
 This was not endorsed as Government policy but it 
was circulated to ‘the Dominions as a valuable staff study’.
115
 It concluded that ‘our 
strategy during 1941 must be one of attrition’ but that as 1942 approached we should 




The personality factor concerned the change at the top of the RAF command 
structure. As highlighted, the new commanders were a younger generation who had 
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fought as aircrew and squadron commanders in the First World War. Their attitudes 
had been formed during the establishment of the RAF in the 1920s and 1930s and 
they were the products of RAF, rather than Army or RN staff and command education 
and training. Portal, Peirse, Douglas, and Park were all students on the first RAF Staff 
College Course, and Freeman was one of their instructors.
117
 This common 
background created an alignment which contained both strength and potential 
weakness. Its strength lay in the general ease with which business could be conducted, 
a distinct asset when conducting high command under the Hankey System. On the 
other hand, its potential weakness lay in the danger of what today would be termed 
‘group think’ the tendency to visualize and address challenges from a certain 
perspective, to reinforce that perspective through dialogue and to shut out contrary 
views and opinions. In the first two years of their time in command, this group did not 
seriously succumb to this danger, as it shown by the doctrinal and tactical debates that 
unfolded during 1941 and 1942, often at the behest of Freeman. Indeed, the presence 
of Freeman as the chosen VCAS may have been vital for his approachable authority 
and stature was a distinct asset to Portal as he found his feet as CAS.
118
 
The change of personalities enabled the change in attitude from the defensive 
to offensive strategy. The new leaders wanted to take the fight to the enemy and to 
undertake the operations that had formed the basis of all pre-war planning.
119
 The 
continuing influence of Trenchard and Salmond undoubtedly added to this desire. 
Once released by the War Cabinet from the demands of defence the new generation 
embraced the opportunities offered to demonstrate their offensive credentials at a time 
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when the RAF held a particularly central position in all British war making. In this 
way, a combination of political desire, personal alignment, and developing doctrinal 
thinking provided the backdrop to the attempts to transition to the offensive during 
1941 and 1942. That the results were far less promising than was thought at the time, 
and the Germans were never constrained sufficiently to transfer assets to the west to 
meet the growing threat, is now well known.
120
 From the perspective of this study it is 
the response of the CAS and Air Staff at the time that is relevant, particularly in their 
approach to the higher command of their forces. 
The experiments in gaining air superiority during 1941 and 1942 reveal a CAS 
and Air Staff that were content to operate in accordance with the precepts of the 
Hankey System. With the war becoming more complex and nuanced after the period 
of crisis, the Air Staff, in concert with the Admiralty and Coastal Command, operated 
the Hankey System well. The growing experience of the staff officers within the Air 
Ministry and at the Commands undoubtedly facilitated this. So too did the fact that a 
previous C-in-C, Portal, was now the CAS, a previous VCAS, Pierse, and DCAS, 
Douglas, were now Cs-in-C, a previous AOC, Harris, was now the DCAS and a man 
with almost universal respect, Freeman, occupied the quiet but pivotal post of VCAS 
to a young and inexperienced CAS.
121
 
The period also shows clearly that although the equipment on hand may have 
been inadequate to deliver the effect desired the understanding of the complexity and 
interrelationships between the various components of operational planning and design 
were well understood. Douglas foresaw these difficulties in several of his replies of 
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 Writing to his SASO concerning Leigh-Mallory’s proposal to form fighter 
wings, Douglas highlighted the doctrine that would, in time, prove instrumental in the 
defeat of the GAF over Germany in 1944.
123
 He stated that: 
I have never been very much in favour of the idea of trying to interpose 
fighter squadrons between enemy bombers and their objective. The best, if not 
the only, way of achieving air superiority is to shoot down a large proportion 
of enemy bombers every time they come over. It would be better to do this 
before they reach their objective if possible, but I would rather shoot down 50 
of the enemy bombers after they have reached their objective than shoot down 
only 10 before they have done so.
124
 
Tellingly he observed: 
Although the Dunkirk battle is by no means an exact parallel, it is 
noteworthy how much better results we got when we went from the system of 
having patrols of one or two squadrons over Dunkirk all day to less frequent 
patrols of 4, 5 or 6 squadron strength. The number of enemy bombers shot 
down went up by leaps and bounds.
125
 
He was sure that the success of Fighter Command during the Dunkirk 
operation was due to the ‘adoption of the policy of larger fighter formations’ and the 
abandonment of the policy of trying to interpose a small fighter force between the 
‘enemy bomber and his objective’.
126
 
In 1943 and 1944 the USAAF would learn this same lesson in terms of 
interposing fighters between the GAF fighters and the USAAF bombers they were 
trying to protect. When the USAAF shifted to a policy of destroying the GAF fighters 
in the air and on the ground in large numbers the daylight bombing offensive was 
transformed. Douglas, like Freeman, Joubert, Leigh-Mallory and Portal, cannot be 
criticised from the primary records for constraining their thinking or being blind to 
opportunities. What they lacked in 1941 was the capability; by the end of 1942 the 
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Allied production system was beginning to deliver both the capability and the 
capacity that would transform air warfare in the final years of the Second World War. 
As the war transitioned into a phase in which Allied co-operation would 
dominate, the RAF had achieved a system of higher command, which although far 
from perfect, was effective and, with the advent of new capabilities, was underpinned 
by Commands that were inexorably shifting away from the mono-functional design of 




PORTAL AND THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE - CCS EXECUTIVE 
AGENT 
The previous three chapters have assessed the performance of the RAF high 
command when faced with operational, personnel, and doctrinal challenges. Over 
time the precepts of the Hankey system were first challenged, then adapted, and then 
re-embraced following a significant change of command personnel. In parallel the 
mono-functional commands that began the war, slowly through the acquisition of 
more flexible and adaptable capability, gained a level of self-sufficiency that allowed 
the effective creation of SAC authority within the post of C-in-C. Whilst the Air 
Ministry remained the overriding authority and drove the development and co-
ordination of operations, equipment and doctrine in close co-operation with the new 
frontline commanders. This chapter will develop this concept by re-examining the 
role of Portal in the high command structure of the CBO that emerged from the Allied 
Conference in Casablanca that began on 14 January 1943.
1
 
The ‘Conduct of the War in 1943’ – Strategy and Plans 
Gilbert and Howard revealed that the priorities facing Churchill and the 
British CsOS in the weeks leading up to the Casablanca Conference were complex 
and wide ranging, and the direction of the combined activity of Bomber Command 
and the Eighth Air Force was but one of many issues to be addressed.
2
 Slessor, who as 
ACAS (Plans) accompanied Portal, kept contemporaneous notes that reveal that the 
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development of the strategic concept was not without its difficulties.
3
 He recorded 
that by lunch time on 18 January 1943, the day the CCS were planned to brief the 
President and PM at 1700hrs, that: 
The CCS had, in fact, agreed upon nothing at all! Tempers were 
getting a little frayed – or anyway Alan Brooke’s was – and it looked 
perilously as though 1700hrs would arrive with the British and US Chiefs of 




However, from Slessor’s perspective: 
it became increasingly obvious to me that the two sides, British and 
American, were not in fact half as far apart in their conceptions of our proper 
strategy as they thought they were.
5
 
Slessor’s subsequent drafting of a compromise agreement that Brooke and 
Portal presented to the CCS, who agreed after some modification, is well recorded.
6
 
The agreed memorandum by the CSS entitled ‘Conduct of the War in 1943’ was 
issued on 19 January 1943.
7
 It highlighted first under the heading of ‘Security’ that 
the defeat of the U-boat ‘must remain a first charge on the resources of the United 
Nations’. Furthermore, assistance to Russia ‘must be sustained’ but ‘without 
prohibitive cost in shipping’. Under the heading ‘Operations in the European Theatre’ 
is optimistically stated that operations will ‘be conducted with the object of defeating 
Germany in 1943’. After outlining in greater detail the planned operations in the 
Mediterranean, such as the ‘occupation of Sicily’ and creating the circumstances in 
which Turkey might become an active ally, the memorandum set the ground for the 
CBO. It stated that in the United Kingdom the ‘heaviest possible bomber offensive 
against German war effort’ would be mounted. This, coupled with limited offensive 
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operations and the assembly of the ‘strongest possible force in constant readiness to 
re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required 
extent’, clearly placed the proposed bomber offensive within a complex and inter-
related Allied strategy. However, on the matter of the nature of the bomber offensive 
the PM was yet to be convinced. 
Howard recorded that Churchill was not fully swayed that the Eighth Air 
Force would be best employed on daylight operations.
8
 Understandably from his 
experience of 1941 and 1942 with the RAF, the PM had seen attempts to conduct 
daylight operations flourish and flounder despite occasional successes such as at 
Augsburg.
9
 The PM stated in a note of congratulations to Harris, the new C-in-C 
Bomber Command: 
We must plainly regard the attack of the Lancasters on the U-boat 
engine factory at Augsburg as an outstanding achievement of the Royal Air 
Force. Undeterred by the heavy losses at the outset 44 and 97 Squadrons 
proceeded in broad daylight into the heart of Germany and struck a vital point 
with deadly precision. 
Please convey the thanks of His Majesty’s Government to the officers 




Against this background, Churchill’s concern over proposed USAAF 
operations could seem incongruous. However, Churchill was well aware that of the 12 
Lancasters that had set out on the raid only five returned; four had been shot down en 
route and a further three near the target giving a loss rate of 58%, a totally 
unsustainable figure for any long term campaign.
11
 On the night of 30/31 May 1942 
Harris mounted his first 1000 bomber raid, this time against Cologne. He followed 
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this up on 1/2 June 1942 against Essen and concluded on 25/26 June 1942 with a raid 
to Bremen. The loss rates on these raids were 3.9%, 3.2%, and 4.9% respectively, 
which while still serious were sustainable in the long term. Also the damage achieved 
was impressive and Bomber Command had perfected their night bombing techniques 
to the point where they could pass 700-800 bombers over the target in less than 20 
minutes. Furthermore, inter-command co-operation, developed in 1941, was in 1942 
providing intruder support, enemy night fighter airfield attack, electronic support, and 
diversion bombing operations. And of significance, Mosquito aircraft of 105 Sqn 
Bomber Command provided immediate photo-reconnaissance support to allow the 




With this obvious comparison so clear in his mind Churchill must have 
recognised that given the CCS were proposing ‘defeating Germany in 1943’ then the 
‘heaviest possible bomber offensive against German war effort’ could not afford for 
the USAAF to re-learn the lessons the RAF had so painfully learnt in 1941-42. In this 
Churchill was supported by the evidence of the very limited daylight operations the 
Eighth Air Force had conducted since their first raid against Rouen on 17 August 
1942.
13
 Overy commented that there ‘was impatience’ in ‘both London and 
Washington, with the slow progress of the Eighth Air Force’.
14
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stated, was strongly sceptical of the claim that daylight bombing would work and that 
they ‘will probably experience a heavy disaster’.
15
 
To represent the case for USAAF daylight bombing Arnold chose Eaker.
16
 
When Eaker learned from Arnold of the opposition to the daylight doctrine of the 
Eighth Air Force his response was unequivocal, but also extremely relevant in terms 
of the capability of the force he commanded: 
General, that is absurd. It represents complete disaster. It will permit 
the Luftwaffe to escape. The cross-Channel operation will then fail. Our 
planes are not equipped for night bombing: our crews are not trained for it. 
We’ll lose more planes landing on that fog-shrouded island in darkness than 
we now lose over German targets....If our leaders are that stupid, count me 
out. I don’t want any part of that nonsense!
17
 
Arnold replied that he was pleased Eaker had reacted that way, and knowing the high 
regard Churchill had for Eaker, he was trying to arrange an opportunity for him to 
speak to the PM to put the argument for continued daylight operations. Eaker 
prepared a single page paper entitled ‘The Case for Day Bombing’ which he 
presented to Churchill on 20 January 1943. After Churchill had read the paper and 
questioned Eaker, he concluded: 
Young man, you have not convinced me you are right, but you have 




Eaker had included in his paper the concept that by joining the RAF night attacks with 
the Eighth Air Force day attacks; the Allies would be able to strike Germany ‘around 
the clock’. That phrase particularly struck a chord with Churchill who commented 
‘how fortuitous it would be if we could, as you say, bomb the devils around the 
                                                          
15
 Ibid., p. 305. 
16
J Parton, Air Force Spoken Here – General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air (Bethesda 
Maryland: Adler and Adler, 1986), p.215. 
17
 Ibid., p.215. 
18





 With Churchill’s tacit agreement to Eighth Air Force daylight bomber 
operations secured the way was clear to further define the plan. 
On 21 January 1943 the CCS published Directive CCS 166/1/D ‘The Bomber 
Offensive from the United Kingdom’.
20
 It was sub-titled the ‘Directive to the 
Appropriate British and United States Air Force Commanders, to govern the 
operations of the British and United States Bomber Commands in the United 
Kingdom’. It stated that: 
Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation 
of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining 
of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed 
resistance is fatally weakened.
21
 
The primary objectives given were, in order of priority, as German submarine 
construction yards; the German aircraft industry; transportation; oil plants; and other 
targets in the enemy war industry. 
The Directive expanded on the objectives by observing that day and night 
attacks had already commenced on the submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast, 
which, if put out of action, would represent a ‘great step forward’ in the Battle of the 
Atlantic.
22
 Berlin, it stated: 
Should be attacked when conditions are suitable for the attainment of 
specially valuable results unfavourable to the morale of the enemy or 
favourable to that of Russia.
23
 
In terms of the assault on the GAF: 
You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to 
destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous 
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pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter 
force and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and 
Mediterranean theatres of war.
24
 
This Directive demonstrated the clear linkage of the proposed bomber 
offensive with other aspects of the agreed strategy for 1943. It also showed the desire 
to do all that was possible to ease the pressure on the Russian front, be it by 
destruction of German manufacturing capacity, the fixing of GAF fighter assets in the 
west, or hopefully, the redeployment of GAF assets in the east to the west to meet the 
growing threat from the day and night bomber offensive. Underpinning this was the 
continuous goal of damaging German morale and undermining her capacity to 
continue the fight. Of particular interest, given subsequent developments, was the 
specific reference to day bombing operations being targeted against the ‘German day 
fighter force’.
25
 Taking this document in isolation, however, can create a somewhat 
distorted perspective on the importance of the air war to the CCS, and the President 
and PM in particular. 
Overy observed that the records of discussions at Casablanca ‘give little hint 
of arguments over bombing taking place’ and that the records of the American Joint 
COS (JCS) mentioned bombing only three times and that it was discussed during the 
plenary sessions only twice.
26
 He also pointed out that the final list of CCS agreed 
priorities the: 
critical issues were the commitment to an invasion of Italian territory 
in the Mediterranean and an eventual campaign in north-west Europe, for 
which bombing would be a necessary prelude to maximise the chances of 
success for a major combined-arms operation.
27
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In Churchill’s summary telegraph to Attlee and the War Cabinet on the outcome of 
the Conference he does not mention bombing.
28
 Overy concluded that: 
The army and navy commanders at Casablanca devoted almost nothing 
in their memoirs to the arguments over bombing strategy. The projection of air 
power against Germany was essentially a subsidiary to the wider strategic 
intention of re-occupying Europe during 1943 and 1944. 
The Casablanca Directive itself was a brief set of instructions to 
destroy and dislocate the German ‘military, industrial and economic system’ 
and to undermine the morale of the German people to the point where the 
German power of resistance was ‘fatally weakened’.
29
 
This is an important and nuanced perspective on the outcome of the Casablanca 
Conference. In retrospect it is clear that the decision to embark on the CBO led to an 
air campaign of great importance and operational significance. It is also now clear that 
the achievement of air superiority over the GAF in North West Europe was an 
essential precondition for the successful prosecution of Operation OVERLORD. 
However, at the time these events were not as clear cut as hindsight now makes them, 
and it is that perspective that is important in assessing Portal’s approach and mindset 
during the coming months of 1943 and 1944. 
The reason Portal’s perspective is important for this study emanates from a 
decision recorded in the CCS Report on the SYMBOL Conference issued on 23 
January 1943.
30
 Portal, although content that the CBO decision had clarified the way 
ahead for Bomber Command and secured the USAAF focus against Germany from 
the UK, would undoubtedly have been aware that the CBO was but part of a wide 
range of strategic options that would develop over the coming months. Therefore, the 
CBO must be seen in perspective. For Portal, whose intelligence and political 
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understanding were well attuned, this would have made him acutely aware of where 
the CBO stood in the minds of the President and PM and in the priorities of his CCS 
colleagues. This understanding would be vital for as CCS 170/2 states in paragraph 4: 
We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bombardment Units in 
the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategical direction of the British 
Chief of Air Staff. Under his general direction the United States Commanding 
General will decide upon the technique and method to be employed. 
We have agreed upon a directive (CCS 166/1/D) to be issued to the 
British Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, and to the Commanding 
General, United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom.
31
 
When stripped of its official language and style, paragraph 4 appointed Portal to the 
role of strategic commander of the CBO, effectively the SAC to ensure co-ordination 
of planning supply and execution of the bombing campaign which, as Overy noted, 




Portal - The Appointed SAC 
Overy recorded that the Americans were pleased when the decision was made 
to make Portal the ‘nominal director’ of the whole bombing campaign as it removed 
the threat of Harris being placed in charge of the Eighth Air Force which they would 
have found very difficult because of his stated view that the Americans should operate 
at night and abandon their plans for daylight operations.
33
 Webster and Frankland 
noted that in response to the ‘pressing question of how the air offensive was to be 
conducted’ that it was left unresolved in the Casablanca Directive and that ‘everything 
depended upon how the direction was interpreted’.
34
 They noted that ‘Sir Charles 








 Webster and Frankland SAOG Vol II, p. 13. 
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Portal had been charged with the ‘strategical direction’ of the British and American 
bomber operations from the UK and that ‘in theory at least, the responsibility for the 
interpretation of the Casablanca Directive might have been supposed to be his’.
35
 
However, what was clear from the Directive was that ‘strategical direction’ did not 
embrace the power to determine tactics or techniques.
36
 
Tactics and techniques were to remain the preserve of the frontline 
commanders, Harris at Bomber Command, Spaatz and Eaker with the Eighth Air 
Force, and because of the limitations of the aircraft having the authority over the 
tactics and techniques of the execution of the CBO conferred on the recipient 
considerable authority over the progress of the campaign.
37
 Considerations of 
weather, training, weapon load, and aim points all gave the tactical commanders 
considerable leeway in the execution of higher direction. Harris had already proven 
that he was adept at interpreting directives he received from the Air Ministry, and 
Spaatz and Eaker were learning fast that directives were not executive orders but 
expressions of direction from their political leadership as to how they wished to see 
the campaign progress.
 38
 In 1943 it was simply impossible, given the capability of the 
time, to impose more rigid control. To Portal this would not have been a surprise 
given the experience he had gained in his putative SAC role as CAS since 1940. 
Moreover, the softer touch of senior executive guidance among close colleagues who 
                                                          
35
 Ibid., p. 13. 
36
 TNA CAB 99/24; and Howard, Grand Strategy Vol IV, p. 625 - CCS 170/2 dated 23 January 1943. 
37
 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p. 215. 
38
 P W Gray and S Cox, Air Power Leadership – Theory and Practice (London: HMSO, 2002) Chapter 
12 by S Cox ‘Sir Arthur Harris and the Air Ministry’, pp. 225-226. 
247 
 




There is no surviving evidence of what Portal thought of his role at the time, 
or whether he saw himself as a ‘Super CinC’, rather than the CCS’ ‘executive agent’ 
to oversee the CBO.
40
 From the available sources it is difficult to determine what 
exactly the CCS expected of Portal for many sources do not even mention that Portal 
even had an executive role. Biddle commented that though ‘Portal was theoretically in 
control of what was now called the Combined Bomber Offensive, the real power was 
in the hands of Harris and Eaker, since the tactical decisions of field commanders 
often were as consequential as the higher-level strategic plans.’
41
 This was a fair 
point, but it also confirms that Portal was ‘in control’ of the CBO even if the nature of 
air warfare at the time meant that subordinate commanders could have a serious 
impact on the conduct and outcome of operations based on tactical considerations. 
This was, and remains, an entirely normal situation when dealing with any large 
undertaking. Central direction, planning and guidance eventually have to give way to 
the individuals who will ultimately carry out the orders. This truth was implicit in 
General Eisenhower’s message to the troops on D-Day. Beginning ‘Sailors, soldiers 
and airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Forces!’ he recognised that his vital role in 
forming, planning and deciding on the mounting of OVERLORD had now been 
overtaken by the vital role of those charged to carry out his plan.
42
 In the case of the 
CBO, Harris and Eaker may indeed have been able to significantly influence the 
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outcome of the plan but the plan remained the preserve and responsibility of the 
higher authority, namely Portal. The CCS were expecting him to oversee the strategic 
direction and coherence of the campaign and ensure the planning, resourcing, 
execution and, if necessary, adaptation of the plan was carried out to deliver the 
desired outcomes.
 
So even if some historians have underplayed Portal’s role in the 
CBO, he was central to its success or failure.
43
 
The ironic aspect of the situation in which Portal found himself in early 1943 
was that he had the exact authority of SAC that the RAF had sought in 1937. The 
SAC was never intended to be the arbiter of day to day tactics or techniques and 
procedures, which were always intended to be the role of the Cs-in-C. By contrast the 
SAC was to be the conductor of the complex orchestration that would create multi-
functional effect from mono-functional components. Portal’s role for the CBO was 
entirely in tune with the role that the RAF had foreseen in 1937. In 1943 Portal would 
have ‘higher direction’ of the increasingly multi-functional RAF Bomber Command 
specializing in night operations, the growing multi-functionality of the Eighth Air 
Force with its embedded bomber, fighter, and air support commands, and authority as 
CAS over Fighter Command and the growing tactical air assets being established to 
support the planned invasion of Europe. Dwelling on the fact that subordinates still 
had great influence is to miss the essential point. Portal had the authority of the CCS, 
the experience of CAS under the Hankey System, and the will of his CCS colleagues 
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to lead the development and execution of the CBO, whose success was seen as an 
essential stepping stone to invasion.
 44
 
The ‘Round the Clock’ CBO - Directives and Plans 
On 2 April 1943 Eaker wrote to Portal saying that a Col Cabell had arrived 
carrying a letter from Arnold concerning the planning and development of the CBO 
Directive. Eaker stated that Arnold: 
Believes that in order to build-up an American Air Force of sufficient 
size in the UK he must be armed with two needs: first, a list of the industrial 
targets in Germany which, if destroyed, will cripple her ability to wage war: 




Arnold felt that if armed with this information he would be able to convince the US 
authorities and obtain their agreement to make the build-up ‘our Air Forces in this 
theatre’ the ‘first priority of the US’. 
Arnold’s letter dated 24 March 1943 introduced a report by his ‘Operational 
Analysts on the subject of strategic targets in Europe.’
46
 After setting the scene he 
came to his main point: 
In view of the new facts we now have, I believe we should review the 
bombing priorities set out in paragraph 2 of CCS 166/1/D, approved by the 
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Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca. The directive itself is in broad terms, 
and apparently needs no change. 
Our efforts in the past to build up a larger bomber force in the United 
Kingdom have been disappointing. Bombers for that theatre have too often 
been regarded as a reservoir from which demands of other theatres can be met. 




In his reply to Arnold, Portal commended the study by the Committee of 
Operational Analysts (COA) saying ‘we have been very much impressed with it’ and 
that ‘we are in general agreement with it, at least as far as the more important 
industries are concerned’.
48
 The previous day Portal had replied to Eaker, allocating 
his Director of Bomber Operations, Bufton, to Eaker’s Committee and asking to see 
the plan in draft form at his earliest convenience.
49
 Eaker had also circulated the plan 
to Harris who replied on 15 April 1943 with his initial impressions.
50
 Harris was clear, 
stating: 
I am in complete agreement with the policy recommended. The effect 
of linking up precision bombing of selected targets in daylight by an adequate 
force of VIII Bomber Command with intensified night bombing by the RAF 
will unquestionably cause both damage to material and morale on a scale 
which the enemy will be unable to sustain. The necessity under which such an 
offensive will place him of maintaining still larger day and night fighter forces 
in the west from dwindling production will, inevitably, reduce his fighters on 
other fronts below the danger point and force him to put more and more 




He went on to say that he felt the plan as then stated ‘may prove somewhat in 
elastic’ and thought that in practice it might need to be ‘modified as necessary to meet 
developments.
52
 On the subject of U-boat attacks he was firmer basing his comments 
on his experience of attacking U-boat installations over the previous year which he 
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opined had been ‘an extravagant and comparatively fruitless task’.
53
 He hoped such 
attacks could be made: 
less prominent in the Plan – or, if that is impracticable, if it could be 
made clear that only precision day bombing against selected vulnerable points 
in those bases, and not heavy night attacks, are recommended.
54
 
He then stated unequivocally that: 
Apart from these points, which concern the detailed presentation and 
not the substance of the matter, I have nothing to add to the Plan itself.
55
 
Also on 15 April 1943 Portal wrote to Arnold: 
As you know, the Eighth Air Force has been engaged with the Air 
Staff in drawing up a detailed plan for the purpose of discharging the 
responsibilities laid upon our combined bomber forces at the Casablanca 
Conference. 
The Plan is now complete. It is based on our combined resources in the 
matter of intelligence and operational data including the very valuable report 
of your Operations Analysts and has been drawn up in close consultation with 
the Ministry of Economic Warfare. 
I have carefully examined the plan and discussed it in all its aspects 
with the Commanding General 8
th
 Air Force. I take this opportunity of saying 
that I believe it to be entirely sound and that it has my full support.
56
 
Portal then moved on to the issue that would determine the effectiveness of the 
plan, an issue which he as the ‘executive agent of the CCS’ had particular 
responsibility. He continued stating that: 
The Plan includes an estimate of the rate at which the strength of the 
Eighth Air Force must be developed in order to achieve the planned effect. I 
believe this rate of build-up and the time factor generally to be of primary 
importance. The German Fighter strength is increasing and every week’s delay 
will make the task more difficult to accomplish. We cannot afford to miss the 
good bombing weather which will soon be due. We cannot exploit to the full 
the great potentialities of the daylight bombing technique if the requisite 
numbers are not available. 
For all of these reasons I earnestly hope that every effort will be made 
to achieve and if possible to exceed the programme.
57
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Col Cabell again acted as courier and delivered Portal’s letter to Arnold who 
replied on 19 April 1943.
58
 After acknowledging the quality and soundness of the 
plan, Arnold addressed Portal’s concerns about resources and the build-up of the 
Eighth Air Force: 
The destruction of the targets set forth therein is within our 
capabilities, provided we can prevent any further diversion of our forces to 
other theaters. 
Let me assure you that I will do everything within my power to 
augment the American heavy bomber forces in the UK. In this connection, I 
am opposing the proposed diversion of two more heavy bomb groups to North 
Africa, even for a limited period. Such a diversion would be entirely 
inconsistent with the plan just evolved for the combined bomber offensive, 
particularly during this first phase.
59
 
He concluded by stating that ‘I feel the work that has been done on this plan 
within the past few months by your people and mine will have a profound influence 
upon the conduct of the war’.
60
 
To assist Arnold in his quest to ensure the build-up of the Eighth Air Force 
went according to plan, Portal authorised his representative in Washington, Foster, to 
re-iterate, in a speech in New York to the American-Canadian Club on 28 April 1943, 
comments made by the PM at a Staff Conference in London on 22 April 1943 
concerning the ‘best way to defeat the Japanese’.
61
 Foster reported that Arnold felt 
that such a speech would ‘do much to remove lingering suspicion among many people 
here that we do not really mean business with Japan’ and that it would ‘strengthen his 
hand considerably to resist pressure’ to divert assets away from the UK.
62
 Foster’s 
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speech was successful but the pressures on Arnold to divert heavy bomber allocation 
would not abate just yet. 
This passage of correspondence showed the close involvement of both Portal 
and Arnold in the development of the CBO Plan. Both were members of the CCS, 
both led their respective air forces, and both realised the vital importance of the 
proposed campaign, not just to the air war but to the wider campaign to defeat 
Germany. As the CCS ‘executive agent’ his style of leadership was to enable, engage 
and encourage. Much of his work was behind the scenes, as evidenced by the 
authorisation and fine tuning of Foster’s speech. Furthermore, he was rightly much 
more focussed on the challenge of making available to the frontline commanders, 
Eaker and Harris, the necessary resources than overseeing the detail of the operational 
plan. The response of the enemy, particularly in terms of his fighter force and the 
impact that would have of the time available for the effective conduct of the CBO, 
featured highly in Portal’s correspondence. In terms of the Eighth Air Force Portal 
would have recognised the challenges he had faced in his early days at both Bomber 
Command and as CAS when the resources were barely available and constantly under 
threat of diversion to seemingly higher priority missions. In 1943, Bomber Command 
had grown to a size which gave it the capacity to be somewhat more flexible to extra 
demands; the small and resource starved Eighth Air Force did not enjoy such benefits. 
Portal appears to have focussed on those issues that required his authority and weight 
of effort. Others could and did deliver a tactical plan that was based on the best 
available information. Overseeing the whole was Portal who quietly exercised the 
authority he had amassed in the eyes of his British and US counterparts to ensure 
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Eaker and others delivered the Plan and Arnold was as supported as possible to 
deliver the resources to carry out the plan. 
On 15 April 1943 Portal wrote to Foster to emphasise the importance of RAF 
support to Arnold in the wake of the completion of the Eaker Plan.
63
 He explained to 
Foster that: 
I have today signed a letter to General Arnold stating that I believe the 
plan to be sound and that I back it 100%. I have added that I regard the time 
factor as vital and that if the plan is to succeed development of the Eighth 
Bomber Command must equal, and if possible exceed, the scheduled rate. 
Failing this, the whole success of the plan will be imperilled by the rapid 
development of the German fighter force now in progress.
64
 
Portal acknowledged that the plan would be ‘attacked by those who believe 
that the American tactics of precision bombing by day have not proved themselves’.
65
 
The view of the Air Staff must therefore, ‘be made plain’.
66
 He emphasised to Foster: 
The immense advantages which would accrue if the Americans 
succeeded with their plan for precision bombing by daylight have never been 
doubted. The plan opened up the possibility of systematic destruction of vital 
targets in Germany coupled with the ability to inflict heavy attrition on the 
German fighters. The plan was clearly the perfect complement of our own 
night bombing operations, as the two forces in combination would tend to 
exhaust the German fighter defence and spread the attacks over the full 24 
hours. The only doubt was whether the Americans could achieve the necessary 
penetrations and maintain the accuracy of daylight attacks in the face of 
intense flak and fighter defences. 
Sufficient experience has now been accumulated to show that the 
Americans have proved their case.
67
 
Portal urged Foster to ensure that the support of the Air Staff was unequivocal 
and that the USAAF had, in the view of the Air Staff, proved their case for daylight 
                                                          
63
 Ibid., Letter Portal to Foster, dated 15 April 1943. 
64
 Ibid., dated 15 April 1943. 
65
 Ibid., dated 15 April 1943. 
66
 Ibid., dated 15 April 1943. 
67





 This correspondence shows the twin concerns of Portal at the time, 
namely, the build-up of the Eighth Air Force and the pressing need to arrest the build-
up of the German fighter force. Arnold, however, had another concern. With support 
given to Arnold to help him deliver the resources for the Eaker Plan, the task shifted 
to gaining CCS approval and the final sanction of the President and PM. 
Portal’s records contain a copy of the US COS paper advocating the ‘Plan for 
Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom’.
69
 The ‘Problem’ the plan 
sought to solve was the provision of a plan: 
to accomplish, by a combined US-British air offensive, the 
‘progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, 
and economic system, and the undermining of morale of the German people to 
a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened’ as 
directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at CASABLANCA.
70
 
Thus the antecedence was clear and so was the purpose, as revealed by the 
opening paragraph of the detailed plan under the heading of ‘The Mission’. Reprising 
the problem stated above it clarified that the phrase ‘fatally weakened’ was construed 
as meaning ‘so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on the 
Continent’.
71
 Therefore, the CBO was clearly in the minds of the CCS the stepping 




Much has been made of the role of Harris and Bomber Command in re-
wording the Eaker Plan, and indeed several passages were significantly re-worked.
73
 
But just as the US commanders were worried at Casablanca that Harris might 
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interfere with their methods and tactics, he too was concerned that having developed 
Bomber Command significantly during 1942 into a force designed to undertake night 
bombing, the CBO could upset his methods and tactics.
74
 When in April and May the 
Eaker Plan was being staffed the Eighth Air Force, despite the reassurances given by 
Portal, had far from resolved their ability to operate by day and thus it would have 
been unwise for Portal to have been too firm with Bomber Command over their desire 
to focus on their night offensive against German industry which was also a clearly 
stated aim of the Casablanca Directive. Indeed, in all of Portal and Arnold’s 
correspondence there is a clear recognition that the two bomber forces would 
undertake two separate styles of attack, which the Plan would co-ordinate overall. 
Thus Portal, as the CCS representative, allowed a sensible degree of ambiguity 
to ensure Alliance cohesion and operational insurance.
75
 To have demanded a change 
in the methods of Bomber Command at a time when the methods of the Eighth Air 
Force were unproven might have appeared strong but would not have been wise. At 
the First TRIDENT Conference in Washington on 12
 
May 1943 the pressing issues 
for the President and PM were operations in the Mediterranean, China, and the 
Pacific.
76
 The PM commented that some issues were now so broadly agreed that he 
‘did not propose to deal with the U-boat war and the aerial bombardment of Germany. 
There were no differences of opinion on these subjects’.
77
 Portal had provided a 
campaign plan that focussed on the ‘round the clock’ aspect of the CBO concept in 
which the enemy would have no respite from the growing capability of the Allies in 
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 On 18 May 1943, Portal proposed to the 5
th
 CCS Meeting of the TRIDENT 
Conference in Washington that the CCS should consider Eaker’s Plan and agree it for 
immediate implementation.
79
 After a short discussion which once again emphasised 
the pressing need for the build-up of the Eighth Air Force assets in the UK and the 
threat posed by the growing GAF fighter force, the CCS approved CCS 217 the plan 
for the Combined Bomber Offensive from the UK whose codeword was 
POINTBLANK. 
POINTBLANK – Campaign Analysis and Control 
On 4 June 1943 the CCS requested that they should receive periodical reports 
on the progress of the CBO.
80
 On 12 June 1943 Eaker wrote to Portal following up the 
proposal requesting support from the Air Ministry in producing the requested 
reports.
81
 However, Portal’s reply, on 16 June 1943, painted on a larger canvass.
82
 
Portal pointed out to Eaker that the CCS required: 
A periodic analysis of the effects of the combined bomber offensive 
which, amongst other things, would help in assessing the extent to which 
conditions for a re-entry into the Continent of Europe had been created. 
My own view is that the Joint Intelligence Committee, with all sources 
of information at its disposal, is much better qualified to make an assessment 
of the effects of our bomber offensive, particularly in relation to the creation 
of conditions suitable for re-entry in to the Continent, than would be the more 
domestic committee you suggest in your letter.
83
 
This was an excellent example of Portal as the military statesman, bridging the 
needs of the highest command level with the desire of the operational strata to 
advocate its case, but doing so in a way, by rational use of the JIC, that allowed 
everyone to move forward in harmony and agreement. Portal proposed a quarterly 
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report based on the Monthly Industrial Damage Report of the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare (MEW), the Monthly report on ‘The Combined Bomber Offensive and 
German Morale’, and a new monthly report on ‘The fighting value of the German Air 
Force’ which he said was ‘being introduced partly for this purpose and partly in 
connection with the new directive’.
84
 He concluded his letter to Eaker by stating that: 
I think these arrangements will fully meet the requirements of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff and at the same time provide a complete picture of 
the progress which we are making towards the fulfilment of our task.
85
 
Whatever criticism could later be made of the CBO, in mid-1943 the man responsible 
for it could not be accused of not preparing to understand the effect of the operations 
about to get underway. 
Between the Casablanca Conference in January and the issuing of the 
POINTBLANK Directive in June the main striking force of the Allies bomber assault 
had been Bomber Command and its night offensive. This had first been directed 
against the Ruhr industrial region beginning on the 5/6 March 1943 with the raid on 
Essen. The Eighth Air Force was growing in capability, but was still hampered by 
disruptions in its build-up programme. However, by the middle of July the objective 




Despite the success of the combined raids during the Battle of Hamburg 
between 24/25 July – 3 August 1943 the offensive was yet to produce telling results. 
The attacks against Schweinfurt and Regensburg on the 17 August 1943 marked a 
significant advance in the ability of the Eighth Air Force to penetrate German 
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airspace, but they also revealed a significant and growing limitation, namely the 
increasing vulnerability of the unescorted day bombers over Germany to GAF fighter 
attack beyond the range of US fighter escort.
87
 Two months later on 14 October 1943 
the Eighth Air Force returned to Schweinfurt and was so badly damaged that is was 
necessary to mirror the limitations placed on Bomber Command in November 1941 
and conserve the force until suitable fighter escorts could be made available.
88
 
On 12 October 1943 Portal planned to hold a meeting to assess the progress of 
both the Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command towards the defeat of the GAF 
fighter force and the achievement of the POINTBLANK aims. This meeting came just 
after the completion of Phase II of the US plan which ended on 30 September 1943.
89
 
During this phase it was estimated that the Eighth Air Force Bomber Command 
would: 
be able to penetrate to a limit of 400 miles, a determined effort must be 
made to breakdown the German fighter strength by every means at our 
disposal, concentrating primarily upon fighter aircraft factories.
90
 
On 7 October 1943 Portal had received a memorandum on the extent to which 
Bomber Command and Eighth Air Force had been able to defeat the GAF fighter 
force.
91
 Quoting figures for the increase in the GAF fighter strength from 300 to 700 
from a paper by the DofI in the series ‘Fighting Value of the GAF’, dated 3 
September 1943, the author stated that: 
It can be reasonably argued that the GAF fighter force alone prevents 
the British and American bomber forces from undermining morale and 
disorganising German war economy as to fatally weaken armed resistance 
within a matter of months. Unless the present build-up of the GAF fighter 
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force is checked there is a real danger that the average overall efficiency and 




The memorandum then moved on to assess the effectiveness of the Eighth Air 
Force attacks on GAF targets stating that the recent raids on Regensburg and Weiner-
Neustadt had demonstrated what could be achieved in that fighter production had 
been significantly reduced from what would otherwise have been the case. 
Nonetheless, it was still significant and twin engine fighter production and that of the 
FW 190 fighter had been ‘affected only to a relatively small degree’. These attacks 
had shown what could be achieved but the attacks had ‘not, as yet, been as heavy and 
as numerous as was contemplated’ in the POINTBLANK plan. The main reasons the 
USAAF had been unable to carry out the plan were threefold. Firstly, Eighth Air 
Force aircraft and crew strength was only 70% of that planned; secondly, weather had 
proved a stubborn limiting factor; and thirdly the three heavy bomber groups that had 
been diverted to the Mediterranean to ‘assist in operations HUSKY and 
AVALANCHE’ had further depleted the fighting power of Eaker’s command. 
The next observation was that ‘the effort of Bomber Command has been 
directed to a small extent only on targets associated with the GAF’. However, the 
need to concentrate on the Ruhr during the summer months, when the short nights 
precluded deeper penetration and the short expected operational life of the OBOE 
system demanded that Bomber Command concentrate on those targets that were both 
within OBOE range and could be attacked under cover of darkness. However, with 
longer nights approaching it was considered that the enemy fighter factories in 
Augsburg, Brunswick, Gotha, Bernberg, Kassel, and Leipzig would make excellent 
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targets in combination with USAAF day attacks. This was particularly so because the 
first four towns listed were responsible for 100% of GAF twin-engine fighter 
production, while the last two produced 27% of the GAF’s single-engine fighters.
93
 
Portal received another update on 11 October 1943 which looked at the Eighth 
Air Force operations in the first 10 days of October.
94
 This report highlighted a 
‘disturbing tendency for the Eighth USAAF to divert its effort from German fighter 
production to area bombing and to various precision targets, such as shipyards and 
port areas, unconnected with the GAF’. The report stated that any diversion from 
GAF fighter assembly plants would be very serious for the build-up of the GAF 
fighter force was the most ‘serious menace’ to the CBO and the success of 
OVERLORD. The report concluded by suggesting that at the Conference on 12 
October 1943 two options presented themselves; first, continuing the destruction of 
the GAF fighter production plants  by concentrating both bomber forces on that aim, 
or second, the ‘all out effort by both Bomber forces in the area attack of German 
cities’. Both could not be accomplished and the over-riding priority was the reduction 
in the German fighter force. This it was argued would’ open the way for the full 




These two reports added further evidence to the picture that had been 
emerging over the previous months. On 15 August 1943 Portal had issued, under 
cover of CCS 309, a summary of the current situation with POINTBLANK.
96
 Portal 
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stated that the GAF fighter force had increased by 22% since 1 April 1943, that its 
strength in the west had doubled, that the increase in the west had absorbed all the 
increased production, that experienced units and pilots were being withdrawn from 
the Mediterranean and Russian fronts, and that despite the present strain on the GAF 
night fighter units they were being used to counter the ‘deep daylight penetration of 
POINTBLANK into Germany. He highlighted that the present strength of Eighth Air 
Force was 921, with 105 deployed to the Mediterranean theatre, against the planned 
strength of 1068 heavy bombers. He also pointed out that the GAF fighter force was 
2260 aircraft against the 2000 that the plan hoped ‘would not be exceeded if 
POINTBLANK’ were to be executed as planned. He then stated: 
I do not set out the above information in order to make a criticism of 
an inability to have achieved complete fulfilment of ‘POINTBLANK’. My 
object is to bring out the fact that, in spite of some shortfall in the build-up, 
Germany is now faced with imminent disaster if only the pressure of 
‘POINTBLANK’ can be maintained and increased before the increase in the 
GAF fighter force has gone too far.
97
 
Portal continued by highlighting the rewards that could be achieved by 
bringing enough force ‘to bear to win this battle during the next 2 or 3 months’ and 
concluded by inviting the JCS to ‘take all practicable steps at the earliest possible date 




 It was ironic that 
Portal’s note should be released two days before the Eighth Air Force were to suffer 
significant losses during their attacks on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, but also telling 
that the attack on Regensburg had significant impact on the production of fighter 
aircraft. 
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These records from August and October 1943 clearly show Portal at the heart 
of initiatives to ensure that the campaign was understood and that his colleagues were 
aware of both the progress being made and the challenges ahead. This was a vital role 
for the CBO had become the essential preparation for OVERLORD and knowledge of 
its progress, as Portal alluded to in his correspondence with Eaker, could only come 
from a comprehensive independent study of progress. It says much of Portal’s 
confidence that he was prepared to cede to the JIC the responsibility for the 
compilation of the CCS Quarterly Analysis reports, given that they were reporting  on 
the campaign for which he was appointed the CCS ‘executive agent’. One wonders if 
other commanders of the time would have been so open. Nonetheless, by early 
October 1943 serious concerns were emerging that the POINTBLANK campaign was 
falling short of its target and that it would fail to prepare the ground for OVERLORD. 
By both day and night the growing impact of the GAF fighters had to be addressed or 
failure was a distinct possibility. 
While the Eighth Air Force was recuperating after the losses incurred on its 
daylight operations, Bomber Command continued its night campaign by mounting an 
assault on Berlin.
99
 This battle would bring Bomber Command to the point of collapse 
and require the RAF to rethink its approach but during the period November 1943 to 
February 1944 whilst the USAAF conducted limited operations the only significant 
element of the combined ‘round the clock’ POINTBLANK offensive was the RAF’s 
night campaign. Davis has argued, with some justification, that the CBO was 
combined in name only, but it is difficult to see, given the capabilities of the time and 
the all-pervading effect that weather had on air operations, how it could have been 
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 Targets that were able to be attacked in daylight were often 
obscured by weather at night, and vice versa. Although radar bombing was now 
commonplace in both bomber forces its accuracy was significantly below that of 
precision attack.
101
 With its aim being the progressive attack on the German industrial 
base to shift the planning calculus for OVERLORD in the Allies’ favour, the key and 
now essential goal was the attainment of air superiority over the GAF fighter force.
102
 
Throughout November 1943 Portal was closely involved in the high level 
debate on the progress of POINTBLANK, particularly as it related to the GAF fighter 
force, and by implication the feasibility of OVERLORD, in preparation for his 
attendance at the first part of the SEXTANT Conference planned for the 22-26 
November 1943 in Cairo. On 3 November 1943 he received a memorandum prepared 
by ACAS (Intelligence), Inglis, reporting on the ‘probable strength and disposition of 
GAF on the Western Front’ on 1 December 1943 and 1 April 1944.
103
 Inglis’ closely 
argued paper concluded that the strength of the GAF at 1 December 1943 was 
estimated to be 5150 aircraft but that on 1 April 1944 it could be 5450. Specifically: 
On the basis of a total strength of 5450 it is considered that 2400 
aircraft would be on the Western Front, and that of these about 1150 
(including 500 single engine fighters and 125 twin engined fighter) could be 




For Portal this was most unwelcome news as his response to Inglis shows: 
I think that this is a very serious paper to put in because it means 
nothing less than that we have abandoned our belief in the ‘POINTBLANK’ 
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plan which was prepared with our assistance and backed up by us 100 per 
cent. 
The Americans have performed about 85 to 90 per cent of what they 
undertook to do. They (and we) estimated that 100 per cent of the projected 
effort would reduce the German fighter force (excluding fighter/bombers) to 
about 650 aircraft by 1
st
 of April 1944. We now say that if they go on as they 
are at present the German fighter force on the 1
st
 of April will be 2865. This is 
tantamount to throwing overboard the whole plan and I cannot possibly let this 
report go forward until you have reconciled your present views with those 




Inglis submitted his response to CAS on 9 November 1943.
106
 He reprised his 
analysis but did not give great ground. Quoting Portal in a note to the PM he pointed 
out that it had already been conceded that it seemed ‘doubtful whether there will be 
any further reduction in German single engine fighter strength during the next few 
months: there may well be some increase’. He stated that he: 
Was under the impression that the point had already been taken that we 
should have to achieve substantially greater results against the aircraft industry 
than we have done in the last few months, good though these have been, if 
further production is to be reduced to the point where there will be a rapid fall 
in first line strength.
107
 
Inglis added that to achieve the desired result by 1 April 1944, the scale of attack 
against the fighter factories will have to be considerably increased.
108
 
In parallel with the debate with Inglis, Portal also received the analysis of 
DCAS.
109
 His analysis, which he had discussed with Eaker who was in complete 
agreement, took an alternative look at the planned attack of German fighter factories 
pointing out that in Phase I (April-June) only one factory was planned for attack, in 
Phase II (July-September) two were planned, whilst in Phase III (October-December) 
                                                          
105
 Ibid., dated 4 November 1943. 
106
 Ibid., dated 9 November 1943. 
107
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six plants were due to be attacked. Thus, DCAS continued Phase III represented the 
‘first time in the plan when substantial results could have been expected to be 
achieved’ against the GAF fighter force. He then explained that the culminating effort 
was planned for Phase IV (January-April 1944) when eight plants were scheduled to 
be attacked by 1200 sorties and an additional 1100 sorties were to be mounted against 
fighter engine factories. DCAS recognised that: 
Although the aim of the directive was to reduce as rapidly as possible 
the strength of the German fighter force, it was realised when the plan was 
being formulated that the deep penetrations involved could only be 
accomplished when the force had been built up to a certain minimum size. 
This is the crux of the problem.
110
 
The Eighth Air Force were in mid-November 26% below the expected 
frontline strength upon which the plan had been based and were, therefore three 
months behind the planned build-up that would enable the deep raids to be sustained. 
Nonetheless, DCAS pointed out that the USAAF had mounted successful attacks 
against some of the deeper targets with considerable success but despite this the 
remaining and critical factories could only be attacked if one of two options was 
adopted by the CCS. Firstly, the CCS could direct that these factories be destroyed 
and ‘accept the resulting immobilisation of the force for the period required to rebuild 
it’.
111
 Or secondly, they could order the ‘build-up of the force immediately to the size 
already calculated to be the minimum’.
112
 There was, DCAS asserted, no ‘easy 3
rd
 
way out’ and nor could the CCS fall back on the hope that the Mediterranean bomber 
force could materially alter the calculus.
113
 Portal was clearly much more taken by 
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this contribution than the one of Inglis, writing in pencil on the cover note to his PS 
‘Sextant with other papers on Control of Strat Bombing’.
114
 
It was telling that he used the phrase ‘control’ of strategic bombing for it 
suggests that he saw himself very much in control and responsible for the outcome of 
the campaign. In the primary sources this is one of the few indications of what Portal 
actually saw himself as being. Earlier Portal had received information from Field 
Marshal Dill that the Americans could be expected at the SEXTANT Conference to 
‘demand the right to unify their own bomber forces and possibly place them under the 
Supreme Commander for OVERLORD. Portal tasked DCAS ‘to prepare, if necessary 
in unofficial collaboration with General Eaker (who must on no account be quoted), a 
note setting forth the disadvantages of the proposed arrangement as we see them’.
115
 
This was not the first time that the matter of overall control had been raised for on 22 
April 1943 Arnold in thanking Portal for his support of the Eaker Plan commended 
that: 
It occurs to me that the time has arrived for the establishment of 
somewhat more formalised machinery for the closes possible co-ordination, or 
rather, integration, of the two bomber efforts. The increasing complexity of 
their operations would appear to me as soon to be beyond the capabilities of 
the commanders, in person, to co-ordinate. Some ‘pick and shovel’ men, 
organized and functioning constantly, would seem to me from this distance, to 
be necessary for the maintenance of continuity in all the many details relating 
to the combined effort. These men would require frequent guidance from the 
responsible commanders, sitting as a committee. 
I would suggest that consideration be given to the establishment of a 
permanent co-ordinating body on the policy level, which would include 
representatives appointed by you and Eaker and on the operations levelled 
appointed by Harris, Longfellow, Leigh-Mallory and Hunter.
116
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Over the summer the process of control had remained a network of co-
ordinating committees reporting to Portal who reported to the CCS, in effect a mirror 
of the Hankey System for the MAF extended to the Eighth Air Force but crucially 
including many of their senior staff to build trust and co-operation and exploit their 
knowledge and expertise. DCAS’s response addressed the matter under two headings, 
the unification of command, and the control of US Strategic Air Forces by the 
Supreme Commander of OVERLORD, who at the time had not been selected. He 
began discussing the ‘Unification of Command’ by highlighting that the subject had 
already been carefully examined in the wake of Arnold proposal that a ‘Supreme Air 
Commander should be appointed to co-ordinate the activities of the Strategic Air 
Forces, both British and American operating from this country and from the 
Mediterranean theatre’. It was thought that it would be impossible for a SAC located 
in either the UK or Mediterranean to be in effective contact with the forces in the 
other theatre, and that the weather variations between the two theatres would make 
effective co-ordination difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, the strategic forces in 
the Mediterranean were an essential part of the armoury of the Theatre Commander, 
thus interposing a SAC would be of little benefit and potential disruption. These 
arguments mirrored the RAF experience with control of the MAF and control through 
empowered Air Cs-in-C of the overseas commands. AS DCAS pointed out: 
These arguments apply with just as much force to unification of 
command of the US Strategical Air Forces as they do to that of Allied Air 
Forces. If the arguments in the Paper sent to General Arnold by CAS on 27 
October, 1943, are accepted by the Americans in their application to both the 
US Bomber Forces and our own, they must accept them in their application to 
their own VIIIth and XVth Air Forces.
 117
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On the matter of the US forces being placed under the authority of the Supreme 
Commander for OVERLORD, DCAS was unequivocal: 
Although the US and British strategic bomber forces will undoubtedly 
be called upon to give a large measure of direct support to the OVERLORD 
operations, and indeed may for a certain period be employed exclusively in 




He concluded that the best means of exercising flexible control was through 
the extant procedures under the CAS, and that any allocation of the bomber forces to 
OVERLORD must be through the Air C-in-C AEAF under the terms of a clear 
directive from the COS.
119
 
Huston highlighted that the motivation behind Arnold’s proposal was both 
operational and institutional.
120
 Operationally Arnold wanted to link and oversee the 
operations of both the USAAF Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces with a single 
commander. Institutionally, ‘Arnold had desired a single commander for all bombers’ 
who was free of the ‘control by a non-aviator theatre commander’ and who operated 
‘directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff’.
121
 Of course for the CBO Arnold had 
this arrangement already in the wake of Casablanca, but the single air commander was 
British and Arnold’s ‘Anglophobia was still alive’.
122
 Arnold hoped that the American 
air commander would be based in London, with access to the British intelligence 
network and communications facilities, and with rank equivalence to the theatre 
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commander. Huston commented that success for such a ‘command would enhance 
Arnold’s post-war goal of a separate Air Force’.
123
 
En route to the SEXTANT Conference in Cairo aboard the USS Iowa, the JCS 
‘determined that they would attempt to secure approval of a US Strategic Air 
Command’.
124
 At the Fifth Meeting of the CCS in Cairo on 6 December 1943, the 
Allies agreed that the USAAF Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces should come under a 
unitary command which would eventually be called US Strategic Air Forces 
(USSTAF) which would be established with Spaatz in command on 1 January 
1944.
125
 With this the nature of Portal’s role as the executive agent of the CCS for the 
CBO changed, although, Spaatz was to prove himself a co-operative commander and 
Doolittle, who replaced the highly regarded Eaker also on 1 January 1944, would 
rapidly be seen as an excellent ally and air commander. The operational challenge for 
Portal in the first months of 1944 was to address the concerns raised by Inglis and 
ensure the outcome of POINTBLANK delivered by 1 April 1944, namely, a 
sufficiently favourable air situation as to permit the launching of OVERLORD by the 
newly appointed Supreme Commander Eisenhower. 
On 6 December 1943 at the 5
th
 SEXTANT Meeting between the CCS and the 
President and PM, Portal had outlined the progress made by POINTBLANK and 
asked the CCS to address the alternatives posed by Bottomley in his memorandum of 
11 November 1943.
126
 The CCS decided that the plan for the CBO should remain 
unchanged and that reinforcement of the Eighth Air Force in the UK should have the 
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 Portal’s advocacy was critical in keeping the CBO on track and 
free from serious disruption and reassignment. As the correspondence of early 
November showed there was at the time very little reason to be confident that matters 
would turn out for the better. But as the executive agent he had maintained the aim in 
the face of equivocal opinion and evidence, for as hindsight now reveals, the balance 
of advantage was about to shift in favour of the Allies. The deployment in significant 
numbers of a true long range escort fighter, namely the Merlin engine P-51 Mustang 
equipped with range extending drop tanks, provided the catalyst that transformed the 
Eighth and Fifteenth Air Force capability.
128
 This aircraft when combined with the 
existing P-47 Thunderbolt and P-38 Lightning in a more efficient relay escort tactic 
would enable the VIII Fighter Command to wreak havoc among the GAF fighter 
force. An additional stimulus were the command changes instigated by Arnold to re-
invigorate the daylight campaign and shift the focus of the fighters away from bomber 
defence to attacking the enemy fighter force in the air and on the ground.
129
 
Whilst these changes were underway, Portal was engaged in an exchange of 
correspondence with Harris.
130
 The eventual outcome was that on 14 January 1944 the 
Air Ministry issued Harris with a new Directive focussing on a strategy of destroying 
‘selected key industries’ of which the ball-bearing plant at Schweinfurt was one.
131
 
The Directive was blunt, for persuasion with Harris had by that time failed: 
It is confirmed and emphasized that the closest co-ordination is 
essential to the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive and 
that without it, the reduction of the German fighter strength which is a 
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prerequisite to the launching of ‘Overlord’ as well as the effective conduct of 
‘Pointblank’ may not be achieved in the time available.
132
 
Having made clear his direction to his MAF subordinate at Bomber Command, Portal 
then issued clarification to the three senior airmen responsible for the execution of 
POINTBLANK as the CCS ‘Executive Agent’ on 28 January 1944.
133
 Portal stated 
that: 
It has been decided that to ensure best possible use of short time before 
‘OVERLORD’ maximum effort of strategic bomber forces is to be 
concentrated upon key installations in the German fighter aircraft industry and 




He then listed targets for Eighth Air Force covering fighter aircraft and ball-bearing 
plants, before detailing Bomber Command to attack Schweinfurt, Leipzig, Brunswick, 
Regensburg, Augsburg, and Gotha, all of which contained aircraft industry targets. 
This note was followed up on 17 February 1944 with a new Air Ministry Directive to 
Bomber Command which stated that the Primary Objective of Bomber Command was 
the attack of targets supporting the GAF, especially those concerned with single or 
twin engine aircraft production. The Directive stated the Concept was the: 
Overall reduction of German air combat strength in the factories, on 
the ground and in the air through mutually supporting attacks by both strategic 
air forces pursued with relentless determination against same target areas or 
systems so far as tactical conditions allow, in order to create the air situation 




The result of these directives and the arrival of new capability and increased 
resource allowed the Allies to mount an overwhelming anti-GAF campaign. Under 
the codename Operation ARGUMENT, but known colloquially as Big Week, the 
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attack began with a 730 aircraft raid by Bomber Command on 19/20 February 1944 
against the Messerschmitt factory at Leipzig.
136
 Over the coming week the Eighth and 
Fifteenth Air Forces would mount daylight missions from the UK and Italy, and 
Bomber Command would attack complimentary areas by night. Indeed, Harris 
mounted seven night raids, four with the main force of heavy bombers and three with 
the light night striking force of Mosquitoes, against aircraft installations that were 
then struck by the Americans. By the time Bomber Command aircraft had returned 
from their final attack on Augsburg the GAF fighter force was not destroyed, but over 
the coming months it would decline at such a rate and across such a widespread area 




The Essence of the Portal System 
Determining Factors.  This chapter has looked at Portal’s role as the CCS ‘Executive 
Agent’ for the CBO in terms of his involvement in the planning, resourcing, 
analysing, controlling and executing the POINTBLANK plan. It has explored the 
primary source material to show how engaged Portal was in this role and how critical 
he was to the maintenance of support among the CCS and the steadfastness of their 
approach that saw the campaign through the very difficult period in the late autumn 
and winter of 1943/44. In retrospect, it is clear that although the Casablanca Directive 
was ‘a classic example of pragmatic compromise at the strategic level’ Portal’s 
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performance in seeing his way through the resulting uncertainty was admirable.
138
 
Indeed, it is difficult to identify any other single figure, and supporting staff, who 
could have aligned the MAF, integrated the USAAF in the UK, retained the 
confidence of the CCS, the President and PM, and held off the demands and pressures 
from a man of the stature and forcefulness of Arnold, whilst simultaneously presiding 
over a structure of international military and civilian stakeholders who were grappling 
with a problem that had never previously been solved, namely how to gain and sustain 
air superiority over an enemy air force on a continental scale and to such an extent 
that the enemy’s industrial capacity could not address the shortfall, and the enemy’s 
air force could not interfere with the largest planned amphibious landing in military 
history. When cast in those terms, Portal’s achievement was great and resulted from 
both his personality and his recent command experience. 
By D-Day the RAF had created a high command method in the UK that had 
evolved considerably from the one envisaged under the Hankey System. Various 
factors shaped these changes particularly the demands of war; the experience and 
approach of the commanders; and the quality and availability of the frontline 
equipment. New capabilities altered the calculus of operations and allowed, through 
multi-role capability, the emergence of the tactical self-sufficiency that the RAF had 
abhorred so strongly in the RN.
139
 Significantly, Portal’s entire senior command team 
had changed in the space of just over seven months
140
. Such a comprehensive change 
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in the higher command of any service at war has few parallels and the fact that it has 
not been studied more is an obvious shortfall, perhaps due to the continual historical 
focus on events at the front.
141
 Eight days after Joubert took command of Coastal 
Command Germany invaded the Soviet Union and the strategic demands on British 
forces changed significantly.
142
 That complexity grew when Japan attacked Pearl 
Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States. The demands of coalition 
warfare meant that the RAF’s activity had to have wider impact for it to contribute to 
the successful outcome of an ever widening global war. These complicated pressures 
demanded a mature response and Portal rose to the occasion co-ordinating and 
advocating the RAF’s response in mid-1941, and playing a key role with the COS and 
the PM.  
The period 1941-42 saw a strengthening of the CAS and Air Staff Hankey 
System role coordinating the activities of the Command. The hand of Freeman can be 
detected in much of this despite the fact that operations were not a mainstream 
element of his duties.
143
 Freeman was never a man to allow his official terms of 
reference to restrain him when he felt matters needed to be addressed.
144
 His office 
was separated by a single green baize door from Portal’s and as Dean recorded that 
close proximity was of great benefit in the smooth running of the RAF, especially for 
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Portal whose trust in Freeman was peerless.
145
 This was also a period in which Portal 
was repeatedly called upon to defend the reputation and structure of his Service. 
The Butt Report of August 1941 shook confidence in the effectiveness of 
Bomber Command and by inference the raison d’etre of the RAF.
146
 Likewise, the 
curtailment of Bomber and Fighter Commands following heavy losses in the early 
winter of 1941 also undermined political and inter-service confidence. Demands for 
bespoke air solutions by the RN for Coastal Command, and the Army for a separate 
Army Air Force, were effectively calls for the dismantling of the RAF as a separate 
service.
147
 Failure to draw German forces from the east and gain an enduring level of 
air superiority over Northern France again illustrated that while the RAF was very 
active it was achieving little of strategic importance.
148
 On the other hand, over 
Dieppe on 19 August 1942 the RAF did deliver its operational mission and was 
wholeheartedly congratulated by both the Army and RN for its ‘faultless air support’ 
and gained perspective on air superiority over an invasion beachhead that was to have 
a significant effect on its future thinking.
 149
 Efforts by Bomber Command to 
demonstrate its relevance, such as Operation MILLENNIUM, the 1000 bomber raid 
against Cologne, further shaped thinking and established enduring perspectives.
 150
 
This coupled with the immense overseas pressures in the Mediterranean and the Far 
East, Portal’s responsibility was vastly greater in scale and complexity than had been 
the case for Newall, or perhaps envisaged by Ellington. Moreover, Portal led the 
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organization that was emerging as the key element for operational success, and air 
superiority and air attack were beginning to be seen as the essential pre-requisites for 
success on land and at sea.
151
 The demands on his assets seemed to know no limits 
and their flexibility demanded an efficiency of management and operations that was 
second to none. 
It was not surprising; therefore, that Portal was not inclined to tamper with the 
higher command processes he had inherited. In this he was supported by Freeman 
who was keen to play his part in the primacy of Air Staff authority under the Hankey 
System.
152
 Freeman’s dispute with Harris over the armouring of Lancasters and a 
return to more accurate daylight operations, were both concerned with exploiting the 
full potential of the available aircraft.
153
 As was his long-running debate with Portal 
on the focus of bombing policy.
 154
 In all these matters no final conclusion was 
reached but it illustrated the willingness of the RAF’s highest commanders to debate 
and reconsider ‘established’ decisions. When Freeman left the Air Staff to return to 
the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) as its Chief Executive in October 1942, his 
departure removed a strong counterbalance to the Cs-in-C and a powerful advocate 
for the emerging views of the battle experienced Air Staff in their dealings with the 
Commands.
 155
 Given the original role for the Air Staff to control the strategy of the 
air, Freeman’s departure was a significant event.
156
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The Growth to Multi-Functional Commands.  By 1943 the MAF commands had 
developed a level of multi-functionalism through a combination of higher command 
decision, re-equipment, scientific advance, and campaign imperatives. To achieve the 
goals established at Casablanca, namely the creation of the CBO as an immediate 
Second Front, the gaining of maritime supremacy in the Atlantic to enable BOLERO 
and SICKLE, the build-up of US ground and air forces in the UK, and the broad 
commitment to a cross-Channel invasion in 1944, the MAF commands had to be 
deeply involved.
157
 Bomber Command had to continue its night offensive, Coastal 
Command faced an ever growing and important role in the Battle of the Atlantic, and 
Fighter Command had to develop concepts and plan for the creation of an Allied 
expeditionary tactical air force. To achieve this there were two broad but not 
completely mutually exclusive options. On the one hand, Portal could continue with 
centralized co-ordination of the increasingly multi-functional commands. Or, on the 
other hand, he could develop a more flexible system that preserved central 
responsibility but enabled decentralised authority and created greater self-sufficiency 
based on increased aircraft capability and greater availability brought about through 
improving industrial output.  
Coastal Command had transitioned far from a ‘Cinderella’ command fitted 
with obsolete and inadequate aircraft to an organization equipped with long range 
bombers, torpedo bombers, long range escort fighters, long range and long endurance 
reconnaissance aircraft, and a command and intelligence structure designed to support 
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the Admiralty led Battle of the Atlantic.
 158
 By 1943, Coastal Command was able to 
conduct semi-autonomous operations with limited support from the other RAF 
Commands.
159
 Under Slessor’s leadership, as a semi-independent force emerged 
rather than the mono-functional sub element of a larger air force requiring constant 
central co-ordination.
 160
 This multi-functional Coastal Command was able to play an 
equal part alongside its Bomber Command and Fighter Command units in the 
growing multi-functionality co-ordinated air war that was developing.
161
 
In parallel, Fighter Command was able to conduct attack operations that would 
complement its growing offensive fighter role and fighter capability to increase the 
range of escort for medium bomber and reconnaissance operations.
162
 Together these 
activities defined the roles and missions of a tactical air force, and matched the 
experience that had emerged from the Desert Air Force in North Africa.
163
 And it was 
in the direction of a tactical air force that Fighter Command had been developing 
since the decision to ‘lean towards France’ had been taken in late 1940. By 1943 
Fighter Command was equipped with excellent, but still short range, fighters, 
powerful fighter bombers, twin engine night fighters and Intruder fighters, specialist 
reconnaissance aircraft, and had access and in time control of medium bomber 
aircraft.
 164
 Developments in command and control systems allowed for effective 
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expeditionary command, and Exercise SPARTAN developed air-land co-operation 
techniques which would be further developed in the months leading up to D-Day.
165
 
On top of this, the establishment at C-in-C Fighter Command’s initiative of a 
Combined Operations Planning Committee (COPC) brought together Fighter 
Command and Eighth Air Force to plan and enable the escort of Eighth Air Force 
Bomber Command operations by Fighter Command fighter escorts.
 166
 
Finally, Bomber Command had also established the foundations of multi-
functional capability through the creation on 8 November 1943 of No 100 Group to 
oversee the development and operation of all the Commands operational support 
capability.
167
 Night Intruder squadrons were transferred from Fighter Command to 
give Bomber Command organic night offensive fighter capability.
168
 And scientific 
developments to improve navigation and bomb aiming further enhanced the capability 
of the Command.
169
 The Air Staff also allocated some of the Mosquito night fighter 
support Harris requested and also ensured that Fighter Command provided robust a 
escort capability during the daylight operations that were increasingly a feature of 
operations in 1944.
170
 Finally, the contribution of electronic capabilities to jam and 
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spoof the GAF defence forces was also a significant contribution to the multi-
functionality and self-sufficiency of Bomber Command.
171
 
By late 1943 the 3 RAF commands were all multi-functional in their capability 
and their Cs-in-C were all combining mono-functional capability into multi-functional 
effect; effectively the SACs envisaged by Ellington. By taking advantage of the 
production superiority of the Allies and relaxing the organizational precepts that had 
previously defined the MAF Commands, Portal and the Air Staff created a higher 
command system that allowed him to balance his widespread responsibilities as CAS, 
British COS, and Allied CCS with the role of SAC allocated to him under CID 1425-
B. This emergence of a multi-functional command structure for the MAF less than 
eight years after the creation of the mono-functional commands was a remarkable 
transition and one that has not been properly emphasised in the literature. Its 
recognition casts a new light on the command and conduct of RAF operations, 
particularly the CBO and the operations for OVERLORD and beyond. 
This multi-functional transition was aided from a variety of sources. The Cs-
in-C wanted greater control over essential assets. The Air Staff concerned, for 
example, with bombing efficiency demanded the creation of the Pathfinders.
172
 And 
the frontline developed tactics, such as the Master Bomber technique of real time 
airborne control.
173
Further removed, scientists and industry developed electronic 
support systems, and the two great oversights of the pre-war era, navigation and bomb 
aiming, were eventually addressed by the development of airborne air to ground radar 
sets that allowed for both accurate navigation in all weathers and the bombing of 
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targets through clouds and smoke, thus in large measure freeing Bomber Command of 




Throughout this transitional period Portal maintained close and harmonious 
working relations with his Cs-in-C and senior staff. The presence of Freeman 
undoubtedly, as Portal intended when he demanded his appointment, helped oil the 
machinery of higher command and Freeman was very active in the debates over the 
Pathfinders and the introduction and development of both the Mosquito and the 
Merlin-engined Mustang.
175
 However, Portal’s approach was neither passive nor 
unsophisticated, and he was content to adopt various solutions to similar problems. He 
was not, for example, initially minded to allow for the dispersed allocation of fighter 
aircraft to Bomber Command.
176
 But he was amenable to requests to develop long 
range twin engine fighter escorts within Coastal Command.
177
 He was determined to 
create the Pathfinders and encouraged the development of Fighter Command into an 
expeditionary tactical air force in advance of D-Day.
178
 In this way, he acted as both 
stimulant and restraint on the multi-functional development of the RAF’s command 
structure. Throughout he appears to have been guided by the need to develop the 
Service and to provision it to meet the ever growing range of tasks demanded by the 
increasingly complex operational situation. Portal’s correspondence with Tedder 
shows clearly the close attention he played to the development of capability and 
tactics in the other operational theatres that would inform the planning stages of the 
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work being undertaken in London.
179
 In this way he behaved exactly as he should as 
the strategic head of the RAF, but it was still a notable achievement. 
Despite Portal’s somewhat insular nature and restrained self-confidence, 
assuming command of the RAF over the heads of many more senior in both 
experience and age, and serving one of the most demanding Prime Ministers in British 
history, cannot have been an easy task.
180
 It would have been only natural for him to 
be cautious at first, as indeed he was. Only later did he sanction developments in the 
command process and enable the growing multi-functional structure. Thus Portal 
grew into the role of organizational reformer in tune with his gaining confidence with 
his senior commanders and staff and his growing experience and standing as a key 
member of the COS.
181
 At the heart of this nuanced perspective was the interplay of 
the political and the operational. It was the boundary that the COS occupied and it 
defined their special role and unique contribution to their respective Services.
182
 As 
the war progressed, and Portal gained in both confidence and responsibility, did his 
perspective shift? 
It was clear in his handling of the CBO that he was as much motivated by the 
operational demands of the campaign as he was by its political goals. Portal had in 
mind, at all times, the political consequences of the RAF’s activity. Portal remained 
more distant from the day-to-day aspects of MAF operations than Newall. However, 
this must have been influenced by the vastly increased complexity that Portal faced.
183
 
This, coupled with the demonstrated strength and developing talent within the RAF’s 
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senior officers, created a situation in which Portal was able to devote the necessary 
close attention he clearly gave to his COS and CCS duties. 
Portal was consumed with the vital work of the British COS and Allied CCS 
for much of his time. During 1943 he attended six major CCS Conferences which 
required him to be away from Whitehall for several months. Throughout, Portal 
played a key role in the most senior direction of the global war as well as being 
responsible for the executive oversight of the CBO. It is also obvious from the way he 
conducted himself among the CCS that he was convinced, as was the PM, that the 
maintenance of Alliance cohesion was a higher priority than parochial air power 
matters, such as his advocacy of allowing the Eighth Air Force to test its daylight 




The statesmanlike approach that Portal developed, and many of his 
contemporaries admired, was central to his willingness to loosen the command reins 
held by the Air Staff over the Cs-in-C. Once his Commands had developed to the 
point where they were capable of ‘independent’ action, Portal appeared to be content 
for his commanders to exercise the freedom of command over the multi-functional 
forces that he had been responsible for providing.
 185
 A combination of the capability 
and the capacity allowed the creation of the multi-functional forces, whilst the 
confidence, borne of experience, to devolve authority to the Cs-in-C to command 
these forces was coupled with a sophisticated understanding that effect of the RAF 
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had to be harmonious with the political short, medium and long term goals. 
Qualitative improvements created multi-functional flexibility that when coupled with 
excellent training, provided a route to operational self-sufficiency that had been 
impossible earlier in the war. Once the quality was available in sufficient quantity 
then the need for central co-ordination of scarce valuable resources eased, and the 
way was free for the loosening of central control and the growth of the ‘C-in-C as 
SAC’ of their increasingly multi-functional self-contained commands. Portal was at 
the heart of these developments and the resulting command process that emerged was 
sufficiently different to the one Hankey envisioned that it deserves to be identified as 
the Portal System, the sophisticated process through which the MAF was commanded 
during the last two years of the war and which allowed the CAS to shoulder the 
enormous load he faced and still remain in control of the RAF in the UK and 
overseas. 
It is important to recognise that Portal did not attempt to resurrect Ellington’s 
SAC concept. He preferred an adapted form of higher command and one that was 
much more in tune with the realities of the time. On 2 March 1942 the PM had asked 
the COS for their views on the ‘Appointment of Supreme Commanders’, stating that 
he was ‘increasingly impressed with the disadvantages of the present system’ and that 
it ‘seems to me that we should move in the direction of appointing Supreme 
Commander in particular areas and for special tasks’.
186
 Portal’s views are revealing 
for they are the only source to offer his perspective on higher command. He was clear: 
I very much doubt whether any of our failures in this war can be fairly 
attributed to the present systems of command or planning. 
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I think they can mostly be accounted for by the inadequacy or 
insufficiency of the forces, equipment and shipping available. 
I of course agree that the offensive spirit is vital, but I think it will 
show itself both in planning and in the field as soon as the forces and 




He continued addressing the specific issue of Supreme Command: 
I maintain that the authority of the supreme commander must be 
exercised only in the fields of strategy and broad administrative policy, and 
that he must on no account attempt the tactical control of the forces under his 
command. This must at all levels be exercised by the respective commanders 
of the Services acting in closets co-operation with one another; their ability to 
do this has been proved.
188
 
This insight into Portal’s thinking reflects the manner in which he acted as the 
‘Executive Agent’ for the CBO, the way in which he nurtured, developed and 
empowered the Cs-in-C of the MAF, and the role he played as a member of both the 
COS and CCS Committees. Although he would undoubtedly have abhorred the 
suggestion, he acted entirely in tune with his views of the duties of a Supreme 
Commander. 
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This study set out to examine the efficacy of the RAF’s organisational changes 
of the 1930s when tested by the wartime conditions of 1939-1945. Review of the 
primary sources uncovered two important aspects of the RAF’s inter-war 
development. First, the forgotten review and reform of the Air Ministry in 1934 and 
secondly, the barely mentioned plans for the establishment of an overarching C-in-C 
to co-ordinate the actions of the RAF’s mono-functional MAF. These re-discovered 
aspects coupled with the well-recorded but mal-attributed Command restructuring of 
1936 set the scene for the command of the RAF during the Second World War. 
Unfortunately, little attention has been given to the higher command of the Service at 
the level of the CAS and the Air Ministry. This was a critical level for it set the 
operational direction and purpose of the MAF by translating the policy decisions of 
the War Cabinet and later the CCS into directives and orders. Without this guiding 
influence the frontline’s actions would have amounted to little more than courageous, 
exciting, but uncoordinated and incoherent activity falling way short of strategic 
achievement. 
Peacetime Preparation 
A common theme runs through the Air Ministry Review of 1934, the 
Command re-structuring of 1936, and the SAC Debate of 1937. That theme was the 
need to move the focus of the RAF away from the Phases of institutional survival and 
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development identified by Brooke-Popham onto a fourth Phase concentrating on its 
real function, the preparation for war.
1
 Likewise, Ellington’s memorandum that 
initiated the re-organisation of the commands was motivated clearly by the need to 
organise in peacetime as it was expected the RAF would fight in war.
2
 Finally, the 
RAF’s proposal to establish a SAC to oversee operations was also to meet perceived 
operational need, with Ellington stating unequivocally that he intended in time of war 
to introduce Brooke-Popham into the command chain to oversee the activities of 
Bomber Command and Fighter Command.
3
 The view that the 1936 command 
restructuring was to address the management of expansion simply does not accord 
with the contemporary record in the primary sources. 
The Air Ministry review addressed the needs of growing a coherent force, 
establishing a secure operating base within the UK and the co-ordinated training and 
development of the frontline. It also addressed the chronic shortfall in manpower, not 
by the creation of larger staff, but by the establishing of the need for greater staff that 
would inevitably develop over time. By winning this argument in 1934 the RAF was 
able to expand its staff capability over the coming years with the grudging but 
positive agreement of the Treasury and other government bodies. This achievement 
alone went a considerable way to delivering the air staff envisaged by Smuts in 1917 
as being capable of developing air strategy and conducting air operations on a par 
with its counterparts in the Admiralty and War Office. Ellington’s insistence on 
retaining the works department and unit training direction within the Air Ministry 
ensured the close control of two vital aspects of any air force’s capability, namely 
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effective and secure operational bases and co-ordinated and common training 
standards that would allow co-ordinated and effective operations to be centrally 
directed by the Air Ministry. The re-structured arrangement in the areas of operations, 
intelligence and staff duties and organization all contributed to the creation of a 
system not aimed at the command of the RAF of 1934 but of a future RAF of much 
greater size and equipped with much more capable aircraft facing the challenge of a 
major European war against Germany. 
Likewise, in the 1936, Ellington was clear that the purpose of reform was the 
establishment of greater operational capability and the potential for better operational 
development. This was reinforced by his attempts to establish the post of SAC in the 
last days of his tenure as CAS. This was the thinking of an operationally aware 
commander, something very few have given Ellington credit for being. He was 
content for the frontline to focus of developing its capability under the headings of 
offence for Bomber Command, defence for Fighter Command and maritime co-
operation for Coastal Command, but when war came, he expected that the demands 
would not fall so simplistically into these narrowly defined stovepipes, hence his 
perceived need for a ‘super air c-in-c’ to oversee the whole. This conclusion has not 
been emphasised in previous studies and it points to an Air Staff with a much clearer 
view of what was needed for the RAF to fight the forthcoming war. 
Wartime Adaptation 
The process encapsulated in CID 1425-B required the RAF to be centrally co-
ordinated by the CAS and Air Staff to achieve the desires of the War Cabinet. It was 
an entirely logical approach and one that had the benefit of having gained credibility 
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in the First World War. It suited the RN and the British Army whose frontline assets, 
once allocated to a particular mission or task were virtually fixed in that endeavour 
until completion. Neither the RN nor the British Army was faced with the possibility 
that political or inter-service operational demands could be exercised on their 
frontline forces on a day to day or even hour to hour basis. Neither force possessed 
the inherent flexibility and adaptability borne of the speed of movement and multi-
role capability that the RAF possessed even with the aircraft of 1939. In reality the 
RAF, in striving for consensus and compromise in the SAC debate of 1937, had 
achieved much but left unresolved the critical aspect of the effective command system 
they required for war. In retrospect, several of the command adaptation during Second 
World War came from this root cause. 
The first concerned the changes under Newall in which he employed Joubert 
as his advisor to oversee co-ordination of RAF assets in the North Sea operations in a 
manner very similar to the one envisaged for a SAC. The second major change 
resulted from Army pressure for more air support and greater authority over deployed 
air assets in France. Here Newall, under COS direction, established BAFF under 
Barratt to centralise the command and control of all RAF units in France to provide 
Gort with an air point of contact more in tune with the methods and procedures of the 
Army. Finally, Newall created the ad hoc SAC appointment of Blount at Back Violet 
HQ Hawkinge during the Dunkirk evacuation to co-ordinate all MAF support. These 
changes were brought about by a variety of factors but two were overriding: shortfalls 
in capability and inadequate availability of assets. 
Newall’s RAF had mono-functional aircraft and a frontline strength that was 
woefully inadequate to address the demands made upon it. He was faced with the 
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unenviable task of transitioning from the theories and investments of peacetime to the 
realties and demands of war. Apart from the increasing production of established 
types and the replacement of outmoded platforms, Newall benefitted from no 
transformative frontline improvements. His adaptations to the system of higher 
command and control addressed the shortfalls in CID 1425-B amid the emergence of 
wartime reality. 
Newall’s final adaptation was not an adaptation at all but the oversight of the 
system of command envisaged in CID 1425-B, but it was possible through an 
undesired circumstance; the collapse of France and the eviction of the BEF from the 
Continent. Against this background Newall had to confront the command 
requirements for a strategic battle of survival which unexpectedly would fall 
predominantly upon the RAF. CAS and Air Staff, under the precepts of CID 1425-B 
co-ordinated the mono-functional commands of the MAF, balanced the needs of their 
sister Services, and remained alert and ready to the demands of the new PM, 
Churchill. They pushed forward development of capabilities that would in time be 
required and co-ordinated the many agencies seeking to counter the GAF night 
bombing capability. This performance during the critical summer months of 1940 was 
a solid vindication of the principles of Hankey System and a serious question mark 
over the validity of Ellington’s proposal to employ a SAC. 
But once again, in retrospect it is clear that the nature of the battle was such 
that the various commands of the MAF could undertake broadly parallel activity 
within their mono-functional discipline. Whilst Fighter Command battled the day 
offensive of the GAF, Bomber Command and Coastal Command attacked the build 
up of invasion craft, forward GAF airfields and apply a small measure of disruption to 
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German industry and transportation. Only rarely did these separate activities come 
into contact. For the vast majority of time the components of the MAF could make 
their contribution to the overall fight co-ordinated centrally by the Air Staff. But this 
was really only possible because during the Battle of Britain the needs of the battle 
coincided with the overarching priorities of the War Cabinet. The pressures that had 
previously arisen from the demands of the RN and British Army were, in the summer 
of 1940, secondary. It was not however, a situation that would last. With Newall’s 
departure and the immediate threat of invasion passed, his successor, Portal, faced a 
different set of circumstances and a different mix of factors. 
During the Battle of Britain it was clear that those who had held command 
appointments at the start of the war needed to be replaced. Echoing the popular 
opinion that ‘it never pays to be a British Chief at the outbreak of a major war’ the 
command changes were necessary to re-invigorate the structure and to ensure those 
occupying high command appointments were imbued with the same offensive spirit 
as the PM and War Cabinet.
4
 That created a situation in which Portal, along with 
Freeman as his DCAS, swiftly established within the Service the moral authority over 
his subordinates to match the positional authority he enjoyed as CAS. This 
combination gave him a powerful position and one that would allow him time to 
develop the RAF as he and his advisors saw. However, regardless of the internal 
authority he possessed he quickly faced the external challenge of Beaverbrook and the 
RN over the control of Coastal Command
5
. Having resolved that matter to his 
satisfaction by agreeing to the RN exercising operational control of the day to day 
activities of Coastal Command within a more integrated RN/RAF command structure 
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coupled with the appointment of Joubert as the next C-in-C Coastal Command, he 
faced further institutional pressure concerning the allocation of Bomber Command 
and the support given by the RAF to land support operations
6
. Had he failed to carry 
the day in either of these debates the status and future of the RAF would have been 
severely curtailed. That he was successful was due to both the fundamental strength 
and logic of the arguments he deployed and the skill with which he advocated his 
position. 
The case of the Army was narrowly focused; the RN’s case for self-
sufficiency was inefficient and readily countered through greater devolved operational 
control. Moreover, the alternatives to the continued build-up and use of Bomber 
Command were extremely limited and flew in the face of many of the arguments the 
PM had previously deployed in support of the bomber offensive. Nonetheless, all 
these debates could easily have been lost and it is of great credit to Portal, Freeman 
and the wider air staffs that they managed to emerge with their Service largely intact. 
It was in retrospect an institutional baptism of fire and test of his fitness for high 
command, and he and his colleagues emerged enhanced. But regardless of how well 
Portal was performing as CAS in 1941, little had changed in terms of capability since 
the start of the war. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 the 
strategic calculus of the war was fundamentally changed. 
The emergence of a new form of coalition warfare created a new set of 
imperatives for the UK COS. No longer were operations in North Africa aimed solely 
at the protection of the Suez Canal and access to the wider Empire. Neither was the 
Battle of the Atlantic a fight for the survival of the UK island base. And the 
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embryonic bombing campaign against Germany now took on a much wider geo-
strategic importance. All these separate campaigns now interplayed with the war 
unfolding on the Russian front. Pressure from the PM to undertake operations that 
would help ease the situation facing the Soviet forces now led to greater emphasis on 
offensive operations that could both destroy the Germans’ means of war production, 
interdict its ability to transport war materiel, and cause the retaining of forces in the 
west, or the re-deployment of forces from the east, to counter the hoped for growing 
threat in the west. This all affected the RAF and Portal’s emerging response was to 
enable the greater self-sufficiency of his increasingly trusted subordinate 
commanders. 
Thus, Douglas at Fighter Command was given greater freedom and resources 
to conduct the offensive into northern France. Joubert at Coastal Command benefitted 
from the allocation of a wider array of more multi-role aircraft to enable him to 
conduct his offensive maritime operations with less recall to his fellow commanders 
in Fighter and Bomber Commands. Only in Bomber Command did matters remain 
broadly as before, but in Bomber Command multi-role capability had yet to emerge, 
and improvements in navigation, bomb aiming, electronic protection, offensive fighter 
escort, and weapons capability, although in the pipeline of development and 
production, were still some months away from fruition.
7
 Nonetheless, the die was cast 
in 1941 for the shift of the RAF command structure from mono- to multi-
functionalism. If improvements in personal trust, institutional standing, and geo-
political imperatives set the basis for this multi-functional shift, it was the 
combination of capability, capacity and concepts that sealed the transition. 
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In 1936, the command structure was based on a concept of war that envisaged 
separate mono-functional activities centrally co-ordinated. War had demanded a more 
complex approach and events in North Africa, although largely tactical in purpose, 
were continually demonstrating the benefits of greater integration and multi-
functional co-ordination. Thus, co-ordinated fighter activity combined with fighter 
escorted bomber and maritime attack were successfully contributing to a much more 
favourable air situation which the land and maritime forces could exploit
8
. In the UK, 
the essential difference was that there was no engaged land force to exploit the 
success in the air, and the challenge in the north Atlantic was of a specialist nature 
that required a specialist solution, one that was increasingly being fielded. 
Notwithstanding, the multi-functional lessons of North Africa were compelling and 
Portal’s response was to allow the increasing multi-functioning of the MAF. In this 
unprecedented developments in capability and capacity were the key. 
The development of the US support to the UK in Second World War began 
well before the entry of the US into the war on 7 December 1941. Thereafter, despite 
arguments and disputes over priorities and geographical allocation, the productive 
capacity of the US, the wider Empire, and the increasingly secure UK main base, 
made the outcome of the production war beyond doubt. Even if all that had happened 
had been the creation of increasing stockpiles of existing weapons, it is arguable that 
even that would have been sufficient to eventually win the war. But the vast increase 
in production was matched by an impressive array of capability advances that 
changed the forces of 1939 into the war winning arms of 1944 and 45. This 
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combination of capacity and capability transformed what could be envisaged on land, 
at sea and in the air.
9
 
The improvements in the capability and the enormous increases in availability 
removed the penalty of self-sufficiency that had dominated the debate in 1936 over 
the command structure and which had underpinned the SAC debate of 1937. 
Perversely, the author of the self-sufficiency critique, Harris, was to be the beneficiary 
of the self-sufficiency reality in the form of Bomber Command in 1944/45. The 
criticism he levelled at the RN regarding self-sufficiency became the underpinning 
argument he employed to grow and develop EW capabilities, form No 100 Group and 
realise a day fighter escort force, albeit one that was not under his command. But all 
of this only happened because the industrial capacity of the Western Allies allowed 
for the enormous build up of the RAF’s frontline and the deployment of 
transformational capabilities. 
Throughout Portal’s handling of the MAF Cs-in-C was a master class in 
military statesmanship. He maintained alignment and cohesion, despite great tensions. 
He secured and maintained political support. He gained and maintained Alliance 
confidence. He supported Arnold to ensure US decisions went in favour of UK aims. 
And he allowed the MAF to breathe and innovate and the Cs-in-C to act in the role of 
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 TNA AIR 6/620 and 6/620 contain the correspondence and minutes of the Monthly Meetings Portal 
conducted with his Cs-in-C and clearly demonstrate the effort he took to communicate with and 
understand their concerns. 
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Victory and Demise 
The 1945 RAF multi-functional command structure and ‘C-in-C as SAC’ 
process did not survive the post-war drawdown. It was a consequence of the time. It 
was a contextual event whose relevance going forward was undermined by the 
reduction in capacity and the advent of the nuclear bomb which demanded highly 
centralised control and tight political oversight. But its creation was an important 
development in the air war of the Second World War and one which has not been 
properly acknowledged. That it was a contextual way point along the path of the 
RAF’s development was not the point. It shaped how the MAF conducted operations 
and therefore deserves much more study and analysis. The RAF did not re-organise in 
1936 just to accommodate the growth of the Service under the expansion schemes. It 
did not ignore the need to prepare to fight a war as the Air Ministry reorganisation 
shows. It did not fail to understand the requirements of air command as the SAC 
debate reveals. And it did not sit impassive as war revealed its true nature and the 
need for adaptation grew. In all these areas the RAF took the steps that at the time 
were the best argued and least preconceived that it could. The adaptation of its 
command structure and processes bears favourable comparison to similar 
developments in the British Army during the latter years of the First World War.
11
 
By 1944 the Hankey System of CID 1425-B was overtaken by the Portal 
System of empowered multi-functionality. This came about as a result of many 
factors: the limits of inter-command co-operation; the rightful and relevant needs for 
self-sufficiency; the unique command requirements of air power; the developments in 
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air capability; and the great advances in equipment availability. This was all coupled 
with the growth of mutual trust within and between the command chain, the positive 
and negative impact of personalities, and the overarching impact of Alliance warfare 
with its complex interplay of politics, diplomacy, and military operations. 
In 1945 Portal addressed the boys of his old school, Winchester College, 
stating that his job as a COS in war was ‘two jobs rolled into one’.
 12
 One was to 
attend to service matters such as ‘policy’ and the ‘selection of types of aircraft to 
have’. However, he had to acknowledge that he did not ‘direct actual operations’. He 
then recounted the tale of a small boy he had met who, he recalled, had ‘greeted me 
with a demand to know what job I did’: 
Did I send the bombers out? No, that was the job of the C-in-C Bomber 
Command. 
Then did I send out the fighters? No, that was the job of the C-in-C Fighter 
Command. 
Then what do you do? Well I said I sat up till 2 o’clock this morning arguing 
with the Prime Minister. 
Oh, he said, and my Mother told me you were somebody quite important.
13
 
Setting aside the forward nature of the small child, this anecdote gives a clear insight 
into Portal’s character and disposition. 
This study set out to examine the efficacy of the RAF organisational reforms 
of the 1930s when set against the challenges of the Second World War. The only fair 
conclusion is that the reforms were sound and that Portal’s conduct was of the highest 
order. He saw his role as one of high level stewardship, setting the ship of the correct 
course for others to steer in detail. He also understood he was one of the PM’s close 
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military advisors rather than a supreme operational commander. The 1930’s re-
organisations led by Salmond, Ellington and Newall, were the bedrock upon which 
wartime adaptations, driven by experience, were built. This trio of reforms needs to be 
seen as a critical factor in understanding the performance of the MAF in the Second 
World War. 
It was Portal’s stewardship of the RAF during this period that enabled the 
creation of the efficient and effective command structure that fought the last and 
critical years of the Second World War. It was far from perfect and retrospectively 
shortfalls can be identified. But in war the best is definitely the enemy of the good and 
the command structure, command practices and processes, and command cohesion 
that emerged, were a transformation from the situation in 1939. The RAF never fully 
adopted the role of SAC; events were to show that it was too simplistic for the 
complex conflict that the Second World War became. But the reforms of the 1930s of 
the Air Ministry, Command structure and higher command processes laid a solid and 
sound foundation for wartime development and adaptation. That they have never 
received adequate attention is the shortfall this study sought to right and it is hoped 
that this work will play a small part in reassessing the performance of the higher 
commanders of the RAF in the Second World War, and the importance of the close 
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